Politics
Türkiye-UK relations likely to flourish under Burnham
The “King of the North” is expanding his “kingdom” to other domains of the United Kingdom, but what can be expected from Andy Burnham, the seventh prime minister of the country in a decade, in international relations? Burnham has mainly focused on domestic issues, particularly on the economic side, since taking office on July 20, but soon he will have more on his plate in foreign affairs. Among these responsibilities are relations with Türkiye, which somewhat thrived under Keir Starmer. Experts say this momentum may very well continue under Burnham.
Professor Ozan Örmeci, a political scientist and general coordinator of the International Political Academy (UPA), points to Downing Street’s pragmatic approach to relations and believes this will carry over into the new era under Burnham, “at a time where transactionalism dominates international relations.”
“Türkiye too favors a relationship based on mutual interests and benefits, though this was not always the case in recent decades,” Örmeci told Daily Sabah. “In this context, Türkiye-U.K. relations will start out the new era strongly,” he underlined.
Relations between the two countries – which inherited the legacies of two great empires – have always been close, even when they were on opposing sides of conflicts such as World War I. Throughout the rest of the 20th century, relations seldom deteriorated, and in recent years, a new momentum has emerged, especially in terms of the economy.
“A Burnham government is unlikely to bring about a fundamental shift in U.K.-Türkiye relations,” said Hacı Mehmet Boyraz, vice chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University.
“Bilateral ties have remained stable and constructive in recent years, regardless of changes in government, reflecting a relationship that is increasingly driven by shared strategic and economic interests rather than partisan politics. While a Labour government may differ from its Conservative predecessors on certain foreign policy issues, continuity is likely to outweigh change in its approach toward Türkiye,” Boyraz told Daily Sabah.
Under Keir Starmer, relations remained close and strategic, particularly in defense, security, trade and regional diplomacy. This was especially evident in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and growing tensions in the Middle East, as both countries are important NATO allies. Without a major shift on Burnham’s part, this trend may very well continue.
The highlights of the Starmer era were efforts to upgrade the post-Brexit free trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries and the signing of the Strategic Partnership Document last April. There was also the deal to acquire Eurofighter Typhoon jets. Last year, the two countries signed a multibillion-dollar agreement for the acquisition of the jets – “a new symbol of the strategic relationship between us as two close allies,” as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said following the signing of the deal during a visit by Starmer to Ankara in 2025.
As Burnham aims for several major economic changes in his country, especially through “re-industrialization” plans, extra funds will come in handy. “Eurofighter sales can do this, and this will be a positive development for the U.K. economy,” Örmeci highlighted.
Boyraz says defense cooperation is an area with “considerable untapped potential.”
“Although the possible sale of Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft has attracted significant attention, bilateral defense relations should not be viewed solely through the prism of a single procurement project. The United Kingdom possesses one of Europe’s most advanced defense-industrial bases, while Türkiye has emerged as one of the fastest-growing defense producers in recent years through substantial investments in indigenous capabilities. These complementary strengths create opportunities for a broader strategic partnership based on technology transfer, joint production, research and development, and cooperation in next-generation defense technologies,” Boyraz said. “Such cooperation would not only generate mutual economic benefits but also contribute to NATO’s long-term defense capabilities. For this reason, the momentum established under the Starmer government is likely to continue under Burnham, and there is even scope for further deepening bilateral defense-industrial cooperation.”
“Burnham showed particular success in the local elections, working a small-scale miracle in Manchester. He turned Manchester into the fastest-growing city not just in England, but in the entire United Kingdom. But of course, this took time; he didn’t achieve it in just a year or two. He has reasonable proposals to revitalize the economy, but these are mostly tailored to domestic politics. That is to say, I don’t think he has a particularly visionary project regarding relations with Türkiye or Britain’s role in the world. He is more likely to maintain existing policies,” Örmeci stated.
He underlined that the government’s main focus would naturally be the economy. “In this context, they may seek closer relations with the European Union, try to align with the Trump administration in the U.S. – perhaps without angering Trump – and revive Chinese investments. In fact, Chinese investment was at the heart of the Conservative Party’s economic success during the David Cameron era, and he may try to bring that back to life,” he said.
