Politics
Relics, newcomers will fight, ally in Türkiye’s busy political scene
The elections have been a two-handed game in the past two decades, thanks to the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) incomparable success. Its main rival, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), fights for political survival amid internal friction and mounting allegations of corruption. Smaller parties continue to calculate the risks of aligning with it in the next election and going alone or through a separate alliance against the AK Party and its beloved leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Erdoğan has been a game-changer in Türkiye’s democratic history and has been at the helm of Türkiye’s longest since the founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as prime minister and president. After more than two decades in power, his AK Party is still ahead according to some opinion polls. In others, the party has a narrow gap with the CHP, while neither of the parties’ rivals comes close. For instance, an April survey by Optimar shows the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) scored 9.6% after the CHP, while another poll from March by Genar indicates the DEM Party can secure 8.9% of the vote after the AK Party and the CHP.
According to the official figures, there are 188 political parties in Türkiye. Most remain functional in name only, while several among them have less than 100 members, and maybe even fewer voters. The abundance of parties is a sign of the democratic wealth of the country, which has gone through three coups and more attempts by the military to interfere in politics. It is also a blessing for bigger, older parties, which usually rely on voter behavior to side with the winning side in the elections, though their loyalty might lie elsewhere at other times.
Some are “relics” not in the true sense of the word, but rather, due to the waning popularity of political views they defended. Those relics also include spiritual successors of once-popular parties. The newcomers referred to in the title, meanwhile, are mostly founded by dissidents of bigger parties, though some among them are truly new to politics, seeking to garner votes from those dissatisfied with the course their old parties took, namely the AK Party, the CHP and the AK Party’s ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
Here are likely winners and losers of the next election scheduled to be held in 2028, although AK Party signaled that it may be rescheduled to the fall of 2027. Wins and losses, however, can be limited to the parliamentary seats as the AK Party and the CHP will likely dominate the polls again, based on recent surveys.
Key Party
The “A Party,” as it formally refers to itself, was founded in 2024 by Yavuz Ağıralioğlu, a 54-year-old former lawmaker who made his foray into politics in the Great Unity Party (BBP) before switching to the Good Party (IP) in 2018, only to resign in 2023. The party has set out to be a “key” to what it called “a deadlock in the system,” according to its manifesto, a reference apparently to the unending race between the AK Party and CHP. This was affirmed by Ağıralioğlu in a recent interview. He also claimed that the party has become popular among voters of the AK Party, MHP and IP, and to a degree, the CHP. With former AK Party and IP members among its founders and executive board, the A Party inevitably set its politics strictly to the right and its proposed policies, such as immediate deportation of all migrants and Syrian refugees, draw comparisons to fellow underdogs in the political scene.
Soon after its foundation, the party joined the growing list of political pundits’ “third-way parties” in the face of the AK Party and the CHP domination. In the ideological sense, it does not offer an all-embracing approach, but it managed to make it to the opinion polls, scoring slightly above 1% in Optimar’s survey. Areda-Survey’s poll put it above 4%. The party is not intent on being a part of future alliance against or with the AK Party, but as a quote attributed to late veteran politician Süleyman Demirel says, “Even 24 hours is a long time in politics,” and this stand may change in an instant when the election season begins.
New Welfare Party
Often leading or trailing behind the A Party in opinion polls, the YRP proved its potential in the 2024 municipal elections by securing more than 6% of the vote. Founded in 2018 by Fatih Erbakan, son of former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, it follows the path of the late politician, specifically “National View” ideology, something also shared by the Felicity Party (SP). The YRP allied with the People’s Alliance of the AK Party and MHP in 2023 before parting ways after the elections.
Younger Erbakan seeks to build upon the legacy of his father, who managed to rally disenfranchised conservative voters stuck in center-right parties for decades. Erbakan’s “National View,” which also sought to attract voters with wildly different world views, especially through anti-imperialist elements of the ideology, made the now-defunct Welfare Party (RP) a rising star in the politics of the 1990s. The RP is where President Erdoğan honed his political and oratory skills, and the AK Party has managed to attract some of its former supporters when the party was closed and its reincarnation, the Virtue Party (FP), was split.
