Türkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has regained the lead in voter support, reaching 31.9% in an October election survey by MetroPOLL Research, while the New Party (YP) suffered a sharp decline, falling to 25% after leading by more than 10 percentage points in July.

The survey, comparing voter preferences in July and October 2026, revealed significant shifts in support for major political parties, with the AK Party overtaking its closest rival by 6.9 percentage points.

According to the results, which were calculated after proportionally distributing undecided voters, nonresponses and protest votes, the AK Party increased its support by 2.92 percentage points from 28.98% in July to 31.9% in October.

The New Party, which topped the July survey with 39.2%, recorded the steepest decline among the parties surveyed, losing 14.2 percentage points to fall to 25% and second place.

The reversal marks a significant shift from July, when the YP held a 10.22-percentage-point advantage over the ruling party.

The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) registered the largest increase in voter support, climbing 3.61 percentage points from 6.99% in July to 10.6% in October, placing third.

The Good Party (IP) also recorded a notable increase, rising 3.45 percentage points from 5.05% to 8.5%.

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the AK Party’s governing alliance partner, increased its support from 4.66% to 6.6%, a gain of 1.94 percentage points.

Meanwhile, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) saw its support edge down from 3.75% to 3.5%, according to the figures provided in the survey report.

The New Welfare Party (YRP) increased its share from 2.2% to 3.4%, while the Key Party (Anahtar Party) rose from 1.68% to 3.2%.

According to the October report, undecided voters and protest responses accounted for 27.8% of respondents before their proportional redistribution among political parties.

The adjusted results placed the AK Party first, followed by the YP, DEM Party, IP and MHP.

The findings suggest a substantial reshuffling of voter preferences between July and October, although the figures represent polling estimates rather than actual election results.

Moreover, presidential chief adviser Mehmet Uçum recently said the Constitution allows Erdoğan to seek reelection if Parliament votes to call early elections, suggesting April 16, 2028, as his preferred date to coincide with the anniversary of Türkiye’s 2017 constitutional referendum.

Uçum argued that bringing forward the vote would not constitute an early election in the traditional sense but rather an adjustment to enable Erdoğan’s candidacy.

He cited the 2023 presidential election, which was held on May 14 instead of its originally scheduled June 18 date, as a precedent.

He further claimed that around 500 lawmakers could support a parliamentary decision to renew elections, adding that Erdoğan’s candidacy was politically settled but still required legal authorization.

Under Article 116 of Türkiye’s Constitution, Parliament can call for renewed presidential and parliamentary elections with a three-fifths majority, requiring at least 360 votes in the 600-seat legislature.

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) ally currently hold 331 seats, meaning they would need support from at least 29 opposition lawmakers.

Erdoğan was elected president under Türkiye’s current presidential system in 2018 and 2023. The Constitution generally limits presidents to two terms but provides an exception when Parliament renews elections during a president’s second term.

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Turkish authorities have uncovered a network of police officers allegedly supplying confidential information to a man arrested on suspicion of spying for Israeli intelligence, revealing unauthorized access to police databases and surveillance of Palestinian activists and Turkish citizens, according to a report by Sabah newspaper.

The findings emerged from the second phase of an investigation conducted by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Istanbul Police Department’s Counterterrorism Branch into Serkan Çiçek, who was arrested in 2025 over allegations of conducting surveillance activities on behalf of Israeli intelligence.

Investigators identified 11 current and former police officers who allegedly maintained direct or indirect contact with Çiçek from 2023 to 2024, providing access to restricted databases and confidential personal records.

According to the report, the suspects included a chief inspector and two former police officers; the remaining nine were described as active-duty personnel. The investigation examined messages, audio recordings, phone records and witness statements.

Authorities found that Çiçek, who presented himself as the owner of Pandora Detective Agency, obtained sensitive information through police officers who accessed official databases without authorization.

In one instance, a suspect identified as Mehmet Nurullah Y., allegedly obtained hotel accommodation records through a colleague’s access credentials and passed the information to Çiçek.

The spy monitored the individual’s movements and conducted reconnaissance near the person’s residence.

Another officer, identified as Şahin K., admitted to secretly monitoring a jeweler for about 14 hours while off duty at Çiçek’s request.

Investigators also found that officers shared citizens’ identification numbers, residential addresses, family information, vehicle registration details, hotel records and criminal histories through WhatsApp.

According to the report, Çiçek used the alias Serkan Ipek and presented himself as an intelligence operative while visiting government offices in a vehicle equipped with emergency flashing lights.

The investigation further uncovered an alleged financial scheme through which Çiçek established relationships with police officers by promising lucrative business opportunities.