In this context, the modernization of the FTA is expected to remain the most important item on the bilateral agenda, according to Boyraz.
“Although the existing agreement has provided a solid foundation for bilateral trade, it no longer reflects the evolving nature of the two economies. Expanding its scope to include services, digital trade, investment and other high-value sectors would create significant economic opportunities for both countries. More importantly, the post-Brexit environment has encouraged the United Kingdom to pursue a more pragmatic and interest-driven external economic policy. Freed from the constraints of the EU’s common commercial policy, London has sought to strengthen partnerships with countries that offer strategic and economic value. In this regard, Türkiye occupies a unique position due to its large market, dynamic economy, strategic geography, and growing regional influence. Moreover, unlike many of the U.K.’s other international partnerships, relations with Türkiye are characterized by relatively few structural disputes, providing a favorable environment for further economic integration,” Boyraz emphasized.
Türkiye’s bilateral trade volume with the United Kingdom increased from $18.9 billion in 2023 to $24 billion in 2025, according to official figures. Services trade, meanwhile, reached approximately $8 billion. Trade Minister Ömer Bolat noted at a recent meeting with outgoing U.K. Ambassador Jill Morris that the U.K.’s direct investment in Türkiye rose to $15.2 billion from $9.5 billion in the same period.
“At the political level, a Burnham government may adopt a somewhat different tone from previous Conservative administrations, particularly on issues such as human rights and the Middle East. However, these differences are unlikely to redefine the overall trajectory of U.K.-Türkiye relations. The structural foundations of the relationship – economic interdependence, NATO membership, defense cooperation, and shared geopolitical interests – remain sufficiently strong to sustain a pragmatic and strategically oriented partnership. Rather than marking a new departure, a Burnham premiership would most likely reinforce the existing trajectory of bilateral relations while seeking to capitalize on the opportunities created by the post-Brexit environment,” Boyraz said.
“We can argue that the United Kingdom has served as Türkiye’s most strategic Western partner, helping maintain Ankara’s Western anchor at times when its relations with the United States and the European Union have faced difficulties,” Örmeci notes, offering an in-depth look into the history of relations. “This has been the case at times even during the Cold War,” he underlined.
Örmeci points out that Turkish-U.K. friendship can best be exemplified by the era of Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher, two prime ministers who shared similar economic views. “It is safe to say that although it has not been the primary partner in terms of economy, politics, and security, the U.K. has always viewed Türkiye as a strategically important country and a practical ally, especially in times of crisis,” Örmeci said.
Such a crisis may unfold between Burnham and U.S. President Trump. Although Trump was more than relieved to see Starmer leave, Burnham appears more cautious in his approach to the United States. Türkiye similarly had its share of problems with the United States, though this appears to be changing in Trump’s second term, as was evident during the U.S. president’s recent visit to Ankara for the NATO summit.
Örmeci also highlights the strategic framework agreement signed between the two countries, adding that although its contents are not fully public, it is a clear indication that both nations are willing to preserve their alliance over the short and long term.
Differences in foreign policy
As two strong diplomatic actors with much to gain or lose in today’s complex foreign policy landscape– where diplomacy is critical amid lingering conflicts – Türkiye and the U.K. pursue different approaches to foreign affairs.
“Türkiye and the United Kingdom share common interests in several areas of foreign policy, yet their approaches diverge significantly when it comes to the Middle East, particularly the war in Gaza. While both governments officially support a two-state solution, have repeatedly called for humanitarian assistance and an end to the fighting, and recognize that prolonged instability threatens regional security, their policies differ both normatively and strategically. Türkiye has consistently defended the Palestinian cause, emphasizing international law, humanitarian principles, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The United Kingdom, despite adopting a more critical tone toward Israel in recent months and announcing its intention to recognize the State of Palestine, has continued to preserve its long-standing strategic and security partnership with Israel,” Boyraz emphasized.
“The two countries also differ fundamentally in their approach to Hamas, with the United Kingdom designating Hamas as a terrorist organization, while Türkiye regards it primarily as a political actor within the broader Palestinian question. Consequently, many observers argue that British policy reflects a gap between its normative discourse and strategic practice. Moreover, Britain’s historical legacy, particularly the 1917 Balfour Declaration, continues to shape debates surrounding its role in the conflict,” he added.
