The “King of the North” is expanding his “kingdom” to other domains of the United Kingdom, but what can be expected from Andy Burnham, the seventh prime minister of the country in a decade, in international relations? Burnham has mainly focused on domestic issues, particularly on the economic side, since taking office on July 20, but soon he will have more on his plate in foreign affairs. Among these responsibilities are relations with Türkiye, which somewhat thrived under Keir Starmer. Experts say this momentum may very well continue under Burnham.

Professor Ozan Örmeci, a political scientist and general coordinator of the International Political Academy (UPA), points to Downing Street’s pragmatic approach to relations and believes this will carry over into the new era under Burnham, “at a time where transactionalism dominates international relations.”

“Türkiye too favors a relationship based on mutual interests and benefits, though this was not always the case in recent decades,” Örmeci told Daily Sabah. “In this context, Türkiye-U.K. relations will start out the new era strongly,” he underlined.

Relations between the two countries – which inherited the legacies of two great empires – have always been close, even when they were on opposing sides of conflicts such as World War I. Throughout the rest of the 20th century, relations seldom deteriorated, and in recent years, a new momentum has emerged, especially in terms of the economy.

“A Burnham government is unlikely to bring about a fundamental shift in U.K.-Türkiye relations,” said Hacı Mehmet Boyraz, vice chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University.

“Bilateral ties have remained stable and constructive in recent years, regardless of changes in government, reflecting a relationship that is increasingly driven by shared strategic and economic interests rather than partisan politics. While a Labour government may differ from its Conservative predecessors on certain foreign policy issues, continuity is likely to outweigh change in its approach toward Türkiye,” Boyraz told Daily Sabah.

Under Keir Starmer, relations remained close and strategic, particularly in defense, security, trade and regional diplomacy. This was especially evident in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and growing tensions in the Middle East, as both countries are important NATO allies. Without a major shift on Burnham’s part, this trend may very well continue.

The highlights of the Starmer era were efforts to upgrade the post-Brexit free trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries and the signing of the Strategic Partnership Document last April. There was also the deal to acquire Eurofighter Typhoon jets. Last year, the two countries signed a multibillion-dollar agreement for the acquisition of the jets – “a new symbol of the strategic relationship between us as two close allies,” as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said following the signing of the deal during a visit by Starmer to Ankara in 2025.

As Burnham aims for several major economic changes in his country, especially through “re-industrialization” plans, extra funds will come in handy. “Eurofighter sales can do this, and this will be a positive development for the U.K. economy,” Örmeci highlighted.

Boyraz says defense cooperation is an area with “considerable untapped potential.”

“Although the possible sale of Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft has attracted significant attention, bilateral defense relations should not be viewed solely through the prism of a single procurement project. The United Kingdom possesses one of Europe’s most advanced defense-industrial bases, while Türkiye has emerged as one of the fastest-growing defense producers in recent years through substantial investments in indigenous capabilities. These complementary strengths create opportunities for a broader strategic partnership based on technology transfer, joint production, research and development, and cooperation in next-generation defense technologies,” Boyraz said. “Such cooperation would not only generate mutual economic benefits but also contribute to NATO’s long-term defense capabilities. For this reason, the momentum established under the Starmer government is likely to continue under Burnham, and there is even scope for further deepening bilateral defense-industrial cooperation.”

“Burnham showed particular success in the local elections, working a small-scale miracle in Manchester. He turned Manchester into the fastest-growing city not just in England, but in the entire United Kingdom. But of course, this took time; he didn’t achieve it in just a year or two. He has reasonable proposals to revitalize the economy, but these are mostly tailored to domestic politics. That is to say, I don’t think he has a particularly visionary project regarding relations with Türkiye or Britain’s role in the world. He is more likely to maintain existing policies,” Örmeci stated.