Presenting himself as the wealthy owner of two companies, Çiçek reportedly borrowed small amounts of money from officers before repaying them with additional profits to gain their confidence.

He subsequently persuaded several officers to obtain bank loans ranging from TL 1.2 million to TL 3 million (approximately $25,000 to $60,000), promising returns from food distribution and water purification businesses.

When payments stopped, several officers reportedly faced severe financial difficulties, including the sale of personal assets and accumulated savings.

Police officer Nurullah Y. reportedly suffered a heart attack amid mounting debts and underwent surgery to receive two coronary stents.

Authorities also determined that Çiçek allegedly used bank accounts and cryptocurrency accounts belonging to family members and an associate to conceal proceeds from his activities.

The findings have expanded the investigation into alleged espionage, unauthorized disclosure of confidential information and financial misconduct involving law enforcement personnel.

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The Greek Cypriot administration plans to allocate approximately 230 million euros (nearly $260 million) to water infrastructure and supplies in 2027 as worsening drought conditions strain resources, while Türkiye’s decade-old underwater pipeline continues to provide drinking and irrigation water to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

According to Greek Cypriot media reports, the administration is preparing at least 65 drinking water and irrigation projects, with approximately 43% of the Agriculture Ministry’s proposed budget earmarked for the water sector.

Of the total allocation, 158 million euros will be dedicated to purchasing desalinated water as authorities seek to secure supplies amid persistent shortages.

Greek Cypriot Agriculture Minister Christos Senekis said the proposed water budget represents an increase of approximately 30 million euros compared with 2026. The administration plans to undertake 15 major infrastructure projects while maintaining continuous operations at existing desalination facilities.

It currently relies on five permanent and five mobile desalination plants, with two additional mobile facilities planned to expand production capacity.

Türkiye’s cross-sea water link

While Greek Cypriot authorities pursue new investments to address water shortages, Türkiye has supplied the TRNC through an underwater pipeline since 2015.

The TRNC Water Supply Project, inaugurated by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Oct. 17, 2015, was designed to address longstanding water shortages and strengthen water security in the Turkish side of the island.

Known in Türkiye as the “Project of the Century,” the system transports freshwater from the Alaköprü Dam in Anamur, in Türkiye’s southern Mersin province, across the Mediterranean to the Geçitköy Dam in the TRNC.

The pipeline, which includes an approximately 80-kilometer (49.7-mile) offshore section, has an annual transportation capacity of 75 million cubic meters (19.8 billion gallons).

Of that capacity, approximately 37.76 million cubic meters are designated for drinking, domestic and industrial use, while 37.24 million cubic meters are allocated to agricultural irrigation.

The project aims to reduce dependence on limited local water resources while supporting agricultural production and economic development.

Islandwide water proposal

Türkiye has also expressed willingness to extend the project’s benefits beyond the TRNC under appropriate political conditions.

According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s 2015 annual report, the water supply system could potentially be expanded to serve the entire island if the Greek Cypriot side demonstrated the necessary political willingness.

The proposal highlighted the possibility of using water infrastructure as an avenue for cooperation between the island’s two communities.

As Greek Cypriot authorities prepare substantial investments in desalination and water infrastructure, Türkiye’s existing pipeline remains a major component of the TRNC’s water supply network, providing an alternative source of freshwater amid recurring drought conditions across the island.

TRNC Prime Minister Ünal Üstel said last week that the Turkish Cypriot side remained open to cooperation with the Greek Cypriot leadership on both water and natural gas.

“Our door is always open to the Greek Cypriot leadership on both water and natural gas,” he noted in a written statement.

Üstel added that his government was closely monitoring the Greek Cypriot administration’s diplomatic initiatives and correspondence with the United Nations and European Union, warning that unilateral actions disregarding Turkish Cypriots’ rights and interests could further undermine stability on the island.

Türkiye and the TRNC signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on natural gas supplies on July 10, after which Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar announced that work had begun on a subsea pipeline linking the two.

Bayraktar said the planned pipeline would stretch 101 kilometers (63 miles), including 97 kilometers offshore and 4 kilometers onshore, connecting Anamur on Türkiye’s Mediterranean coast with Teknecik in the TRNC.

The project envisages two 22-inch pipelines designed to operate in both directions, allowing natural gas to flow from Türkiye to the TRNC while also enabling any future gas production from the island to be transported to Türkiye and potentially onward to Europe.

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Türkiye, which has been involved in climate negotiations since the 1990s, when global climate talks gained momentum, is preparing to open a new chapter with its hosting of and presidency over COP31.