The YRP did not veer much from the RP in its policies and mainly targeted voters who were adherents of the National View and disillusioned with the AK Party’s changing ways, specifically the widening political spectrum of the party. A rise in the polls indicates that this strategy may work. Forty-seven-year-old Erbakan is among the youngest of the leaders of prominent parties, but age has rarely been a determining factor in the choices of voters in multiparty elections since 1950.
The party recently tried to lure voters critical of the government’s policies toward Israel, adopting a rhetoric that the AK Party was not doing much to stop Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its power in the international community. It is unclear how it may bring more votes to the party, where the economic challenges are expected to be a more significant factor in the choices of the voters in the next election.
The YRP does not favor another bid in the People’s Alliance, but it is open to aligning with the SP in the next election. Though Erbakan is confident about going solo, he also signaled openness to allying with other parties as well, including the Democracy and Progress (DEVA) and the Future Party (GP), which were founded by former members of the AK Party.
DEVA and GP
Although they are separate entities under Turkish laws, DEVA and GP are almost one in their policies and voter base. This eventually led to an alliance in the parliament under the New Path banner, together with the SP.
The DEVA was founded in 2020 by Former Minister Ali Babacan, once a rising young politician in the AK Party. He apparently followed the example of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who established SP one year before. In the 2023 elections, both parties relied on the main opposition to secure parliamentary seats, while they had no dream of having their own candidates against Erdoğan and his rival, CHP’s Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Babacan and Davutoğlu succeeded in convincing former AK Party supporters, including former ministers and those who served on the AK Party boards. Yet, this has not been enough to pass the electoral threshold.
Like the parties above, they can be lumped with right-wing or center-right parties, and their policies do not differ much from the AK Party’s policies in the early 2000s. Indeed, they have more in common with the AK Party than the six-party bloc they supported against Erdoğan in 2023. Their alliance with the opposition will likely continue in the next election, though they may prefer siding with the FP and the YRP instead of the CHP. Defeat of the CHP’s candidate Kılıçdaroğlu in the 2023 elections cost the main opposition party’s chair his seat but also revealed seething anger among CHP supporters against DEVA and FP lawmakers who won seats with CHP loyalists’ votes. The FP and DEVA were accused of being freeloaders who run under the CHP banner in the legislative elections in exchange for voicing their support for Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy. This mounting criticism effectively shut the door to another alliance, though both parties still appear to be on good terms with the CHP administration after Kılıçdaroğlu was replaced with Özgür Özel following his devastating electoral loss.
Good Party
Once hailed as the primary alternative to the MHP, IP now floats somewhere between a hub for nationalists who fell out with the MHP due to its proliferating alliance with the AK Party and a stopover or last destination for CHP voters believing that the party is too left-wing for their taste. The IP’s sole ideological compass adhering to the right-wing politics of yesteryear may bring in votes from the elderly voters, unlike the Victory Party (ZP), which appears to lure much younger voters despite a similar policy with the IP.
The party’s membership and poll numbers show a downward trend, as voters who prioritize national stability increasingly return to the MHP or look toward newer nationalist experiments. The party now faces the risk of becoming a “relic” before it ever truly matures, as it struggles to convince the public that it offers anything more than a diluted version of the MHP’s robust nationalism, willing to take risks for sustaining the state.
Party Chair Müsavat Dervişoğlu underlined that they were not open to alliances, especially establishing a “nationalist league” and relying on what little support it has to run in the future elections independently. Any future alliance may further erode the support, as the 2023 elections demonstrated.
Victory Party
One of the youngest parties, the ZP was founded in 2021 by 65-year-old Ümit Özdağ. Özdağ’s easygoing public image and oratory skills helped the party to attract voters at a time of rising anti-migrant, anti-refugee sentiment in the public. A diehard nationalist, Özdağ tempted impressionable youth with his radical discourse, which is blamed for notorious riots against migrants and refugees.
Unfortunately for the ZP, this appears to be the only thing the party is known for. With the end of the Syrian civil war and refugees returning home, the party might lose voters attracted to Özdağ’s narrative of “sending all refugees home immediately by Victory Tourism buses.”
In the 2023 elections and subsequent polls leading to 2026, the ZP has functioned more as a disruptor than a viable governing partner. Its aggressive stance often alienates the very conservative-nationalist base it hopes to win from the MHP and the AK Party. Though it captures a small, reactionary segment of the youth vote, its lack of a holistic platform makes it an unlikely contender for any serious power-sharing in the future. Still, the ZP is among the most willing to form alliances and most recently, called on the CHP to establish one with them for an “Ataturkist alliance.”