He underlined that the government’s main focus would naturally be the economy. “In this context, they may seek closer relations with the European Union, try to align with the Trump administration in the U.S. – perhaps without angering Trump – and revive Chinese investments. In fact, Chinese investment was at the heart of the Conservative Party’s economic success during the David Cameron era, and he may try to bring that back to life,” he said.

In this context, the modernization of the FTA is expected to remain the most important item on the bilateral agenda, according to Boyraz.

“Although the existing agreement has provided a solid foundation for bilateral trade, it no longer reflects the evolving nature of the two economies. Expanding its scope to include services, digital trade, investment and other high-value sectors would create significant economic opportunities for both countries. More importantly, the post-Brexit environment has encouraged the United Kingdom to pursue a more pragmatic and interest-driven external economic policy. Freed from the constraints of the EU’s common commercial policy, London has sought to strengthen partnerships with countries that offer strategic and economic value. In this regard, Türkiye occupies a unique position due to its large market, dynamic economy, strategic geography, and growing regional influence. Moreover, unlike many of the U.K.’s other international partnerships, relations with Türkiye are characterized by relatively few structural disputes, providing a favorable environment for further economic integration,” Boyraz emphasized.

Türkiye’s bilateral trade volume with the United Kingdom increased from $18.9 billion in 2023 to $24 billion in 2025, according to official figures. Services trade, meanwhile, reached approximately $8 billion. Trade Minister Ömer Bolat noted at a recent meeting with outgoing U.K. Ambassador Jill Morris that the U.K.’s direct investment in Türkiye rose to $15.2 billion from $9.5 billion in the same period.

“At the political level, a Burnham government may adopt a somewhat different tone from previous Conservative administrations, particularly on issues such as human rights and the Middle East. However, these differences are unlikely to redefine the overall trajectory of U.K.-Türkiye relations. The structural foundations of the relationship – economic interdependence, NATO membership, defense cooperation, and shared geopolitical interests – remain sufficiently strong to sustain a pragmatic and strategically oriented partnership. Rather than marking a new departure, a Burnham premiership would most likely reinforce the existing trajectory of bilateral relations while seeking to capitalize on the opportunities created by the post-Brexit environment,” Boyraz said.

“We can argue that the United Kingdom has served as Türkiye’s most strategic Western partner, helping maintain Ankara’s Western anchor at times when its relations with the United States and the European Union have faced difficulties,” Örmeci notes, offering an in-depth look into the history of relations. “This has been the case at times even during the Cold War,” he underlined.

Örmeci points out that Turkish-U.K. friendship can best be exemplified by the era of Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher, two prime ministers who shared similar economic views. “It is safe to say that although it has not been the primary partner in terms of economy, politics, and security, the U.K. has always viewed Türkiye as a strategically important country and a practical ally, especially in times of crisis,” Örmeci said.

Such a crisis may unfold between Burnham and U.S. President Trump. Although Trump was more than relieved to see Starmer leave, Burnham appears more cautious in his approach to the United States. Türkiye similarly had its share of problems with the United States, though this appears to be changing in Trump’s second term, as was evident during the U.S. president’s recent visit to Ankara for the NATO summit.

Örmeci also highlights the strategic framework agreement signed between the two countries, adding that although its contents are not fully public, it is a clear indication that both nations are willing to preserve their alliance over the short and long term.

Differences in foreign policy

As two strong diplomatic actors with much to gain or lose in today’s complex foreign policy landscape– where diplomacy is critical amid lingering conflicts – Türkiye and the U.K. pursue different approaches to foreign affairs.

“Türkiye and the United Kingdom share common interests in several areas of foreign policy, yet their approaches diverge significantly when it comes to the Middle East, particularly the war in Gaza. While both governments officially support a two-state solution, have repeatedly called for humanitarian assistance and an end to the fighting, and recognize that prolonged instability threatens regional security, their policies differ both normatively and strategically. Türkiye has consistently defended the Palestinian cause, emphasizing international law, humanitarian principles, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The United Kingdom, despite adopting a more critical tone toward Israel in recent months and announcing its intention to recognize the State of Palestine, has continued to preserve its long-standing strategic and security partnership with Israel,” Boyraz emphasized.