COP31, the world’s most important climate-themed gathering, will be held next week in Antalya, a Mediterranean city in southern Türkiye, which has been a venue of high-profile events in recent years, including the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Prior to that, Türkiye has contributed to international efforts to combat climate change to date.

As part of efforts led by the United Nations to establish global cooperation in combating climate change, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was opened for signature at the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The convention, which became the foundation of international cooperation in the fight against climate change, entered into force in 1994. Following the convention’s entry into force, the Conference of the Parties (COP) began international climate negotiations. The COP was authorized to regularly review the implementation of the convention and adopt the necessary decisions to promote its effective implementation.

While the first COP summit was held in Berlin in 1995, Türkiye participated in COP summits as an observer country until 2004, when it became a party to the UNFCCC. Having joined the convention on May 24, 2004, Türkiye has since attended subsequent COP summits as a party.

Following its accession to the convention, Türkiye restructured its Climate Change Coordination Board that same year and established eight technical working groups. The Ankara Climate Change Conference was also held on Sept. 1-3, 2004.

In 2006, Türkiye submitted its first greenhouse gas inventory to the UNFCCC Secretariat. Parliamentary commissions on global warming were also established.

Türkiye signed the Kyoto Protocol in 2009. Adopted in 1997 and entering into force in 2005, the protocol was regarded at the time as the most significant step taken toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

In May 2010, the National Climate Change Strategy Document was published, followed in 2011 by the National Climate Change Action Plan and the Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan. These documents were regarded as important steps toward fulfilling Türkiye’s obligations in international climate negotiations.

The Paris Agreement, a legally binding international treaty on climate change, was adopted at COP21 in Paris on Dec. 12, 2015, and entered into force on Nov. 4, 2016.

At the heart of this global framework are the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), through which countries party to the agreement set out concrete commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and strengthen their resilience to the adverse effects of climate change.

Türkiye signed the Paris Agreement on April 22, 2016, and became a party to it on Nov. 10, 2021. Like all other parties, Türkiye began submitting NDCs to the UNFCCC Secretariat every five years, each time including more ambitious emission reduction targets and, on a voluntary basis, climate change adaptation targets.

Within the framework of the Glasgow Climate Pact, adopted by parties at COP26 in addition to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, Türkiye submitted its Updated First Nationally Determined Contribution on April 13, 2023.

With this submission, Türkiye reaffirmed its commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 41% by 2030 compared with the reference scenario outlined in its First Nationally Determined Contribution and Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, which used 2012 as the base year.

Türkiye strengthened its targets in its Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0), pledging to achieve a greenhouse gas emissions reduction of 466 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent by 2035 compared with the reference scenario and limit its emissions to 643 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.

International initiatives undertaken under the Zero Waste Project, launched in 2017 by the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change under the auspices of first lady Emine Erdoğan, have also become one of the key components of Türkiye’s climate diplomacy agenda. On Dec. 14, 2022, the U.N. General Assembly designated March 30 as International Zero Waste Day. At the same meeting, the U.N. Secretary-General’s Advisory Board of Eminent Persons on Zero Waste, announced by Antonio Guterres, was established on April 12, 2023. At Guterres’ proposal, Emine Erdoğan assumed the chairmanship of the U.N. Advisory Board of Eminent Persons on Zero Waste.

Following the consensus reached at COP30, held last year in the Brazilian city of Belem, Türkiye took on the responsibility of hosting COP31 and holding its presidency.

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Parliament is debating a bill Wednesday approving the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, a trilateral pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan aimed at strengthening collective defense, military cooperation and regional security coordination.

The agreement identifies Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as its three founding members, referred to as “Core Parties,” and establishes mutual defense obligations based on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law.

Under Article 2, an externally initiated armed attack or military aggression against any signatory would be considered an attack against all three countries.

The provision draws on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

However, military assistance would not be automatic or unconditional. The country facing an attack must first request support, after which the three parties would jointly assess the situation and determine the nature and scope of assistance through consensus.

Any deployment of Turkish troops abroad would remain subject to Article 92 of Türkiye’s Constitution, which regulates parliamentary authorization for overseas military operations.

Joint defense production

Beyond collective security commitments, the agreement outlines extensive cooperation in defense manufacturing, technological development and military logistics.

The three countries would pursue joint weapons production, research and development projects, technology transfers and specialized personnel training.

The framework also provides for coordinated logistical support, including supplies of ammunition, weapons, fuel and spare parts during peacetime, wartime and emergencies.

The agreement would establish a Strategic Political and Defense Committee comprising the foreign ministers, defense ministers and military chiefs of the three countries.

The committee would meet at least twice annually, with rotating host countries, while national leaders could convene once a year when necessary.