DEM Party
The DEM Party does not quite fit in the categories of relic or newcomer, but developments may render it the former. The latest incarnation of a left-wing ideology claiming to fight for the rights of the Kurdish community, the DEM Party holds considerable sway among the electorate, often trailing behind the CHP and occasionally overtaking the MHP in the opinion polls. Its spiritual predecessors have also enjoyed the same success in the elections.
The party’s electorate is strictly confined to Kurds, especially those concentrated in southeastern Türkiye. Despite securing roughly 8% in recent surveys, the party remains hamstrung by its inability to distance itself from the shadow of terrorism, which remains a red line for the majority of the electorate. Like its predecessors, the DEM Party has been a staunch supporter of the PKK terrorist group. A surprise initiative by the government to end the PKK terrorism outside of solely military means limited the DEM Party’s ambitions to thrive on pro-PKK propaganda to attract voters. In the past two years, the DEM Party has found itself in unexpected places: a messenger between PKK jailed ringleader Abdullah Öcalan and the general public, a guest at the Presidential Complex and in the offices of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, who publicly caught them off guard when he extended an olive branch to the party he once openly despised through well-known remarks in the past.
That the DEM Party and the CHP flirted with the idea of an alliance in the past elections and a so-called “urban compromise,” a not-so-hidden alliance for the DEM Party to support the CHP in big western cities where it has a slim chance of winning, is attributed to the main opposition’s growing success. Yet, with the terror-free Türkiye initiative launched by Bahçeli, the DEM Party has aligned more with the People’s Alliance, at least for the sake of the initiative. The DEM Party’s strict opposition and scathing rhetoric did not change much, though. The CHP or the DEM Party itself may try another shot at an alliance, hidden or obvious. But the CHP will have to risk losing voters who view the terror-free Türkiye initiative as a concession to the PKK.
A curt statement followed an Oct. 5 meeting of ministers and army chiefs in Riyadh on the Mecca Joint Defense Alliance. The Strategic Political and Defense Committee of the alliance, in its second meeting after an Istanbul gathering, decided to deploy military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia. The move is the most concrete step since the agreement was signed in August by top officials of Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to showcase the impact of the alliance in the broader region. Experts say the alliance remains focused on defense amid tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Yemen, which stepped up attacks on the kingdom.
The Sabah newspaper reported on Wednesday that Türkiye would provide low- and medium-altitude aerial defense systems to Saudi Arabia along with assistance in drone technologies and electronic warfare. The newspaper also reported that Saudi Arabia was working on setting up a base for Türkiye. A Foreign Ministry official told Daily Sabah that the Saudi side conveyed “some expectations” to Türkiye and they would examine those.
Gökhan Ereli, assistant professor in the Political Science and International Relations Department at Ibn Haldun University in Istanbul, told Daily Sabah that the multilateral defense mechanism represents “a strictly territorial security framework.”
“It is fundamentally defensive. Under no circumstances will allied military assets deployed through this agreement be drawn into the internal combat operations of the Yemeni theater. Their mandate remains exclusively confined to fortifying Saudi Arabia’s capacity to intercept cross-border hostilities. This ensures the kingdom can effectively shield its sovereign territory from external strikes. Ultimately, by consolidating these defensive lines, the pact establishes a robust deterrent that substantially bolsters the broader security architecture of the region,” Ereli stated.
As civil war in Yemen flared up this summer, Houthis spread it to Saudi Arabia, prompting the central government in Yemen to launch an all-out operation against the group this week. Saudi Arabia’s oil and military installations are among the main targets of the Houthis.
Ereli says the unified posture of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan was a result of current geopolitical realities.
“The Houthi movement continues to operate as a profound destabilizing force. They project a sustained, asymmetric threat both within Yemen’s borders and across the wider regional landscape. Countering this hazard is paramount. Furthermore, the structural stability of the entire region remains deeply intertwined with the political trajectory of Sanaa. Protecting the fundamental welfare of the Yemeni people and ensuring the survival of their legitimate political authority are not merely localized objectives. They serve as indispensable prerequisites for achieving durable regional peace and preventing further systemic fragmentation,” he said.