“The two countries also differ fundamentally in their approach to Hamas, with the United Kingdom designating Hamas as a terrorist organization, while Türkiye regards it primarily as a political actor within the broader Palestinian question. Consequently, many observers argue that British policy reflects a gap between its normative discourse and strategic practice. Moreover, Britain’s historical legacy, particularly the 1917 Balfour Declaration, continues to shape debates surrounding its role in the conflict,” he added.

Still, Boyraz believes that the new government will not fundamentally alter the U.K.’s Middle East policy. “Britain’s strategic partnership with Israel and its broader regional priorities are driven primarily by long-term geopolitical interests, institutional continuity, and alliance commitments rather than by the preferences of a single political leader. Therefore, continuity is likely to outweigh change. Nevertheless, compared with previous Conservative governments, a Burnham administration may adopt a more critical discourse toward Israel and place greater emphasis on humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, accountability under international law, and support for Palestinian statehood. Burnham has already apologized for Labour’s initial response to the Gaza war, called for increased pressure on Israel through sanctions and restrictions targeting illegal settlements, and argued that potential war crimes should be investigated by international courts. These positions suggest that the tone of British policy could become more balanced. However, they are unlikely to translate into a fundamental reorientation of the U.K.’s strategic posture toward Israel,” he noted.

On the other hand, the two countries are more aligned regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. “Both countries reject Russia’s annexation of Crimea, support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and oppose the use of force to alter internationally recognized borders. They also view NATO as the cornerstone of European security and share a common interest in preserving stability in the Black Sea region. The principal difference lies in the policy instruments they employ. The United Kingdom has pursued a strategy centered on military assistance, sanctions, and deterrence, whereas Türkiye has sought to balance its support for Ukraine with continued dialogue with Russia, refraining from joining Western sanctions while positioning itself as a mediator through diplomatic initiatives such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In this respect, the two countries largely share strategic objectives but differ in the methods they employ to achieve them,” Boyraz stated.

For Örmeci, the U.K. is inclined to view relations with Türkiye more from the perspective of regional power and security, especially in the post-Brexit period. “Türkiye became a critical country in terms of the UK’s growing conflict with Russia, similar to the Great Game,” Örmeci says. The 19th-century rivalry between the two powers was also reflected in Anglo-Turkish relations, particularly through British involvement in the Crimean War, where it joined an alliance with the Ottoman Empire against Russia.

“The United Kingdom will likely continue its relations with Türkiye within the context of economy and security. Burnham will be preoccupied with the economy and Labour’s performance in the next election anyway. Türkiye, on the other hand, has a growing strategic importance, as it demonstrated at the NATO summit, especially regarding the U.S.-Iran tension and the Russia-Ukraine conflict,” Örmeci added.

Erdal Beşikçioğlu, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) mayor of Ankara’s Etimesgut district, was among 40 suspects remanded in custody on Monday as part of a corruption investigation involving the municipality.

The actor-turned-mayor was detained last Thursday along with 55 other suspects, most of whom were municipal employees.

The investigation targeting the mayor and the other suspects stems from allegations of irregularities in municipal operations, forgery of official documents, and the payment of bribes to municipal officials in connection with construction permits.

Beşikçioğlu denied the corruption allegations during a statement to prosecutors that lasted about four hours. When questioned about his reported monthly income of TL 2.5 million, he said that his earnings came from ticket revenues generated by a theater he owns, his salary as mayor, and royalty payments from his acting work. However, according to security sources cited by Turkish media outlets, his bank transactions did not correspond with his declared monthly income. The financial analysis included in the investigation file reportedly identified discrepancies and suspicious transfers into his bank accounts.

He also said he was unaware of the controversial tender processes, claiming that he had no duty or authority regarding tenders and that his role was limited to general supervision.

