Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Libya’s Acting Defense Minister Abdulsalam Zubi and Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah’s National Security Adviser Ibrahim Dbeibah in Ankara on Tuesday, the Foreign Ministry said.

The meeting was held behind closed doors and no further details on the agenda or the discussions were provided.

Ankara emerged as a prominent diplomatic actor as it helped ease military tensions in Tripoli and stepped up its outreach to the eastern faction throughout 2025 as it shifted its Libya policy.

Libya remains split between two administrations: a government appointed by the House of Representatives in early 2022 and based in Benghazi, led by Osama Hammad, which controls the east and much of the south; and the internationally recognized Government of National Unity, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah, in Tripoli, which runs the west.

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President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that Israel must fully comply with the roadmap for the second phase of the Gaza Peace Plan for it to succeed, as the two leaders discussed bilateral ties and regional developments in a phone call on Monday.

Erdoğan held a phone conversation with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Monday, discussing Türkiye-Saudi Arabia relations as well as regional and global issues, according to Türkiye’s Communications Directorate.

According to the statement, the leaders reviewed cooperation between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia and exchanged views on regional and global developments during the conversation.

During the call, Erdoğan reaffirmed Türkiye’s commitment to promoting lasting peace and stability in the region, expressing sorrow over recent attacks targeting Saudi Arabia.

The Turkish president also stressed that Israel’s full adherence to the roadmap for the second phase of the Gaza Peace Plan is essential for the initiative’s success.

Erdoğan said Türkiye is closely monitoring developments related to the implementation of the plan, underscoring Ankara’s continued support for efforts aimed at securing a lasting cease-fire and regional stability.

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Three crew members were critically injured after a Turkish-owned roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) cargo ship came under a drone attack in the Black Sea on Monday, Turkish maritime authorities said.

The NADEZHDA, a Turkish-owned cargo vessel sailing from Russia’s Novorossiysk to the Turkish port of Samsun, was attacked about 20 nautical miles (37 kilometers) off Novorossiysk on Monday, according to a statement by Türkiye’s Directorate General of Maritime Affairs.

The vessel was carrying 22 crew members, including 13 Turkish nationals.

Initial assessments indicated the ship sustained damage to its living quarters and bow, while a fire continued to burn on board.

The Directorate General of Maritime Affairs said that, following coordination with Russia’s Maritime Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC) in Novorossiysk, all crew members were safely evacuated to the Russian port by Russian maritime units.

According to preliminary information cited in the statement, three crew members may have sustained critical injuries.

The agency added that the fire remained active aboard the vessel, but rescue operations could not be carried out because of the continuing risk of drone attacks in the area.

The Directorate General of Maritime Affairs said it was closely monitoring the situation and wished all affected seafarers a speedy recovery and safe return to their families.

More than three years of the Russia-Ukraine war have jeopardized maritime security in the Black Sea. Türkiye has witnessed several drones of Russian or Ukrainian origin crash on its territory, while uncrewed armed naval vessels have frequently washed ashore. In response to growing threats, Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria established a maritime security initiative primarily tasked with clearing stray naval mines in the Black Sea.

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Türkiye is preparing to define its “red lines” in a new phase of its fight against PKK terrorism through the terror-free Türkiye initiative. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is expected to submit a draft framework law to Parliament later this week after holding talks with all political parties. The framework law and the consultations will focus on the integration of PKK members and on how those who surrendered or are serving prison sentences will be treated once the PKK’s full dissolution and disarmament have been verified by the authorities.

The initiative began in October 2024, when Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, a key government ally, proposed that jailed PKK ringleader Abdullah Öcalan call on the terrorist group to lay down its arms. Öcalan accepted the proposal and shaped his side of the initiative over the following months. After issuing his historic call to the PKK in February 2025, the terrorist group complied and began laying down its arms. However, Turkish authorities have not yet verified its complete disarmament and continue monitoring the group’s senior leadership in northern Iraq.