Critical threshold
Yusuf Bahadır Keskin, assistant professor at Amasya University Social and Strategic Research Center (AÜSSAM), says the alliance was at a “critical threshold,” citing the clause of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, which says an attack on one party would be viewed as an attack on all sides of the agreement.
“Nowadays, we witness that this won’t remain on paper. Houthis crossed a boundary here. Though they deny it, we saw attacks targeting the infrastructure of sacred sites. We see attacks on oil facilities and military bases in Saudi Arabia. This is beyond a mere border issue. It is an overall threat to the security of the kingdom and the region,” Keskin said.
He stated that Houthis’ aggression toward the legitimate government in Yemen was also unacceptable for the wider region. “Even though attacks on Saudi Arabia may cease at one point, it is not realistic to expect the situation to calm down in the short run,” he stressed.
Keskin highlighted that the Mecca alliance openly demonstrated that it would take “active responsibility in defense of Saudi Arabia” through the message given in Riyadh during the meeting of foreign and defense ministers and military officials on Monday.
“At this stage, the alliance’s strategy toward the Houthis should be understood primarily in terms of deterrence and defense support. Looking at the statements, there is no promise or plan for a ground operation inside Yemen or a joint offensive. The focus is clear: defending the kingdom’s territory. But there is another side to this. If the deterrence messages are ignored, the Houthis will have to face a much tougher intervention. In other words, the door is not closed, but the sequence is clear,” he underlined.
“Ankara and Islamabad could concretely contribute in areas such as air defense systems, intelligence sharing, advisory support or limited air assets. Each of these would significantly raise the cost of Houthi attacks targeting Saudi cities, energy infrastructure and holy sites. It would also make any potential retaliation much more effective and destructive,” Keskin added.
“Pakistan already has a longstanding military presence in Saudi Arabia, and expanding that presence could be on the agenda. Perhaps even the establishment of a Turkish military base in the kingdom could come up in the months ahead. For now, on the Turkish side, the focus appears to be more on training and the integration of defense industry products,” he also said.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said last month that the defense alliance was “part of a shared effort to promote regional security and stability.”
In an interview with U.S. magazine Newsweek, Erdoğan has stressed that Türkiye’s broader diplomatic priority was to prevent existing conflicts from spreading and to keep channels for negotiations open.
“Conflicts directly affect the security, economy and stability of our region. At times like these, it is the shared responsibility of the international community to expand the space for diplomacy rather than narrow it,” said Erdoğan.
Keskin says that Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s emphasis on a measured stance after the meeting in Riyadh shows that deterrence and a diplomatic solution are “still being given a chance.”
In his first statement after the meeting, Fidan underlined that they discussed in detail “what could be done to resolve the issue (of the Yemen conflict) peacefully and through dialogue.” Fidan said the talks focused both on strengthening the institutional structure of the alliance and on possible steps that could be taken in response to the current situation involving Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
“Diplomacy remains on the table, but there is also very serious preparation on the ground,” Keskin pointed out.
He added that the positions of Türkiye and Pakistan could have a profound impact on the regional balance, both in terms of deterrence and operational capacity.
“For Türkiye, the issue has both symbolic and strategic significance: the security of an ally, the protection of Islam’s holy sites, and the security of the Turkish Ministry of National Education-affiliated school in Abha, its staff and Turkish citizens, with the city located approximately 100 kilometers from the Yemeni border. When these three factors come together, the possibility of Türkiye becoming directly involved in the process, if necessary, will also increase,” he said.
“The latest developments represent the alliance’s first serious test. Since the alliance was announced, the Houthis have effectively been testing it, and that test has now crossed the red line. Everyone is now watching how the alliance will respond to this challenge. If the necessary steps are not taken at this stage, it could undermine the alliance’s credibility in the years ahead. But if it demonstrates the right and resolute stance, the Mecca alliance will have taken a very important step toward becoming a genuine security architecture in the region,” Keskin concluded.
Türkiye and Hungary will hold the first meeting of their Joint Planning Group on Thursday as the two NATO allies seek to deepen cooperation in trade, defense, energy and regional security, according to Turkish diplomatic sources.
Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Anita Orban will visit Türkiye on Oct. 8 for talks with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, with the newly established mechanism expected to provide a framework for coordinating the two countries’ expanding strategic partnership.