Still, Boyraz believes that the new government will not fundamentally alter the U.K.’s Middle East policy. “Britain’s strategic partnership with Israel and its broader regional priorities are driven primarily by long-term geopolitical interests, institutional continuity, and alliance commitments rather than by the preferences of a single political leader. Therefore, continuity is likely to outweigh change. Nevertheless, compared with previous Conservative governments, a Burnham administration may adopt a more critical discourse toward Israel and place greater emphasis on humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, accountability under international law, and support for Palestinian statehood. Burnham has already apologized for Labour’s initial response to the Gaza war, called for increased pressure on Israel through sanctions and restrictions targeting illegal settlements, and argued that potential war crimes should be investigated by international courts. These positions suggest that the tone of British policy could become more balanced. However, they are unlikely to translate into a fundamental reorientation of the U.K.’s strategic posture toward Israel,” he noted.
On the other hand, the two countries are more aligned regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. “Both countries reject Russia’s annexation of Crimea, support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and oppose the use of force to alter internationally recognized borders. They also view NATO as the cornerstone of European security and share a common interest in preserving stability in the Black Sea region. The principal difference lies in the policy instruments they employ. The United Kingdom has pursued a strategy centered on military assistance, sanctions, and deterrence, whereas Türkiye has sought to balance its support for Ukraine with continued dialogue with Russia, refraining from joining Western sanctions while positioning itself as a mediator through diplomatic initiatives such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In this respect, the two countries largely share strategic objectives but differ in the methods they employ to achieve them,” Boyraz stated.
For Örmeci, the U.K. is inclined to view relations with Türkiye more from the perspective of regional power and security, especially in the post-Brexit period. “Türkiye became a critical country in terms of the UK’s growing conflict with Russia, similar to the Great Game,” Örmeci says. The 19th-century rivalry between the two powers was also reflected in Anglo-Turkish relations, particularly through British involvement in the Crimean War, where it joined an alliance with the Ottoman Empire against Russia.
“The United Kingdom will likely continue its relations with Türkiye within the context of economy and security. Burnham will be preoccupied with the economy and Labour’s performance in the next election anyway. Türkiye, on the other hand, has a growing strategic importance, as it demonstrated at the NATO summit, especially regarding the U.S.-Iran tension and the Russia-Ukraine conflict,” Örmeci added.
Türkiye extended condolences to the people of Nigeria on Monday and said that it is “deeply saddened” over a deadly military aircraft crash in its Ondo state.
“We are deeply saddened by the loss of lives resulting from the crash of a military aircraft today in Ondo state of Nigeria,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
The statement also offered the nation’s condolences to those who lost their relatives in the accident and to the people of Nigeria.
A military helicopter crashed in the southwestern state of Ondo on Monday, according to Jimoh Abayomi, public relations officer for the state police.
Abayomi said an investigation into the accident had been launched and that security forces had been deployed to the crash site.
Nigerian Aviation Minister Festus Keyamo told reporters that the helicopter crashed near the Igbokoda Naval Base.
He said 25 passengers and seven crew members were on board, adding that the wreckage had been located and search and rescue operations in the area are ongoing.
Keyamo did not provide any information on casualties or injuries from the crash.
However, media reports quoted the African country’s president, Bola Tinubu, as saying that all 32 people on board lost their lives.
The crash was seen as one of the worst air disasters in recent years in Africa’s most populous country.
“The president extends his deepest condolences to the family of the 25 passengers and seven crew members involved,” Tinubu’s office said in a statement.
A video circulating on social media showed a small crowd gathered near a river while rescuers searched the area by boat.
The president said he had “directed the Nigerian Air Force to immediately commence a thorough investigation into the cause of the crash to prevent future occurrences.”
Three suspects, including a former deputy head of Türkiye’s Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK), have been jailed as part of an investigation into alleged political or military espionage involving the agency’s financial intelligence systems.