He claimed that he became aware of the alleged irregularities only after reports were issued by the Court of Accounts, which is responsible for auditing municipalities.

According to reports included in the investigation file, several suspects were allegedly involved in irregularities in the procurement of goods for the municipality’s Directorate of Social Assistance Affairs. An expert witness report alleged that the municipality paid for a large quantity of materials, ranging from disposable gowns to disinfectants, even though they were never delivered.

The report compared market prices with the invoices submitted to the municipality and claimed that the products had been purchased at prices approximately 10 to 15 times higher than prevailing market rates, resulting in an alleged public loss of more than TL 812,000.

The report further alleged that a fraudulent market research authorization document had been created and that the verification code and address belonging to an unrelated service procurement had been reused in connection with the personal care supplies purchase. It also alleged that goods that had never been delivered were accepted as though they had been received, that signatures on certain documents differed from one another, and that inventory transaction records had been prepared contrary to the facts.

According to data from the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) contained in the investigation file, part of the money transferred by the municipality to a contractor’s account was subsequently transferred to the contractor’s wife, then to municipal employee Rıza Emrah Altınok, and finally to another municipal employee, Serkan Kozan. Investigators said the alleged scheme resembled corruption methods uncovered in investigations into other municipalities, where contractors were awarded tenders in exchange for bribes.

The investigation file also includes allegations that the municipal company Etimkent suffered losses as a result of duplicate payments.

According to the report, in connection with a bread procurement and distribution contract, the company made several cash payments to an employee in 2025. The report alleges that the money was never deposited into municipal accounts, raising suspicions of financial misconduct.

One of the complainants identified in the case alleged that he was asked to pay bribes in order to obtain a building permit. The complainant, identified by the initials F.K., told investigators that he sought permits for a villa development in the district in 2024.

“After applying to the municipality for the permit, Planning Director Serpil Zengin called me on my mobile phone and invited me to the municipality. During our private meeting in her office, she explicitly requested a bribe of between TL 5 million and TL 6 million in exchange for issuing the permit. I objected and, after an argument, left her office. Shortly afterward, Deputy Mayor Mutlu Kerimoğlu contacted me via WhatsApp. I declined the WhatsApp call and instead called him on his regular mobile number. He invited me to his office and openly demanded TL 4 million as a bribe for the permit,” he told investigators.

CHP mayors have been the subject of corruption investigations in recent years. Investigators have alleged that some mayors and other municipal officials accepted bribes from companies seeking to do business with municipalities or from contractors seeking building permits that otherwise would not have been approved. Last Wednesday, Sinem Dedetaş, the CHP mayor of Istanbul’s Üsküdar district, was detained on similar charges along with several municipal employees. She was subsequently arrested.

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The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) is preoccupied with retaining its ranks, while the splinter New Party (YP) is working to broaden its voter base.

The YP managed to attract a majority of CHP lawmakers after its chair, Özgür Özel, was replaced by his predecessor, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, in May. However, the CHP’s mayors are apparently unwilling to switch their allegiance to Özel, who often boasts that he gave the party an unprecedented boost in the 2024 municipal elections.

Several mayors remain undecided, while others were quick to side with Özel. The YP claims that at least 200 mayors are ready to join the party, but that has not been the case in the two weeks since it was founded. So far, the mayors of 157 municipalities have joined the YP, although most represent small district municipalities, with the exceptions of the Denizli Metropolitan Municipality and the Manisa Metropolitan Municipality, the latter in Özel’s hometown. Cemil Tugay, the mayor of the CHP stronghold of İzmir, Türkiye’s third-largest city, quit the party after Kılıçdaroğlu was reinstated but has remained independent since then. Media reports claim that he may join the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). According to a report by the Sabah newspaper on Monday, the CHP will soon convene a meeting of its mayors to emphasize party unity.