During the talks, Fidan is expected to underline the importance of a $10 billion (TL 491.95 billion) bilateral trade target as a key milestone for expanding economic ties and boosting mutual investment, according to the sources.
Bilateral trade reached approximately $5.1 billion in 2025. Turkish investments in Hungary currently total about $231 million, while Hungarian investments in Türkiye stand at about $35 million. Around 300 Turkish companies operate in Hungary, while nearly 100 Hungarian-capital companies are active in Türkiye.
Fidan is also expected to highlight cooperation in energy, transportation and connectivity and express Ankara’s interest in developing new joint projects.
Defense cooperation will feature prominently in the discussions, with Fidan expected to stress the importance of further developing military and defense industry ties between the two NATO allies based on shared interests and objectives.
The ministers are also expected to discuss Türkiye-European Union relations, including Ankara’s calls for the modernization of the customs union, progress in the visa liberalization dialogue and its long-running EU membership process.
The Turkish minister is expected to argue that Europe’s security cannot be considered separately from Türkiye’s capabilities and emphasize Ankara’s expectation of being effectively included in EU security and defense initiatives.
The talks are also expected to cover Hungary’s support for Türkiye’s EU accession process and Budapest’s engagement with the Organization of Turkic States, where Ankara views Hungary as playing an important role in strengthening interaction between Europe and the Turkic world.
Orban and Fidan are expected to exchange views on major regional and international developments, including the Russia-Ukraine war, Gaza and Palestine, the Balkans, Iran and developments surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.
Türkiye and Hungary established their High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2013, elevating bilateral ties to a strategic partnership. Relations were upgraded to an “enhanced strategic partnership” during the council’s sixth meeting in Budapest in 2023.
The Joint Planning Group was established at the council’s seventh meeting in Istanbul on Dec. 8, 2025. Co-chaired by the two countries’ foreign ministers, the group is tasked with coordinating the implementation of decisions taken by the council and preparing future high-level meetings.
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli addressed his supporters at a parliamentary group meeting on Tuesday. Among other things, Bahçeli’s speech focused on the political future of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan will be eligible to run for the presidency in the 2028 election, but this will require Parliament to approve the renewal of the election. Bahçeli pointed to this fact and threw his full support behind another term for Erdoğan.
“If our president finds it suitable and Parliament demonstrates its constitutional will, the People’s Alliance (of the MHP and Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party)) wants to have him as its candidate,” he said.
“Maintaining the momentum Türkiye has achieved will be possible if President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan runs for office once again and is elected president for a third term. The third term will coincide with many significant developments in Türkiye, the region and the world, and, above all, it will require the resolve and experience to navigate this challenging period. That experience lies with Erdoğan through the executive presidential system and the institutional structure of the People’s Alliance,” Bahçeli said.
It has been 12 years since Erdoğan became Türkiye’s first president elected directly by popular vote, a period that has seen the country overhaul its system of government and expand its diplomatic and defense footprint.
“At a time when the world is going through a chaotic period, amid an environment of uncertainty in our region and as historic steps are being taken toward a ‘terror-free Türkiye’ and a terror-free region, Türkiye needs to not change course or abandon its goals, but to fully maintain its existing capabilities and resources both systemically and institutionally,” Bahçeli said, referring to the process for the dissolution of the PKK terrorist group that the MHP leader spearheaded.
“Considering the responsibility our president has assumed to date, the leadership he has demonstrated and the strategic capacity he has brought to Türkiye, it would be in the interests of Türkiye and our region for him to serve another term as president. There is more than sufficient legal, political and social ground to make this possible,” Bahçeli stated.
Erdoğan’s chief adviser Mehmet Uçum, who also serves as deputy chair of the Presidency’s Legal Policies Board, clarified a debate over the date of the next elections last month. Uçum told journalists that the elections will most likely be held on April 16, 2028, the same date as a referendum held in 2017 on the switch to an executive presidential system. He also underlined that this would be the last election Erdoğan would be eligible to run in.
Uçum said the elections may be held on that date if Parliament approves the renewal of the elections, something that would require the support of 360 lawmakers. He said the possibility of an election in the last quarter of 2027 was “low” amid calls from the opposition for an early election.