The government has repeatedly said that legislative steps would be taken if the PKK dissolved itself, something the terrorist group had long sought. In return for disarmament, the authorities plan to reduce the sentences of convicted PKK members. Those plans have culminated in the framework law, which political parties have discussed in meetings with the parliamentary speaker and among themselves. Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş reaffirmed last week that the bill could be submitted to Parliament this week before the legislature begins its summer recess.

According to media reports, Kurtulmuş, AK Party parliamentary group chair Abdullah Güler, party spokesperson Ömer Çelik and Deputy Chair Efkan Ala, who also took part in the previous “reconciliation process” aimed at persuading the PKK to disarm, met on Monday to finalize preparations for the framework law. Güler will also hold talks with representatives of political parties at Parliament for a “preliminary” meeting to inform them about the contents of the draft bill.

A report by broadcaster A Haber said the framework law would focus on three categories: those who did not actively participate in the PKK’s crimes, those convicted solely of PKK membership, and PKK supporters living in European countries who were not involved in acts of terrorism. Those currently serving prison sentences could become eligible for judicial supervision, under which they would be returned to prison if they committed another offense within three years.

A Haber also reported that the Presidency and Parliament would establish two committees to monitor the next phases of the initiative. The committees would operate for six months and oversee the return of PKK members from abroad, the surrender of weapons, and the social integration of former members of the terrorist group. Öcalan and the PKK’s senior leadership would not be eligible for any leniency.

Öcalan, who was visited by a delegation from the PKK-aligned Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) on Sunday, released a message through the delegation on Monday. He welcomed the framework law and said that “a step was required to begin a one-thousand-kilometer journey.”

“With this law, we are setting out to resolve a historic issue. We are at the beginning of a democratization process that will be at least as significant as the founding of the republic,” Öcalan was quoted as saying by the DEM Party.

“With society’s organized participation, we will achieve a historic breakthrough. This step will make an enormous contribution to both peace and the economy. Not everything has been resolved yet. However, there is also no reason to adopt a negative approach. What matters is that this step is properly understood and that everyone assumes responsibility for the success of the process. The law to be enacted by Parliament will serve as the key to unlocking this process. It will open the door wide to a democratic republic,” he added.

Kurtulmuş said last Thursday that the proposed legislation would pave the way for “a new era of brotherhood,” while reiterating that it would not amount to a general amnesty. Speaking at a ceremony at Parliament, Kurtulmuş said the initiative had reached a critical stage following months of work by Parliament’s National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission, which brought together representatives from nearly all political parties.

“Our goal is to build a terror-free Türkiye,” Kurtulmuş said, describing terrorism as a decadeslong burden that has cost the country thousands of lives and caused significant economic losses.

Kurtulmuş said the process had been carried out with great care through cooperation among state institutions and political actors. He described the initiative as the result of what he called the convergence of “state wisdom and the nation’s collective conscience.”

He also said Türkiye had an opportunity to leave behind decades of violence and painful memories, arguing that the country was entering a new phase focused on national unity, democratic consensus and social cohesion.

“The doors to a new era will be opened with the adoption of this law,” Kurtulmuş said. “Türkiye will begin a completely new period of brotherhood.”

He added that strengthening national solidarity, democracy and social unity would reinforce Türkiye’s position and ensure that no external force could hinder the country’s progress.

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Burkay Karatepe’s capture, 10 years after the Gülenist Terror Group’s (FETÖ) coup attempt, has revived hopes for justice for the victims. Still, several generals and other senior officers involved in the coup attempt remain elusive.

Karatepe, an army captain, was the last member of the assassination team that plotted to kill or capture President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the president’s stay at a hotel in southwestern Türkiye to be captured by authorities. The persistent pursuit of Karatepe, who was caught on security cameras in western Türkiye, paid off last week. Türkiye is now focused on bringing more putschists to justice, although some are believed to have fled the country after the coup attempt was foiled by public resistance.

Among them is Ali Kalyoncu, a member of the putschists’ so-called Peace at Home Council, which would have governed the country had the coup succeeded. Brig. Gen. Kalyoncu headed the Human Resources Department at the Land Forces Command at the time of the coup attempt. He was slated to become commander of a brigade and deputy commander of the coup plotters’ “martial law command.” Kalyoncu was among the generals who attended a coup planning meeting four days before FETÖ attempted to seize power.