Meanwhile, Özgür Özel is seeking to broaden his appeal among potential voters. After a video that the YP said had been “taken by a fan” surfaced online showing Özel performing the Muslim ablution ritual, he was later seen attending an event with members of the Alevi community. He attended a groundbreaking ceremony for a new cemevi, an Alevi house of worship, in the capital, Ankara, on Sunday.

“I am here to receive your blessing as the chair of the YP,” he told a group of Alevi citizens at the ceremony.

“The people who have governed this country owe a debt to the Alevi community. The community has suffered greatly in this country, but its members stood firmly with Atatürk during the War of Independence,” he said, referring to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Türkiye and of the CHP.

Kılıçdaroğlu, who is of Alevi background, highlighted his religious identity during the run-up to the 2023 presidential election, a move that critics viewed as an insincere display of faith intended to bolster his campaign.

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Fake IDs, constant changes of appearance and lying low bought about a decade of freedom for Burkay Karatepe, one of the would-be assassins of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ). This came to an end earlier this week when authorities announced on Friday that Karatepe, the only fugitive member of a team of assassins who escaped capture after the 2016 coup attempt by FETÖ was foiled, was apprehended in Afyonkarahisar, close to his hometown of Emirdağ.

Karatepe, a captain in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) when the coup attempt unfolded, joined other FETÖ infiltrators in the military in a bid to assassinate Erdoğan during the coup attempt and raided the hotel in southwestern Türkiye’s Marmaris where Erdoğan was vacationing at the time. Erdoğan narrowly escaped the attempt and flew to Istanbul, where he mobilized crowds to stand against the putschists, while two police officers guarding him were gunned down by the assassins. Resistance by anti-putschist security officers forced Karatepe and the others to abandon their plans and flee.

Other members of his team were caught within days while hiding in the countryside, while Karatepe almost vanished into thin air. A fellow would-be assassin claimed that he ditched his military fatigues, donned shorts and slippers, and sought to blend in with tourists in Marmaris. Nothing was heard from Karatepe after that, though authorities questioned his family about his possible whereabouts, and it was suspected that he might have fled to nearby Greek islands, as other members of the terrorist group had done.

Media reports on Sunday said that Karatepe kept a low profile while working as a junk collector and, at times, at construction sites. Indeed, it was a fellow construction worker who reportedly led to his capture. The man questioned by police claimed he did not know Karatepe’s true identity and knew him only as “Salih,” but still agreed to lend his cellphone to him, investigators later found.

Security sources said it was the facial recognition systems of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) that helped authorities pinpoint Karatepe’s location. When the facial recognition system indicated a 77% match with a man captured on camera near a park in central Afyonkarahisar on March 14, security forces launched a surveillance operation. In the following months, the same man was captured on security cameras across the city another 14 times, mostly in different outfits, sometimes with or without a beard, and usually covering his head with caps and berets.

Eventually, MIT and police counterterrorism units launched an operation to capture him in the derelict building where he was hiding. Interior Minister Mustafa Çiftçi said on Sunday that Karatepe was drunk at the time of his capture and that authorities also discovered a stash of drugs in the building. He was the only resident of the building, which had no electricity or running water. Security forces, however, found a sizeable stash of cash and gold in his possession and are now tracing their origins and investigating who might have funded his escape and years in hiding.

Karatepe had gold nuggets worth more than TL 6 million, and more than $33,000 and 2,620 euros in his possession, along with a laptop, three cellphones and a fake ID.

Karatepe was on the Interior Ministry’s “red list” of most-wanted terror suspects.

He was transferred to the province of Muğla, where Marmaris is located, for legal proceedings. He will likely face aggravated life imprisonment for the assassination attempt alone, along with additional sentences for crimes such as attempting to overthrow the government, forgery of official documents and possession of drugs.

Security sources said Karatepe was also caught on camera while attending a meeting at a hotel in Afyonkarahisar and had started moving from one residence to another in recent months, apparently suspecting that he was under surveillance.