Under Turkish law, an election would normally be held in May 2028. However, the Constitution allows Parliament to trigger an early election if such a move has the support of 360 of the Turkish Parliament’s 600 lawmakers, which would open the way for Erdoğan to seek another term. The People’s Alliance has 326 seats in total.
The government has repeatedly insisted that elections will be held on schedule. Erdoğan, who was elected prime minister in 2003, was elected president in 2014 after serving three terms as premier.
Bahçeli recalled Article 116 of the Constitution, which stipulates that, “If the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye decides to renew elections during the president’s second term, the president may run for office once more,” saying the provision allows for a third presidential candidacy if Parliament decides, by a qualified majority, to renew the elections.
“For President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to be able to run for office again, the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye should, at an appropriate time and with the broadest possible consensus, decide to renew the elections. If the renewed elections are held in 2028 within the framework of Parliament’s decision, this will not undermine stability or predictability, and the system will have been operated in accordance with its spirit. With the emergence of such a political will, unnecessary debates will come to an end, uncertainties will disappear, economic confidence will increase, and our country will be able to continue full steam ahead on its path as it takes historic steps. The instability that Türkiye’s adversaries expect and hope for will not materialize, and the calculations of those who invest in uncertainty, chaos and turmoil will be thwarted.
“It should also be underlined here that our issue is not the political careers of individuals, but the continuity of the state, political stability and, ultimately, the construction and revitalization of a leading Türkiye,” Bahçeli said.
Emphasizing that the MHP views 2028 not merely as an election year but as the beginning of a period in which major reforms will be implemented in Türkiye, Bahçeli said efforts aimed at diverting attention from these goals should come to an end.
“Candidacy must be clarified, and the realities of the world must be confronted under conditions of ruthless competition. Alongside the president, the parliamentary majority must undoubtedly also belong to the People’s Alliance, while the Nationalist Movement Party must definitely increase its strength of representation in the legislature to ensure that the checks and balances mechanism functions more effectively. Because if the MHP is strong, Türkiye will be secure. If the MHP is strong, our national unity and fraternity will be strengthened, and our people will find peace,” he said.
Bahçeli said his party’s legislative objectives were clear.
“First is representational strength. Within this framework, our goal is to increase our vote share, raise the number of our lawmakers and become Türkiye’s leading party. Second is institutional strength. Within the institutional structure of the legislature, our goal is to assume more positions in its governing bodies and become more effective. Third is political strength. In this way, we aim to become more effective and decisive in legislative activities and policymaking, and to implement our party’s strategic objectives and economic and social policy priorities,” he said.
“Within this framework, I express the political formula for the next five-year period, which will witness Türkiye’s rise, as follows: Erdoğan in the executive, MHP in the legislature, the People’s Alliance in Türkiye, and the ‘Century of Türkiye’ in the world. This formula expresses our strategy that the legislature, like the executive, must be strong, while also being able to exercise oversight, produce policies and play a decisive role, as well as our determination to become a global power.”
Bahçeli, who traditionally wears a different ring at every parliamentary group speech, was seen wearing one featuring the crescent and star symbols of the Turkish flag and the immortal verses of Turkish folk singer Neşet Ertaş: “You have been my hidden, you are my outward, you have been my first, you are my last,” words derived from esoteric expressions linked to Islam.
Security forces on Wednesday launched two new operations in Istanbul and Izmir targeting municipal officials accused of corruption. They are the latest in a string of raids targeting municipalities across the country over the past two years.
In Istanbul’s Esenyurt district, one of the city’s most populated districts, police detained 17 suspects, including a deputy mayor. The suspects are accused of corruption in certain public tenders held by the municipality and taking bribes from contractors. Two other suspects in the case remain at large.
Along with Deputy Mayor Yusuf Ulutaş, former Deputy Mayor Ümit Ünal and the head of a municipal department were detained in the operation. Esenyurt municipality was run by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), but Mayor Ahmet Özer was removed from office in 2024 after his arrest in an investigation into his alleged links to a terrorist group. Since then, the municipality has been run by a district governor appointed as a trustee.
In Çeşme, a popular tourism destination in the western province of Izmir, security forces detained 11 suspects in an operation targeting the local municipality. The suspects are accused of running a criminal ring and committing bribery and forgery of official documents. Among those detained was the acting head of the municipality’s construction and urban planning department.
