Politics
Türkiye aims to make COP31 the ‘COP of implementation’
This year’s U.N. climate summit will seek to turn past decisions into action, with financing the main focus, Environment and Climate Change Minister Murat Kurum told Reuters on Monday as the country prepares to host COP31 and jointly manage the event with Australia in November.
The minister Kurum said financing was the most important task, with nearly $1 trillion needed to help developing countries meet climate change targets, adding that raising public awareness about climate policies was essential at a time when wars and security crises dominate the global agenda.
“Important decisions have been taken in every COP so far. We will follow up these decisions, but what is essential is putting them into practice. The expectation of the world, of humanity from us is to move to practice,” Kurum said in an interview at Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF) 2026, at the weekend.
“Let’s take steps to realise the NDCs that countries have put forth – and there are some countries who have not put them forward,” Kurum said, referring to the nationally determined contribution (NDC) of each nation.
He noted that while wars were inevitable, Türkiye would call on every nation to focus on the “big picture” and see the imminent threats posed by climate change.
The annual COP conference is the main global forum for driving action on climate change. The long-established consensus among the world’s scientists is that climate change is real, mostly caused by humans, and getting worse. Its main cause is greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels like coal, oil and gas, which trap heat in the atmosphere. After a lengthy standoff last year, Türkiye and Australia agreed on a format in which Türkiye would host the COP31 summit and hold its presidency, while Australia leads the negotiation process. The COP conference will take place in November in the southern Turkish province of Antalya.
Phasing out fossil fuels
The minister who will also be COP31 President said Türkiye wanted the conference to be “the COP of implementation”, where actions rather than promises take precedence.
“We want all countries to hand in their NDCs by COP31. We are working for this, we are also working for this within the U.N.,” he said, adding that $150 million in financing was needed for developing countries to prepare their NDCs. One of the most significant perceived shortcomings from last year’s COP30 was the lack of a concrete agreement around language to promote the global phasing-out of fossil fuels.
Asked about how the issue would be addressed at COP31, Kurum said Türkiye aimed to press countries to implement the decisions taken on this issue at COP30, adding that technology to allow such a shift needed to be further developed.
He noted that Türkiye was using both renewable energy and fossil fuels because it needs to meet its needs and be self-sufficient, but added it would move away from this if it finds cheaper energy through new technology.
“We must bring moving away from fossil fuels to the global agenda by providing a transition period. During COP31, we will put into effect those partial decisions taken in COP30.”
COP meetings have been held on a rotating basis across continents since 1995. Some notable hosts include Germany (Berlin) for COP1, Japan (Kyoto) for COP3 Denmark (Copenhagen) for COP15, France (Paris) for COP21, where the Paris Agreement was adopted, the United Kingdom (Glasgow) for COP26, Egypt (Sharm el-Sheikh) for COP27, the United Arab Emirates (Dubai) for COP28, Azerbaijan (Baku) for COP29 in 2024 and Brazil (Belem) for COP30 in 2025.
Hosting a COP requires large-scale organizational capacity. The host country must prepare infrastructure capable of serving more than 100,000 participants, including expansive meeting halls and media centers, as well as spaces for side events, and comprehensive security arrangements. An event of this scale also demands strong logistics and transportation planning.
The host nation is responsible for meeting the U.N.’s security standards and implementing zero-waste practices, sustainability criteria, and a carbon-neutral operations plan. Because heads of state and government attend the summit, the country must also conduct high-level diplomatic preparations and coordinate pre-negotiation meetings and technical committee sessions without disruptions.
In this sense, the host country is not only responsible for managing the logistics of a massive event but also for ensuring that global negotiations take place in a constructive environment.
For Türkiye, hosting the summit would position the country as a hub of global climate diplomacy for two weeks. The process is expected to significantly increase international interest in Türkiye in areas such as climate finance, clean energy and green technology.
Türkiye’s climate policies, emissions-reduction targets, and green transition programs would serve as a global example.
Türkiye on Monday will mark 19 years since a memorandum by the office of the chief of general staff shook the country accustomed to military coups. Today, it is a distant memory, though still a dark episode in Turkish democracy.
The “E-memorandum” of April 27, 2007, was a stark reminder that the army still had a perceived influence on Turkish politics as it did for decades after the 1960 coup. Yet, the memorandum published on the office’s website quickly backfired for those hoping to return to the old days of military tutelage. The government’s strong reaction effectively killed the message of the memorandum penned personally by then-Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt. It would take another four years before the army removed the memorandum from its website, but the deal was already blown due to the military’s lack of influence over politicians.
