The statement from Kandil on the first anniversary of the PKK’s dissolution congress on 5-7 May 2025 clearly revealed this fact. KCK Executive Council Member Mustafa Karasu and KCK Presidential Council Member Sozdar Avesta appeared in front of the cameras with the members of the armed organization and announced that they changed the name of the organization to “Apoist Movement Management”. However, the striking point was this: While the new name was announced, the old KCK titles continued to be used. So the name had changed, but the structure, staff and weapons remained in the same place.

THE MAIN MESSAGE GIVEN BY KANDIL

In fact, the message Kandil gave was quite clear. Abdullah Öcalan is considered the natural leader of the organization, but the control of the weapons and the schedule of the process were wanted to be kept in the hands of Kandil. The moral authority of Imrali was recognized, but the operational will was not left to the process and Öcalan.

On the contrary, Ankara is following a clear sequence. According to the information I have obtained from the sources of the Ministry of Intelligence and Justice, the state has made its decision: First the weapons will be laid down, then the law will come into effect. At the center of the process will be MİT’s detection and confirmation mechanism. For the state’s mind, the main issue is no longer words, but concrete data on the field.

The draft law prepared by the Ministry of Justice has two main pillars. The first of these is the return of members of the organization who are not involved in crime, and the second is how the disarmament process will be managed technically. MİT’s detection and verification system was discussed in detail at the Cabinet’s May 4 meeting. The meeting held by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli in the Social Complex showed that the political consensus on the Ankara front still continues.

THE FORMULA OF THE STATE IS NET

The person who formulated this framework most clearly was Devlet Bahçeli. The sentences used by Bahçeli in the Turkish Grand National Assembly group meeting clearly revealed the ranking of the state. Bahçeli said that Abdullah Öcalan’s legal situation can only be evaluated after the dissolution of the organization with all its elements and the delivery of weapons. So Ankara’s formula was clear: First termination, then delivery, then the legal process will begin.

The “Peace Process and Politicization Coordination” model proposed by Bahçeli is also based on the same ranking logic. In this model, no status discussion is opened without laying down weapons. The sentence “Türkiye without terrorism is not surrender, it is not compromise, it is not bargaining” describes the red line of the state itself.

However, Kandil’s statements argue the opposite. The most critical part of Mustafa Karasu’s statement was this: “Linking legal steps to laying down arms does not reflect the truth.” This sentence is actually a direct objection to Ankara’s model. Because Qandil is still trying to impose the “law first, then weapons” formula.

But even the statement itself contains a serious contradiction. On the one hand, it is said that “we have withdrawn our armed forces beyond the border”, and on the other hand, the statements are made with armed cadres. Even this image is enough to show the organization’s true intentions regarding weapons.

IMRALI WILL QANDIL PRACTICE

The sentence “Öcalan should manage disarmament”, used by KCK Member Murat Karayılan at the PKK 12th Congress, seems at first glance to be a commitment to the İmralı will. However, intelligence officers read between the lines differently. Kandil actually implicitly says: “Öcalan is the leader, but we also have control of the weapon.” The real knot of the process occurs right here.

Because Öcalan’s call for February 27, 2025 is still on the table today. However, Kandil wants to decide alone how the call will be reflected on the field. This is exactly the point that Ankara does not trust.

One of the invisible but most critical details of the process was that the DEM delegation could not establish direct contact with Öcalan for about a month. This is not an ordinary technical problem. Because the will coming from İmralı gives Kandil time and bargaining space every day that he cannot reach the field directly.

As a matter of fact, it is noteworthy that Karayılan’s interview with the organization’s ANF broadcast on April 30 and Karasu’s statement on May 5 coincided with the same period. One speaks from the military wing, the other from the political wing, one after the other, but repeats the same discourse. This shows the intelligence officers that a coordinated line of resistance has formed within the organization.

FOR THE FIRST TIME DEM IS THIS POLITICALLY DARE!

Another statement that made this picture even more remarkable came from DEM Co-Chairman Tuncer Bakırhan. Bakırhan clearly stated that they support the framework put forward by Bahçeli. More importantly, he directly rejected Qandil’s “Middle East is boiling” thesis.

Bakırhan’s following sentence was quite critical: “If regulations are made for democratic politics and the PKK does not do what is necessary, we will be the first to criticize.”

This statement shows for the first time in such a sharp and bold way that there is a clear distance between DEM and Kandil that has not been seen in a long time.

PKK’S INVISIBLE ECONOMIC BACKNESS

There are three basic calculations behind Karasu and Karayılan’s statements. The first is to keep bargaining. The second is to reposition the PKK within the regional equation. The third is to preserve the economic order, that is, the status quo, of the structure, which is nearly fifty years old.

As a journalist who has been closely following the European leg of the PKK since 2007, I can clearly say that the shell company chains stretching from Luxembourg to Rotterdam, from Paris to Brussels, constituted the invisible economic backbone of the organization. For the PKK elite monks, weapons are not only an ideological tool, but also the main center of the economic and organizational order.

The structure, which extends from drug trafficking to the pressure on the European Kurdish diaspora to black money networks operating through restaurants and front companies, still constitutes the main power of the organization today. Karayılan’s statement “our security is our weapons” is actually the code for the continuation of this black economic order.

2015 WILL NOT BE ALLOWED A REPEAT

The tension within the organization is becoming increasingly visible. It is known that there were serious conflicts in the upper management during the decision to terminate the PKK at the 12th Congress. The latest statements of Karasu and Karayılan should be read as a reflection of this internal struggle.

Senior managers of the intelligence agency now read this picture differently. Because for the state, the issue is not just organizational statements, but real data experienced in the field. This was the main reason for the breakdown in the 2013-2015 peace process. At that time, Qandil calculated the conjuncture, put the gun on the table again with the dream of establishing a new state in Syria, and the process collapsed.

This time, the state mind does not want to return to the same ground again. For this reason, preparations for the law are progressing together with the intelligence and military double verification system.

It is also noteworthy that in Mustafa Karasu’s statement, non-organizational names such as Osman Kavala and Can Atalay, other than Selahattin Demirtaş, were brought to the agenda. Because these topics are put forward as part of the political bargaining area, not the direct disarmament process.

Ankara’s approach is very clear here too. Öcalan’s physical conditions or political arrangements will only be evaluated after the complete disarmament and surrender.

THE CRITICAL QUESTION IS NOW!

At this point today, the critical question is: Does Kandil really not want to read the process, or is he trying to keep a new armed ground open in a controlled manner?

Because there is a third space in the middle that is getting narrower.

One of the clearest facts that my nearly twenty years of field observation has shown me is this: It has not been possible for an independent Kurdish politics to gain ground in Türkiye without breaking Qandil’s armed tutelage. Many political figures, from Leyla Zana to Hatip Dicle, from Dicle to Selahattin Demirtaş, experienced the harsh impact of this shadow in different periods.

I can say this: What is remarkable today is that both Öcalan and the DEM administration are so openly approaching unarmed politics for the first time. The resisting structure seems to be the old tutelage reflex in Qandil.

THE STATE IS NOW MEASURING THE FIELD

As a result, the state’s position is now clear. Weapons will be released unconditionally. MIT’s detection and confirmation mechanism in the field will work predictably. As for the legal process, the whole process will come into play in a planned manner, step by step, when the specified order comes.

The fate of this process will no longer be determined by Ankara’s statements, but by Kandil’s real decision on the field.

Last word: The state will no longer measure the words floating in the air, but the field clearly.