Saudi Arabia would host a permanent secretariat headed by a secretary-general serving a rotating three-year term. The first secretary-general would be a Pakistani national.

Articles 9 and 13 outline cooperation on counterterrorism and intelligence sharing through agreed secure communication channels.

Classified information would be protected under a “need-to-know” principle and could not be shared with third countries or companies.

The agreement would enter into force after the parties deposit their ratification documents with the secretariat and remain valid indefinitely.

Member countries would be prohibited from withdrawing during the first 10 years. After that period, withdrawal would require at least three months’ written notice.

Additional countries could join only with the unanimous approval of the founding members and would be required to uphold principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference.

For Türkiye, the proposed pact represents an effort to expand defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan while coordinating diplomatic and security initiatives through a formal trilateral framework.

Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia held the first meeting of the Strategic Political and Defense Committee established under the agreement in Istanbul on Aug. 31. At that meeting, the three countries agreed to take further steps to institutionalize cooperation and establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia headed initially by a Pakistani secretary-general for a three-year term.

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Thursday is the 20th anniversary of the passing of Bülent Ecevit, a prime minister who left his mark on Turkish politics both with controversies and remarkable achievements.

The leader of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) governed Türkiye five times as prime minister before his death at the age of 81 due to respiratory failure. It was during his tenure in the 1970s and 1990s that Türkiye launched the Peace Operation in Cyprus and captured the leader of the PKK terrorist group, two major turning points in the brief history of the republic. It was also Ecevit who was blamed for a major economic crisis in the 2000s and drew the hatred of Muslims for opposing a headscarf-wearing lawmaker during the notorious period after the 1997 coup.

A man of short stature and dark complexion, Ecevit was nicknamed “Karaoğlan” (reportedly by a supporter during his visit to the home of a friend in eastern Türkiye), which can be roughly translated as “dark son,” an affectionate expression in Anatolia.

Before his foray into politics, something he inherited from his lawmaker father, Fahri Ecevit, Ecevit worked as a journalist and translator. Along with translating the works of Rabindranath Tagore, T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound into Turkish, Ecevit himself penned several poems. Yet, he found his true calling in politics. He became a member of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in 1954, when the party was the main opposition after a lengthy rule. He served as a lawmaker for the CHP and later was appointed as labor minister between 1961 and 1965. In 1966, Ecevit’s political life took a new turn as he formed an opposition movement within the CHP with the “Democratic Left” faction of the CHP. After a major fallout with Chair Ismet Inönü, Ecevit challenged him and was elected as CHP chair in 1972. He was first elected as prime minister in 1974 in a coalition government the CHP formed with the National Salvation Party (MSP). Months after taking office, Ecevit faced a critical decision: dispatching troops to Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots against attacks by Greek Cypriots. The peace operation he ordered ensured Turkish Cypriot presence on the island and restored peace.

Like other politicians, Ecevit found himself briefly jailed by the military junta that seized power on Sept. 12, 1980, and faced a political ban. At that time, his wife, Rahşan Ecevit, founded the Democratic Left Party (DSP). After his political ban ended, Ecevit was elected chair of the DSP in 1987. The DSP struggled in the Turkish political scene in the early 1990s but found itself as the biggest left-wing party after the 1994 elections. Ecevit served as deputy prime minister and prime minister in coalition governments, a staple of the 1990s. During one of these tenures, Ecevit oversaw the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the elusive leader of the terrorist group PKK responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of people across Türkiye since the 1980s. Öcalan was brought to Türkiye from Kenya and was jailed for life.

Ecevit was the prime minister of the coalition government formed by the DSP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) after the 1999 elections. It was during this tenure that Ecevit incurred the wrath of the conservative electorate when he opposed Merve Kavakçı’s attendance at Parliament’s General Assembly. Kavakçı, of the Virtue Party (FP), was about to take the oath as the first headscarf-wearing lawmaker in Turkish politics. Ecevit made a fervent speech against Kavakçı while fellow DSP lawmakers sought to block her. He called on other lawmakers to take action against Kavakçı, who was forced to leave Parliament amid outrage from the secular elite and subsequently lost her citizenship.

In 2001, Ecevit was at the heart of another scandal. His quite public row with President Ahmet Necdet Sezer that ended with Sezer hurling a Constitution book toward Ecevit during a tense meeting paved the way for a severe economic crisis. His popularity plummeted, and the DSP lost the 2002 elections. Two years later, Ecevit quit politics. In his final days in office, Ecevit was criticized for clinging to power despite his apparently frail health.

He was hospitalized with a brain haemorrhage in May 2026 and died in intensive care about six months later.

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