On the night of the coup attempt, Kalyoncu, together with former Maj. Gen. Osman Ünlü, who, like him, was a member of the so-called Peace at Home Council and had been designated commander of the 4th Corps in the coup plotters’ assignment list, went to the 4th Corps Command and the 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade Command at Eşref Akıncı Barracks and seized control of the facilities.

On Kalyoncu’s orders, tanks commanded by coup plotters were dispatched to seize the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, the Turkish military’s headquarters. He also sent tanks to seize the Ankara Provincial Police Headquarters and ordered a lieutenant colonel to reinforce other putschists attempting to take over the Gendarmerie General Command.

According to court records, Kalyoncu also instructed troops confronting civilians attempting to stop armored personnel carriers and other military vehicles, saying: “No civilians are to be allowed to climb onto the armored personnel carriers or any other vehicles. Intervene immediately and remove them.” As a result of this order, 16 people, including police officers, were killed and 265 others were wounded. Kalyoncu is also wanted on charges of violating the constitutional order and attempting to assassinate the president, as well as responsibility for the deaths of 250 people and the injuries of 2,686 others during the failed coup attempt.

Former Brig. Gen. Mehmet Nail Yiğit commanded a brigade stationed in Istanbul during the coup attempt. He was appointed by the putschists to head Istanbul’s martial law command. He was also tasked with detaining several politicians opposed to the coup. Acting on his orders, coup plotters attempted to seize several key locations in Istanbul, including Atatürk Airport, the Istanbul Provincial Police Headquarters, and the headquarters of pro-government broadcaster A Haber and the Sabah newspaper, sister outlets of the Daily Sabah. After the coup attempt failed, Yiğit went into hiding and has not been heard from since.

Former Rear Adm. Ayhan Bay, who commanded the Northern Task Group of the Turkish Naval Forces Command, sought to use the warships under his command to support the coup. He also ordered naval vessels to bombard coastal areas. Bay was among the users of ByLock, the encrypted messaging application developed for and exclusively used by FETÖ members. Investigators determined that he used the code name “Abdurrahman” while communicating through the application with FETÖ’s civilian “imams,” who supervised the organization’s military infiltrators. He was aboard a naval vessel when he realized the coup had failed. After disembarking in the northwestern province of Kocaeli, he disappeared.

Former Vice Adm. Mustafa Zeki Uğurlu was serving on a NATO assignment in the United States during the coup attempt. He never returned to Türkiye and instead remained in the United States. Uğurlu has also been identified as one of the perpetrators behind the military espionage conspiracy cases centered in Izmir and is accused of facilitating the transfer of classified Turkish Armed Forces information to FETÖ leader Fetullah Gülen. He is wanted on charges including attempting to overthrow the constitutional order and membership in an armed terrorist organization.

Former Rear Admiral Ali Suat Aktürk, who served as head of the Force Development and Resource Management Department at the Office of the Chief of the General Staff during the coup attempt, was designated by the coup plotters to become governor of the Central Bank of Türkiye if the coup had succeeded. He disappeared after the coup attempt failed.

Former Staff Col. Ilhami Polat, who served as chief of staff of the Turkish Military Academy, detained Military Academy Commander Maj. Gen. Izzettin Çetingöz and directed coup-related activities at the academy.

Following the coup attempt, his wife, Judge Suzan Polat, became a cooperating witness in the investigation into her own FETÖ membership. She stated that her marriage had been arranged by FETÖ, which was known to choose spouses for infiltrators in key positions in order to maintain control over them.

According to her testimony, her husband told her that he would either surrender or flee.

“Ilhami dropped me off at a taxi stand near the metro station. I never saw him again,” she said.

Suzan Polat also stated that during their final meeting, after saying, “Forgive me,” her husband added, “The order came from above. Fetullah Gülen gave the order.”

Former Brig. Gen. Mehmet Zeki Kıralp, who was serving at the Gülhane Military Medical Academy (GATA) during the coup attempt, reportedly received his general’s rank insignia personally from Fetullah Gülen, who spent decades placing loyalists within the Turkish military. Kıralp also disappeared after the failed coup.