Former MASAK Deputy Chair Inönü Akgün Alp and agency employees Eda Aydoğan and Güner Eke were arrested as authorities investigate alleged unauthorized access to MASAK’s Integrated Financial Intelligence System, known as EMIS.
The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office is investigating claims that individuals and companies linked to the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) gained influence over the development and maintenance of MASAK’s critical digital infrastructure between 2012 and 2018.
According to findings cited in the investigation, Aydoğan, a former MASAK statistician, allegedly had administrator-level access to an Oracle Exadata database between 2016 and 2019 despite holding no managerial position.
The investigation also found that a security mechanism designed to alert senior officials when financial information belonging to politically exposed persons was accessed was disabled on Sept. 2, 2016.
Investigators allege that thousands of unauthorized searches involving President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, members of his family and some Cabinet officials were subsequently conducted through EMIS between September 2016 and December 2018.
Financial investigations by police and cybercrime units also uncovered alleged links between FETÖ and subcontracted technology companies responsible for MASAK’s software infrastructure and database management.
Türkiye’s Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) was appointed as trustee to several technology companies, whose partners included Hakan Çiçek, group’s civilian imam accused of playing a key role in the 2016 coup attempt detained at Akıncı Air Base, as well as other FETÖ operatives.
According to official reports cited in the investigation, the companies channeled TL 210 million ($4.3 million) to the group through public contracts.
Investigators also found that audit logs designed to record who accessed the systems had been disabled and identifying data deleted. The network is accused of erasing digital traces of unauthorized access involving senior government officials, including the president.
Investigators further allege that audit logs identifying users accessing the systems were disabled or deleted, making it more difficult to trace unauthorized searches.
Separately, witness testimony included in the case file alleges Aydoğan was involved in distributing questions ahead of a 2013 public personnel examination to individuals linked to FETÖ.
Türkiye will host the multinational Nusret-2026 Invitation Exercise from Oct. 6-16 in the Gulf of Izmir and off the coast of Karadeniz Ereğli, the Defense Ministry said Sunday.
The exercise will bring together Turkish forces, as well as military personnel and assets from allied and partner countries, with 20 ships, five aircraft and unmanned systems, the ministry said.
Participants will include units from the Turkish Naval Forces, Air Force and Coast Guard Command, as well as NATO’s Standing Mine Countermeasures Group 2 (SNMCMG-2), comprising assets from Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Türkiye.
The Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group, known as MCM Black Sea, with units from Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye, will also participate.
Explosive ordnance disposal and autonomous underwater vehicle teams from the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Kuwait, Romania and Oman will participate in the drills, while 32 military observers from a number of countries will attend.
According to the ministry, the exercise is aimed at improving the participating units’ capabilities in the planning, execution and assessment of mine warfare operations.
It also seeks to enhance interoperability among mine warfare units from different countries and strengthen their ability to conduct coordinated multinational operations.
Türkiye most recently conducted the Sea Wolf-I/2026 (“Denizkurdu-I/2026”) Exercise from Sept. 20-25 in the Black Sea, Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, with 100 ships, 50 aircraft and 14,000 personnel taking part.
The growing rift between the main opposition New Party (YP) and the former main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) manifested in Muğla, a southwestern city home to world-famous Bodrum and other top tourism destinations. A local CHP official suggested that Mayor Ahmet Aras should face disciplinary proceedings for his contacts with YP.
YP was formed in July by Özgür Özel, the former chair of CHP. Özel was removed from office by a court ruling over allegations of vote-buying during a 2023 intra-party election that brought him to power. He was replaced by his predecessor Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Kılıçdaroğlu’s return sparked a bitter row with supporters of Özel, who accused him of betraying the party by accepting the court’s request for his reinstatement. Özel initially appealed the verdict but decided to form the new party after receiving overwhelming support among CHP lawmakers.
Under Kılıçdaroğlu, CHP began what it called a “cleansing” process, expelling several figures accused of corruption. The new administration has been more muted about the fate of members openly supporting Özel while several mayors resigned from the party and remain independent, leaving the door open for a future switch to YP.