The memorandum’s primary target was the presidential elections, where Abdullah Gül was nominated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). For the military, then harboring a mindset against what they called “reactionary” forces, the nomination countered “values of the republic,” something Büyükanıt openly said at an April 12 press briefing. Gül’s nomination also faced protests by self-styled defenders of the republic who took to the streets for “republic rallies.” Elsewhere, the opposition claimed that the ruling party was ineligible to field a candidate for the elections, insisting that 367 lawmakers should vote on holding the election, and the AK Party cannot call for it since it only had 354 seats in Parliament. The debate grew over time, but then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was determined to nominate Gül. Gül received 357 votes in the first round of elections on April 27, 2007, out of 361 votes cast that day at Parliament. The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) challenged the result and took the matter to the Constitutional Court.
Within hours of the vote, the office of the chief of general staff released the infamous e-memorandum on its website. The memorandum had all the traces of a declaration by generals in the 1997 coup, claiming the secular nature of the republic was being eroded. It threatened to execute the Turkish Armed Forces’ “mission to carry out duties to preserve the Republic of Türkiye.”
Everyone was anticipating that the AK Party would bow down to the threat, as this was the case in 1997. One day later, then-government spokesperson Cemil Çiçek announced their response to the e-memorandum. “Such statements against the government by the office, an institution under the Prime Ministry, cannot be accepted in a democratic state operating under law,” he said. Nevertheless, the fight was still on. The Constitutional Court, on May 1, cancelled the first round of the election, siding with the CHP. The AK Party proposed another election, along with constitutional amendments to prevent a repeat of the cancellation.
On July 22, 2007, early elections were held, and the AK Party secured victory. The party then proposed a presidential election through popular vote, and the public overwhelmingly approved the proposal on July 22, immediately after the legislative elections.
On Aug. 20, 2007, another presidential election was held, with Gül nominated again. Gül secured 341 votes in the first round, but this dropped to 337 votes in the second round on Aug. 24. In the third round, Gül garnered 339 votes and was elected into office as the 11th president of the Republic of Türkiye. The CHP finally relented and accepted Gül’s election.
In 2012, Yaşar Büyükanıt told a parliamentary committee investigating coups that the memorandum was simply “a text reflecting sensitivity on secularism.” In the same year, authorities launched an investigation against Büyükanıt over the memorandum. As the investigation continued, Büyükanıt passed away in 2019.
The incident and related developments were thought to be the beginning and end of a renewed threat of military tutelage in the country, where the army took the reins in multiple instances on Türkiye’s bumpy road to democracy. In 2016, however, the coup threat emerged again, this time in the form of military infiltrators of the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ). Türkiye pushed back this attempt too, at the cost of more than 250 people killed by putschists while resisting the coup. Since then, the army shed its image of de facto power above democratic institutions, while the public resistance and overwhelming support to the government cemented the role of Erdoğan, now president, as the real commander-in-chief of the country.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan will visit Croatia on April 28 to attend the 11th summit of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) in Dubrovnik, representing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, according to Foreign Ministry sources.
The April 28-29 gathering marks the first time Türkiye will participate in the initiative as a “strategic partner,” a status it secured at the 2025 Warsaw summit. The meeting, hosted by Croatia, brings together Central and Eastern European countries seeking to strengthen transport, energy and digital infrastructure across the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea regions.
Fidan is expected to highlight the growing importance of connectivity, describing it as a multidimensional ecosystem encompassing not only physical infrastructure but also energy networks, digital systems, finance and governance. He is also expected to underline how geopolitical tensions and ongoing conflicts have exposed vulnerabilities in global supply chains and energy security, calling for diversification of routes and resources.
According to the sources, Fidan will stress that Türkiye views the initiative as an inclusive platform that enhances regional ownership, and that it is ready to deepen cooperation as a strategic partner, leveraging its geostrategic position. He is also expected to emphasize the need for a renewed narrative in Türkiye-European Union relations that could deliver tangible progress, with connectivity serving as a constructive area of engagement.
The Turkish minister is likely to reference projects such as the Middle Corridor and the Development Road, presenting them as complementary routes that support global trade rather than competing alternatives.
The Middle Corridor connects China and European countries via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye, reducing delivery times between Europe and Asia to 15 days. Türkiye’s central role in the trade route makes the country the very backbone of trade, directly connecting 21 countries.
The corridor is increasingly emerging as one of the potentially critical links between Asia and Europe amid recent conflicts.
The Development Road project, on the other hand, is a land and rail transport deal spearheaded by Iraq, Türkiye, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The project promises to facilitate trade volumes from Iraq’s Grand Faw Port directly through Türkiye and into Europe.
The initiative includes Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Greece as participating members. Alongside Türkiye, the European Commission, the United States, Germany, Japan and Spain hold strategic partner status. Ukraine, Moldova, Albania and Montenegro take part as associated participating countries.