Authorities said the operation was launched following a tip that a municipal employee was trying to destroy documents at the construction and urban planning department, apparently to cover up irregularities. Çeşme’s former Deputy Mayor O.G., a suspect in the case, was already jailed as part of another investigation.
Earlier investigations in other municipalities showed that construction and urban planning departments were heavily involved in corruption scandals, allegedly issuing construction and zoning permits in exchange for lavish gifts and cash from contractors and other businesspeople.
On Tuesday, the Interior Ministry announced that four mayors and an acting mayor had been suspended from office after being detained in corruption investigations.
Among them were Mithat Bülent Özmen, mayor of Istanbul’s Eyüpsultan district; Murat Güneş, acting mayor of Istanbul’s Ataşehir district; Abdullah Özyiğit, mayor of the Yenişehir district of the southern province of Mersin; and Ahmet Serkan Tuncer, mayor of Mersin’s Mezitli district.
Mersin Mayor Vahap Seçer, who was detained along with Tuncer and Özyiğit in a recent anti-corruption operation, was suspended both from his mayoral post and as chair of the Union of Municipalities of Türkiye.
A Greek Cypriot municipal council has decided to rename a street honoring Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Türkiye, in the historic Turkish Cypriot quarter of the coastal city of Paphos (Baf).
The Paphos municipal council approved by a majority vote a proposal to rename Kemal Atatürk Street in the Moutallos neighborhood as “Memory and Hope Street,” according to local reports.
Deputy Mayor Angelos Onisiforou also supported the change.
Moutallos was predominantly inhabited by Turkish Cypriots before 1974, and several streets in the neighborhood bear the names of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot historical figures.
The decision follows earlier efforts to change street names in the neighborhood. In May, local officials backed a proposal to rename Kemal Atatürk Street after Nikos Kapetanidis.
Kapetanidis, after whom the street was set to be named, was a journalist who published a newspaper in Trabzon and was sentenced to death by an Independence Tribunal in 1921 amid efforts to counter Pontic Greek armed groups and their supporters in the Black Sea region during the Turkish War of Independence.
DISY municipal council member Nina Gkaraklidou said at the time that the proposal had been approved, while indicating that efforts to rename other streets in the area would continue because some existing names were considered “offensive.”
The initiative previously drew criticism from Turkish Cypriot authorities.
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Prime Minister Ünal Üstel described attempts to remove Atatürk’s name from streets as a “hostile attitude,” accusing the Greek Cypriot side of contradicting its calls for peace and goodwill.
Üstel said Turkish Cypriots had consistently respected the religious values, symbols and traditions of the Greek Cypriot community and expected the same respect in return.
The “October 6-7 incidents,” as they are commonly known, claimed 35 lives across Türkiye in 2014. As the country edges closer to the goal of the full dissolution of the terrorist group PKK, the riots incited by a PKK-linked party bring back painful memories for the families of the victims.
Yasin Börü, a teenager, became a symbol of the impact of PKK violence when he was killed by an angry mob in the southeastern province of Diyarbakır as he was going door-to-door with three friends to deliver charitable donations to families in need.
The riots, which also paved the way for the collapse of the “reconciliation process” aimed at ending PKK violence, were linked to a call by the now-defunct Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) for Türkiye to help members of the terrorist group YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK. The HDP invited its supporters to take to the streets for “protests,” which quickly evolved into all-out riots in 35 provinces, particularly in the southeast, where the PKK sought to exploit disillusioned Kurdish youth for its separatist agenda.
Pro-PKK groups set up barricades and launched attacks on public buildings as well as the residences of people viewed as anti-PKK. Along with civilians, two police officers were killed in the riots, while another 761 people were injured. After the riots died down, authorities launched investigations into more than 1,600 suspects, 386 of whom were arrested.
Börü, Hasan Gökguz, Ahmet Dakak and Riyat Güneş were volunteers for a charity known for its anti-PKK stance. As they were delivering meat to families in need, they were cornered inside a building by a mob. They were severely beaten and tortured inside the building where they had taken refuge. They were then thrown out of a window, and their bodies were mutilated.
Forty-one defendants were put on trial for the killings of Börü and the others, and 18 of them were sentenced to life imprisonment.
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