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The Republican People’s Party (CHP), which lost its status as the main opposition party to its former Chair Özgür Özel’s New Party (YP), is on alert against a possible attempt by Özel to regain influence within the party.

Ahead of the party congress process, which will begin in September, the CHP aims to weed out Özel’s loyalists within its ranks.

Özel sought to reclaim control of the party after a court ruled in May that his predecessor, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, should be reinstated as CHP chair, citing allegations of vote-buying in Özel’s favor during a 2023 intra-party election. As legal proceedings challenging Kılıçdaroğlu’s reinstatement continued, Özel decided to establish the YP last month. By transferring a large number of lawmakers from the CHP, the YP cemented its position in Parliament as the main opposition party. However, the CHP fears that Özel may seek to recruit more members or exercise influence over the party through his loyalists who remain within its ranks.

The Kılıçdaroğlu administration is bracing for the congress by making new appointments and expulsions aimed at weakening Özel’s influence in Türkiye’s oldest political party. To that end, it plans to appoint new chairs to local party branches left vacant after pro-Özel officials were dismissed. The administration also plans to swiftly expel former members of the party assembly who remain loyal to Özel but have so far refrained from leaving the CHP.

Party sources say Özel left behind “Trojan horses” within the party – a group of influential figures who have not yet openly declared where their loyalties lie.

Since returning to office, Kılıçdaroğlu has pledged to “cleanse” the CHP of corruption and has focused on those who opposed his reinstatement and sided with Özel. Influential figures and provincial chairs aligned with Özel have been removed in quick succession, and Kılıçdaroğlu is expected to appoint eight more provincial chairs this week ahead of a meeting with party chairs from all 81 provinces.

The meeting is expected to serve as a demonstration of the CHP’s “unity,” party sources said.

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The leader of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Nechirvan Barzani met Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa on Monday, marking the first such visit by a KRG leader to post-Assad Syria. Sources told Agence France-Presse (AFP) that the talks focused on the integration agreement between Damascus and the YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK terrorist group, which has operated a de facto autonomous enclave in Syria.

Syrian state news agency SANA said al-Sharaa received Barzani at the Presidential Palace in Damascus.

The YPG and the security forces of Syria’s new administration clashed last January after the terrorist group reneged on an agreement to integrate into Syria’s new state institutions. The group later reached a new agreement with Damascus following further advances by Syrian security forces. Amid the clashes, Barzani received Ferhat Abdi Şahin, the leader of the YPG, in the KRG regional capital of Irbil during a U.S.-backed meeting.

Al-Sharaa’s office said he and Barzani discussed “strengthening cooperation and coordination, especially in the economic sphere … in a way that contributes to supporting security and stability.”

The Syrian president and Barzani first met on April 11, 2025, on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Türkiye. They met again on April 17, 2026, during the fifth edition of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum.

A Syrian official, speaking to AFP on condition of anonymity, said the two leaders would discuss the January agreement and “procedures for integrating” the YPG into the state. A Syrian diplomatic source, also speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP that the one-day visit would mainly focus on “following up on the agreement between the state and the YPG.” Barzani may also meet Şahin, the diplomatic source added.

The January fighting and the subsequent agreement shattered the YPG’s aspirations for autonomy across swathes of northern and northeastern Syria that it had controlled for years during the country’s civil war.

Damascus and the YPG have taken several steps since the agreement, including the deployment of government forces to the cities of Hasakeh and Qamishli and the transfer of the management of Qamishli Airport and key oil fields to the state.

Senior YPG member Sipan Hamo was appointed regional assistant defense minister.

However, differences between the two sides have delayed the integration of several YPG units into the Syrian army.

The agreement also provided for the return of displaced Syrian Kurds to their areas of origin, although some are still waiting to return. Barzani welcomed the agreement at the time and expressed hope that it would pave the way for “the protection of the rights of the Kurds … in the forthcoming constitution.”

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