Serhat Pasha, a retired noncommissioned officer who had served as aide-de-camp to then-Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar until retiring two months before the coup attempt, and Şener Doğrugören, who was serving as Akar’s aide-de-camp during the coup, participated in the detention of Hulusi Akar and then-Land Forces Commander Salih Zeki Çolak and in the seizure of the General Staff Headquarters while dressed in civilian clothes.

Although they held only the rank of noncommissioned officer, investigators allege that both men issued orders to FETÖ members who outranked them. Both fled after the coup attempt was suppressed.

Former Major Mehmet Murat Çelebioğlu, who also remains at large, was one of the key figures behind the Istanbul branch of the coup attempt. He coordinated the coup plotters through a WhatsApp group he created called “Yurtta Sulh Biziz” (“We Are Peace at Home”).

Another fugitive, Ahmet Zeki Gerehan, ordered putschists to seize the headquarters of broadcaster CNN Türk after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan addressed the nation through a live video call. Gerehan sought to cut off the broadcasts of CNN Türk and its sister channel Kanal D by dispatching troops to the stations. He also organized troops attempting to seize the Istanbul Governor’s Office. An indictment against Gerehan alleges that he ordered soldiers under his command to fire on civilians resisting the coup. After the coup attempt was thwarted, Gerehan disappeared. A search of his home uncovered detailed notes listing locations the coup plotters planned to seize.

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The “King of the North” is expanding his “kingdom” to other domains of the United Kingdom, but what can be expected from Andy Burnham, the seventh prime minister of the country in a decade, in international relations? Burnham has mainly focused on domestic issues, particularly on the economic side, since taking office on July 20, but soon he will have more on his plate in foreign affairs. Among these responsibilities are relations with Türkiye, which somewhat thrived under Keir Starmer. Experts say this momentum may very well continue under Burnham.

Professor Ozan Örmeci, a political scientist and general coordinator of the International Political Academy (UPA), points to Downing Street’s pragmatic approach to relations and believes this will carry over into the new era under Burnham, “at a time where transactionalism dominates international relations.”

“Türkiye too favors a relationship based on mutual interests and benefits, though this was not always the case in recent decades,” Örmeci told Daily Sabah. “In this context, Türkiye-U.K. relations will start out the new era strongly,” he underlined.

Relations between the two countries – which inherited the legacies of two great empires – have always been close, even when they were on opposing sides of conflicts such as World War I. Throughout the rest of the 20th century, relations seldom deteriorated, and in recent years, a new momentum has emerged, especially in terms of the economy.

“A Burnham government is unlikely to bring about a fundamental shift in U.K.-Türkiye relations,” said Hacı Mehmet Boyraz, vice chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University.

“Bilateral ties have remained stable and constructive in recent years, regardless of changes in government, reflecting a relationship that is increasingly driven by shared strategic and economic interests rather than partisan politics. While a Labour government may differ from its Conservative predecessors on certain foreign policy issues, continuity is likely to outweigh change in its approach toward Türkiye,” Boyraz told Daily Sabah.

Under Keir Starmer, relations remained close and strategic, particularly in defense, security, trade and regional diplomacy. This was especially evident in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and growing tensions in the Middle East, as both countries are important NATO allies. Without a major shift on Burnham’s part, this trend may very well continue.

The highlights of the Starmer era were efforts to upgrade the post-Brexit free trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries and the signing of the Strategic Partnership Document last April. There was also the deal to acquire Eurofighter Typhoon jets. Last year, the two countries signed a multibillion-dollar agreement for the acquisition of the jets – “a new symbol of the strategic relationship between us as two close allies,” as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said following the signing of the deal during a visit by Starmer to Ankara in 2025.

As Burnham aims for several major economic changes in his country, especially through “re-industrialization” plans, extra funds will come in handy. “Eurofighter sales can do this, and this will be a positive development for the U.K. economy,” Örmeci highlighted.