Aras, who was Bodrum mayor for CHP before his election as Muğla Metropolitan Municipality mayor in the 2024 elections, faces accusations of cooperating with YP while remaining in CHP. CHP’s local branch was angered when Aras temporarily handed over his duties to a YP municipal assembly member in Muğla during a recent visit to Syria. Aras also reportedly ceased contact with CHP’s Muğla branch.
Aziz Gürsoy, head of CHP’s disciplinary board in Muğla, told the Sabah newspaper that Aras has almost severed all ties with CHP.
“It is neither ethical nor legitimate for Mr. Aras to remain in the CHP under the current conditions. In fact, I believe there is bad intent here. He needs to be expelled immediately. Even during his trips abroad, he leaves the municipality (to YP). He has no communication with us. He no longer has any emotional or organic ties to the CHP,” Gürsoy stated.
Stating that they will protect the institutional structure of the CHP under all conditions and that no one is above the party, Gürsoy said: “The current picture creates serious concern among the CHP base. If this situation continues, as the president of the provincial disciplinary board, I will personally apply to headquarters for Mr. Aras’s expulsion. We will not hesitate to take any step necessary to protect the rights, rules and institutional structure of the CHP.”
According to the CHP bylaws, metropolitan mayors can only be referred to the High Disciplinary Board upon the request of the Party Assembly.
The name of Lütfü Türkkan, a lawmaker from the opposition Good Party (IP), came up in an investigation into judiciary officials accused of taking bribes. Prosecutors in Istanbul separated the case of Türkkan and referred it to Ankara on Monday for further investigation.
The Bakırköy Chief Prosecutor’s Office in Istanbul has recently ordered the arrest of eight suspects in an investigation into judges accused of taking bribes in exchange for verdicts in favor of defendants in some cases. The investigation specifically focused on a former judge working at the Court of Enforcement who was accused of receiving millions of Turkish liras in bribes.
Suspects in the case are also accused of running a criminal organization apparently thriving on bribes. Authorities are now looking into cases handled by several Istanbul courts between 2022 and 2024, on suspicion that some businesspeople, politicians and lawyers sought to influence trials and get verdicts in their favor in exchange for bribes, employing judges and court staff. In connection with the case, the Board of Judges and Prosecutors suspended five people, including judges and prosecutors.
In one instance of the suspicious cases, investigators are looking into the claim that M.Ş. and Y.A., identified only through their initials, served as mediators in a case involving lawmaker Türkkan and secured a verdict in favor of the lawmaker, reports by Turkish media outlets say.
In a social media post on Sunday, Türkkan rejected claims, though he acknowledged that a case he was party to was handled by one of the arrested judges. He said that being a party to a trial involving the suspect did not mean that he should be associated with “allegations (of bribery).” He said his lawyers were looking into the case and he never met the judge in person during the trial.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan will be joined by National Defense Minister Yaşar Güler and Chief of General Staff Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu on a visit to Saudi Arabia’s Riyadh on Monday.
They will attend a meeting of the Strategic Political and Defense Committee of the historic Mecca Joint Defense Alliance, formed by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in August. The meeting comes amid rising threats to Saudi Arabia by the Houthis in Yemen.
Foreign Ministry sources said on Sunday that Fidan would reaffirm Türkiye’s strong solidarity with and support for Saudi Arabia in the face of Houthi attacks and underline that provocative acts targeting sacred sites are unacceptable. Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and home to its most sacred site, the Kaaba, located in Mecca. Mecca has recently come under fire from the Houthis.
The Houthi group said on Saturday that it targeted Saudi oil company Aramco in Riyadh with ballistic missiles and drones in response to attacks on the Yemeni capital, Sanaa.
The operation “successfully achieved its objective,” causing fires at the targeted sites, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said in a televised statement.
Saree added that Sanaa and other provinces had been subjected to 60 airstrikes over the last 24 hours, bringing the total number of strikes to 1,420. He attributed the attacks to Saudi Arabia.
The spokesperson warned that the group would respond to “blockade with blockade, and escalation with escalation.”
Meanwhile, Turki al-Maliki, spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition supporting Yemen’s government, said in remarks carried by Saudi media, including Asharq Al-Awsat, that Houthi claims of targeting Riyadh on Saturday were “misleading.”