Only EU member states can join the Three Seas Initiative as participating members, while Türkiye’s inclusion as a strategic partner was unanimously approved at the 2025 Warsaw summit.
At this year’s summit in Dubrovnik, Italy is expected to be admitted to the initiative as a strategic partner.
The crisis that has erupted amid the Middle East conflict could ultimately create opportunities for Türkiye and make it a regional energy hub through new partnerships and supply routes, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said last week.
Energy prices have spiralled following U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran, which triggered a near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz, where 20% of the world’s oil normally flows. Stalled shipments through the waterway have sent prices skyrocketing far beyond the region and raised the cost of food and a wide array of other products.
After the U.S. and Israel began attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, Iran responded by effectively blocking the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to attack any vessels that did not obtain its permission to transit the waterway.
The blockade caused major disruptions to global trade, sending energy prices soaring and sparking fears of fuel shortages.
Türkiye and Syria carried out a joint anti-narcotics operation, seizing 236 kilograms of marijuana hidden in a container aboard a cargo ship bound for Syria’s Latakia port, security sources said Saturday.
The operation was coordinated by Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the Trade Ministry’s Customs Enforcement units and Syria’s Interior Ministry narcotics teams, marking a notable instance of security cooperation between the two countries.
According to Turkish security sources, MIT tracked a drug shipment departing Southeast Asia and moving through Egypt’s Alexandria and Lebanon’s Beirut before heading to Latakia. The intelligence was shared with Syrian authorities, enabling a coordinated interception.
Syrian anti-narcotics units seized the drugs on April 16 during an inspection of the vessel’s cargo, uncovering the concealed shipment. Authorities estimated the market value of the narcotics at approximately TL 300 million ($6.6 million).
Türkiye has been a strong backer of the new administration in Damascus since the ouster of Bashar Assad by anti-regime forces in December 2024. The neighbors have struck a series of cooperation deals on intelligence sharing and security coordination to combat terrorist groups like the PKK/YPG and smuggling networks. Ankara has also pledged to help Syria rebuild areas affected by 13 years of civil war.
Relations between historic rivals Türkiye and Greece rarely move in a straight line. Periods of cautious rapprochement are often followed by renewed friction, and in recent weeks that familiar pattern has reappeared, this time spanning everything from naval posture in the Aegean to arguments over soup.
The most serious fault line remains the Aegean Sea, where geography and history collide in a dense patchwork of islands, airspace claims and unresolved legal interpretations.
Ankara has stepped up its criticism of Greece’s military presence on islands whose status is governed by the Treaty of Lausanne and the Treaty of Paris. Turkish officials argue that recent deployments and infrastructure upgrades on some eastern Aegean islands breach provisions requiring their demilitarized status, warning against what they describe as attempts to create irreversible “facts on the ground.”
The language has sharpened. Statements from Türkiye’s Foreign and Defense Ministries in recent months have framed the issue not merely as a legal dispute but as one with direct implications for regional stability and alliance cohesion within NATO.
Athens, for its part, has shown little inclination to yield. Greek officials have consistently justified their posture as defensive, pointing to what they see as a broader security environment shaped by competing maritime claims and unresolved tensions in both the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has publicly linked these disputes to wider questions of sovereignty and resource rights, reinforcing Greece’s view that its actions are both lawful and necessary.
The disagreement is not confined to rhetoric. It has been accompanied by a steady rhythm of signaling, naval movements, air patrols and competing navigation notices, that, while calibrated, underline how quickly miscalculation could become a risk.
Overlaying the territorial disputes is a second, equally persistent source of tension: migration.
Greece’s role as a gateway to the European Union has placed it on the front line of migratory flows from the Middle East and beyond, many of which transit through Türkiye. Allegations that Greek authorities have carried out so-called pushbacks, forcibly returning migrants without processing asylum claims, have drawn scrutiny from Brussels, most recently after reporting by the BBC.
The European Commission has urged Athens to investigate the claims, while Greek officials have rejected accusations of illegality, emphasizing the country’s responsibility to secure the EU’s external borders. For Ankara, the issue has become another point of contention in an already crowded agenda, feeding into a broader narrative of uneven burden-sharing and contested responsibility.
Even so, the relationship is not defined solely by confrontation. The aftermath of Türkiye’s devastating earthquakes in 2023 briefly revived a familiar form of “disaster diplomacy,” with Greece among the first to offer assistance. The gesture helped lower the temperature, if only temporarily.
More recent events suggest how fragile that detente was.
In Istanbul, authorities detained two Greek nationals after they unfurled a Byzantine-era flag inside the Hagia Sophia Grand Mosque earlier this month. The building, which has served as both cathedral and mosque over its long history, remains a potent symbol for both countries. Turkish officials treated the act as a provocation; in Greece, such gestures often resonate with a sense of historical loss tied to Orthodox heritage.