Boyraz says defense cooperation is an area with “considerable untapped potential.”

“Although the possible sale of Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft has attracted significant attention, bilateral defense relations should not be viewed solely through the prism of a single procurement project. The United Kingdom possesses one of Europe’s most advanced defense-industrial bases, while Türkiye has emerged as one of the fastest-growing defense producers in recent years through substantial investments in indigenous capabilities. These complementary strengths create opportunities for a broader strategic partnership based on technology transfer, joint production, research and development, and cooperation in next-generation defense technologies,” Boyraz said. “Such cooperation would not only generate mutual economic benefits but also contribute to NATO’s long-term defense capabilities. For this reason, the momentum established under the Starmer government is likely to continue under Burnham, and there is even scope for further deepening bilateral defense-industrial cooperation.”

“Burnham showed particular success in the local elections, working a small-scale miracle in Manchester. He turned Manchester into the fastest-growing city not just in England, but in the entire United Kingdom. But of course, this took time; he didn’t achieve it in just a year or two. He has reasonable proposals to revitalize the economy, but these are mostly tailored to domestic politics. That is to say, I don’t think he has a particularly visionary project regarding relations with Türkiye or Britain’s role in the world. He is more likely to maintain existing policies,” Örmeci stated.

He underlined that the government’s main focus would naturally be the economy. “In this context, they may seek closer relations with the European Union, try to align with the Trump administration in the U.S. – perhaps without angering Trump – and revive Chinese investments. In fact, Chinese investment was at the heart of the Conservative Party’s economic success during the David Cameron era, and he may try to bring that back to life,” he said.

In this context, the modernization of the FTA is expected to remain the most important item on the bilateral agenda, according to Boyraz.

“Although the existing agreement has provided a solid foundation for bilateral trade, it no longer reflects the evolving nature of the two economies. Expanding its scope to include services, digital trade, investment and other high-value sectors would create significant economic opportunities for both countries. More importantly, the post-Brexit environment has encouraged the United Kingdom to pursue a more pragmatic and interest-driven external economic policy. Freed from the constraints of the EU’s common commercial policy, London has sought to strengthen partnerships with countries that offer strategic and economic value. In this regard, Türkiye occupies a unique position due to its large market, dynamic economy, strategic geography, and growing regional influence. Moreover, unlike many of the U.K.’s other international partnerships, relations with Türkiye are characterized by relatively few structural disputes, providing a favorable environment for further economic integration,” Boyraz emphasized.

Türkiye’s bilateral trade volume with the United Kingdom increased from $18.9 billion in 2023 to $24 billion in 2025, according to official figures. Services trade, meanwhile, reached approximately $8 billion. Trade Minister Ömer Bolat noted at a recent meeting with outgoing U.K. Ambassador Jill Morris that the U.K.’s direct investment in Türkiye rose to $15.2 billion from $9.5 billion in the same period.

“At the political level, a Burnham government may adopt a somewhat different tone from previous Conservative administrations, particularly on issues such as human rights and the Middle East. However, these differences are unlikely to redefine the overall trajectory of U.K.-Türkiye relations. The structural foundations of the relationship – economic interdependence, NATO membership, defense cooperation, and shared geopolitical interests – remain sufficiently strong to sustain a pragmatic and strategically oriented partnership. Rather than marking a new departure, a Burnham premiership would most likely reinforce the existing trajectory of bilateral relations while seeking to capitalize on the opportunities created by the post-Brexit environment,” Boyraz said.

“We can argue that the United Kingdom has served as Türkiye’s most strategic Western partner, helping maintain Ankara’s Western anchor at times when its relations with the United States and the European Union have faced difficulties,” Örmeci notes, offering an in-depth look into the history of relations. “This has been the case at times even during the Cold War,” he underlined.

Örmeci points out that Turkish-U.K. friendship can best be exemplified by the era of Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher, two prime ministers who shared similar economic views. “It is safe to say that although it has not been the primary partner in terms of economy, politics, and security, the U.K. has always viewed Türkiye as a strategically important country and a practical ally, especially in times of crisis,” Örmeci said.