He added that the Houthis were trying to “divert attention from the scale of their losses and growing public anger over the militias’ conduct and their ties to foreign agendas that have brought chaos and destruction to Yemen.”
Since March 2015, Saudi Arabia has led a military coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognized government against Houthi forces, which have controlled Sanaa and several other governorates since September 2014.
In July this year, the Houthis announced a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, saying the move was in response to a Saudi naval and air siege on areas under their control in Yemen. The group has since targeted energy infrastructure in the kingdom.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud signed the Mecca agreement for joint defense in Mecca on Aug. 7, 2026. The agreement aims to bolster the security of Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia through joint deterrence and defense, and reflects the three countries’ commitment to developing regional solutions to regional issues and their shared strategic vision centered on regional security and stability.
A Strategic Political and Defense Committee, comprising the foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of general staff of the three countries, was established to guide activities under the agreement. The committee held its inaugural meeting in Istanbul on Aug. 31, 2026. At the meeting, foundational decisions were adopted, and technical work toward institutionalizing the alliance was reviewed. Accordingly, the alliance’s secretariat is expected to be established in Riyadh as soon as possible. Retired Pakistani Lt. Gen. Nauman Mahmood has been nominated to serve as its first secretary-general.
The foreign ministers of the three countries held a meeting in New York on Sept. 24, 2026, on the sidelines of the High-Level Week of the 81st United Nations General Assembly. Regional developments were discussed at the meeting. In a joint statement issued afterward, the three countries condemned attacks targeting the holy city of Mecca and Saudi Arabia’s civilian and economic infrastructure. The chiefs of general staff of the three countries met in Riyadh on Sept. 25, 2026.
Turkish sources said Fidan would convey Türkiye’s views on the next steps for the alliance and its institutionalization process. He will also offer Türkiye’s assessment of threats to peace and stability in the Middle East and views on regional developments related to the joint security of the allies. He is also expected to highlight how the alliance’s progress in a short time has proved valuable for the prospects of lasting stability in the region, as well as the importance of the alliance both in building capacity for a joint and efficient response to existing threats and in preventing regional crises.
Fidan is also expected to underline the prioritization of peaceful means to resolve conflicts in the region and the need to avoid steps that may escalate tensions. He will also stress the importance of ensuring the freedom and security of navigation on international trade routes and discuss how Israel has continued to undermine efforts for regional peace and stability.
In an interview last month, Fidan said the alliance had reached an advanced stage, with efforts underway to establish its headquarters and assign personnel, describing the initiative as a “very game-changing platform.” Fidan also implied that Türkiye stood ready to provide technical assistance to Saudi Arabia amid an escalating conflict with the Houthis in Yemen.
Fidan stated that there is “a very strong will” behind the alliance and that Ankara is working to turn that political will into action.
“The Mecca alliance is really at a good stage. There’s a very strong will that has been put forward. We’re working with all our strength to put this will into action,” Fidan told broadcaster NTV last month.
He said steps toward institutionalizing the alliance are underway, particularly work to establish a secretariat envisaged under the agreement and a military headquarters affiliated with it. He added that detailed preparations for both structures have “almost been completed” and that the three countries have reached a common understanding of how they will operate.
“There are steps currently being taken toward institutionalization. In particular, the work on establishing the secretariat mentioned in the agreement and bringing an affiliated military headquarters into operation is almost complete. We have reached a common understanding. From now on, the remaining stage is to send personnel and make the headquarters operational. I am pleased with the process on this issue,” Fidan said.
He said that once institutionalization steps are completed, talks could be held with the other two founding countries on admitting new members.
“There is such a principle decision because our president said this from the beginning. If this does not grow, then it would not be an alliance area. We would have created a bloc. Our regional vision is for as many countries in the region as possible to come together and establish a common defense area.
“This defense area is not against outsiders; it is about solving problems within the region better through regional ownership and creating an environment of trust that has not existed before, in order to prevent new crises from emerging. The basic point of departure for all of this is the search for regional solutions to regional problems,” Fidan said.
He stressed that the alliance was not intended to create a new regional bloc against other countries but to establish a common defense framework based on regional ownership.
“It is an alliance open to the countries of the region,” he said.
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