Incidents like this tend to operate less as causes of tension than as accelerants, reinforcing narratives that already exist on both sides.
The same might be said of the more curious disputes that have surfaced alongside the geopolitical ones.
Turkish singer Işın Karaca recently said she was denied entry into Greece despite holding a valid visa, attributing the decision to earlier remarks about her national identity. The episode, minor in diplomatic terms, nevertheless gained traction as a symbol of perceived hostility.
Then there is the question of cuisine. Long a subject of quiet rivalry, the origins of dishes such as baklava, yogurt and coffee have again become contested terrain. The latest addition is tripe soup, “işkembe” in Turkish and “patsa” in Greek, after Greek references linking the dish to ancient texts, including the “Odyssey,” prompted pushback in Turkish outlets that framed such assertions as cultural appropriation.
As with earlier food debates, the dispute has played out less through official channels than through commentary, headlines and social media, where questions of culinary heritage often blur into broader questions of national identity.
Taken together, these episodes sketch a relationship that operates on multiple levels at once. Strategic disputes over territory and security unfold alongside legal disagreements in Brussels, while cultural and symbolic issues provide a steady undercurrent of friction.
Neither Ankara nor Athens appears eager for outright escalation. Both remain embedded in the same security architecture and maintain open diplomatic channels. Yet the accumulation of disputes, from the movement of ships and missiles to the provenance of recipes, suggests a relationship that is once again tilting toward tension.
In that sense, the argument over tripe soup is not as trivial as it might seem. It is simply the most digestible expression of a rivalry that runs far deeper.
Türkiye could consider taking part in multinational demining operations in the Strait of Hormuz after a possible peace agreement between the U.S. and Iran, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said late Friday.
Speaking to reporters in London, Fidan said Türkiye “would be open to” participating in a coalition tasked with clearing naval mines in the Strait once a deal is reached, describing such work as a “humanitarian” effort.
However, Fidan underscored that Ankara would not take part in operations that risk positioning Türkiye as a party to renewed conflict. Ankara would avoid any role implying alignment if conflict resumes, Fidan said.
Fidan said Türkiye could foresee a comprehensive deal resulting in a negotiated return to the status quo ensuring open, toll-free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Otherwise, both sides would have to explore new ways to find a resolution, according to the minister.
After the U.S. and Israel began attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, Iran responded by effectively blocking the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to attack any vessels that did not obtain its permission to transit the waterway.
The blockade caused major disruptions to global trade, sending energy prices soaring and sparking fears of fuel shortages.
The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz has been a major sticking point in negotiations to end the war after a ceasefire began on April 8.
Days later, the U.S. implemented a blockade affecting ships coming from or heading to Iranian ports, as Washington tries to cut Tehran off from key revenue streams.
Trump unilaterally extended the ceasefire on Tuesday, but the blockade remains in place.
Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry said a growing climate of peace and reconciliation in the South Caucasus reflects a strong push by regional actors seeking stability and cooperation, while warning against efforts to inflame tensions rooted in historical disputes.
In a statement, the ministry said parties involved in discussions over the events of 1915 share a clear stance against the politicization of the issue, criticizing some third-country politicians for exploiting the matter for narrow political interests or to deflect from their own responsibilities.
Ankara reiterated that Türkiye, which it said has long embodied a culture of coexistence, has opened its archives and continues to support the establishment of a joint history commission to examine the events of 1915 in a fair and objective manner. The proposal, the ministry noted, remains on the table.
Calling for a forward-looking approach, the ministry urged third parties with constructive intentions to support ongoing dialogue efforts and contribute to building a shared and just historical understanding, as well as reinforcing the region’s emerging atmosphere of cooperation.
Türkiye’s position on the 1915 events is that the deaths of Armenians in eastern Anatolia took place when some sided with invading Russians and revolted against Ottoman forces.
A subsequent relocation of Armenians resulted in numerous casualties, made worse by massacres conducted by militaries and militia groups from both sides. The mass arrests of prominent Ottoman-Armenian politicians, intellectuals and other community members suspected of links with separatist groups, harboring nationalist sentiments and being hostile to Ottoman rule occurred in the then-capital city of Istanbul on April 24, 1915. The date is commemorated as the beginning of later atrocities.
Ankara objects to the presentation of these incidents as “genocide,” describing them as a tragedy in which both sides suffered casualties.
Ankara is of the opinion that controversial episodes in history such as the events of 1915 should be studied without prejudice by respecting the scientific and legal principles to write a just account of the incidents. With this understanding, Türkiye proposed the establishment of a Joint History Commission and opened its archives.
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