Such a crisis may unfold between Burnham and U.S. President Trump. Although Trump was more than relieved to see Starmer leave, Burnham appears more cautious in his approach to the United States. Türkiye similarly had its share of problems with the United States, though this appears to be changing in Trump’s second term, as was evident during the U.S. president’s recent visit to Ankara for the NATO summit.

Örmeci also highlights the strategic framework agreement signed between the two countries, adding that although its contents are not fully public, it is a clear indication that both nations are willing to preserve their alliance over the short and long term.

Differences in foreign policy

As two strong diplomatic actors with much to gain or lose in today’s complex foreign policy landscape– where diplomacy is critical amid lingering conflicts – Türkiye and the U.K. pursue different approaches to foreign affairs.

“Türkiye and the United Kingdom share common interests in several areas of foreign policy, yet their approaches diverge significantly when it comes to the Middle East, particularly the war in Gaza. While both governments officially support a two-state solution, have repeatedly called for humanitarian assistance and an end to the fighting, and recognize that prolonged instability threatens regional security, their policies differ both normatively and strategically. Türkiye has consistently defended the Palestinian cause, emphasizing international law, humanitarian principles, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The United Kingdom, despite adopting a more critical tone toward Israel in recent months and announcing its intention to recognize the State of Palestine, has continued to preserve its long-standing strategic and security partnership with Israel,” Boyraz emphasized.

“The two countries also differ fundamentally in their approach to Hamas, with the United Kingdom designating Hamas as a terrorist organization, while Türkiye regards it primarily as a political actor within the broader Palestinian question. Consequently, many observers argue that British policy reflects a gap between its normative discourse and strategic practice. Moreover, Britain’s historical legacy, particularly the 1917 Balfour Declaration, continues to shape debates surrounding its role in the conflict,” he added.

Still, Boyraz believes that the new government will not fundamentally alter the U.K.’s Middle East policy. “Britain’s strategic partnership with Israel and its broader regional priorities are driven primarily by long-term geopolitical interests, institutional continuity, and alliance commitments rather than by the preferences of a single political leader. Therefore, continuity is likely to outweigh change. Nevertheless, compared with previous Conservative governments, a Burnham administration may adopt a more critical discourse toward Israel and place greater emphasis on humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, accountability under international law, and support for Palestinian statehood. Burnham has already apologized for Labour’s initial response to the Gaza war, called for increased pressure on Israel through sanctions and restrictions targeting illegal settlements, and argued that potential war crimes should be investigated by international courts. These positions suggest that the tone of British policy could become more balanced. However, they are unlikely to translate into a fundamental reorientation of the U.K.’s strategic posture toward Israel,” he noted.

On the other hand, the two countries are more aligned regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. “Both countries reject Russia’s annexation of Crimea, support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and oppose the use of force to alter internationally recognized borders. They also view NATO as the cornerstone of European security and share a common interest in preserving stability in the Black Sea region. The principal difference lies in the policy instruments they employ. The United Kingdom has pursued a strategy centered on military assistance, sanctions, and deterrence, whereas Türkiye has sought to balance its support for Ukraine with continued dialogue with Russia, refraining from joining Western sanctions while positioning itself as a mediator through diplomatic initiatives such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In this respect, the two countries largely share strategic objectives but differ in the methods they employ to achieve them,” Boyraz stated.

For Örmeci, the U.K. is inclined to view relations with Türkiye more from the perspective of regional power and security, especially in the post-Brexit period. “Türkiye became a critical country in terms of the UK’s growing conflict with Russia, similar to the Great Game,” Örmeci says. The 19th-century rivalry between the two powers was also reflected in Anglo-Turkish relations, particularly through British involvement in the Crimean War, where it joined an alliance with the Ottoman Empire against Russia.

“The United Kingdom will likely continue its relations with Türkiye within the context of economy and security. Burnham will be preoccupied with the economy and Labour’s performance in the next election anyway. Türkiye, on the other hand, has a growing strategic importance, as it demonstrated at the NATO summit, especially regarding the U.S.-Iran tension and the Russia-Ukraine conflict,” Örmeci added.