Military personnel from Libya’s eastern and western forces are taking part in the EFES-2026 Combined Joint Exercise in Türkiye for the first time under the same drill, the Turkish Defense Ministry said Wednesday.

The ministry said 331 personnel from eastern Libya and 177 from western Libya are participating in the exercise, describing their joint presence as a significant development for efforts toward a “One and Unified Libya.”

EFES-2026, coordinated by Türkiye’s Aegean Army Command, is designed to demonstrate the Turkish Armed Forces’ planning, coordination and joint operation capabilities while strengthening military cooperation with friendly and allied countries, the ministry noted.

The computer-assisted command post phase of the exercise was held from April 11 to 17, with distinguished observer day activities taking place in Istanbul and Izmir. The live phase of the drill is scheduled to run from April 20 to May 21 in Izmir.

The ministry said the exercise reflects Türkiye’s regional security vision and its capacity for international military cooperation. It added that EFES-2026 also highlights the Turkish military’s operational readiness, ability to adapt to modern warfare and use of advanced technology.

Libya’s broad participation was one of the key elements of this year’s exercise, the ministry said, citing the country’s deep historical ties with Türkiye and growing strategic cooperation.

According to the statement, the Libyan naval attack boat LNS Shafak is also taking part in the drill. The ministry said the vessel’s participation was a concrete sign of the willingness of Libya’s eastern and western sides to act together in the field.

The ministry described the development as a step that goes beyond military cooperation, saying it could contribute to strengthening unity, institutional coordination and stability in Libya.

EFES-2026 also demonstrates Türkiye’s ability to act with partners, develop joint responses to crises and contribute to international security, the ministry said.

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A future Cyber Warfare Ministry is in the works in Ankara. The Cybersecurity Directorate of the Turkish Presidency, established last year, is the first stage of this concept. This ministry will likely bring together preventive intelligence, philosophical intelligence and hybrid intelligence models. A report by professor Talha Köse, director of the National Intelligence Academy, published this month, depicts the doctrinal basis of this structure. Essentially, a new Türkiye creates a new front.

The vision of the Cyber Warfare Ministry is what is required to protect the future of Türkiye. The Cybersecurity Directorate today is the core of this structure, and it will be necessary to upgrade it to the ministry level in the future. As much as there is a need to protect the land, skies and seas of this country, there is a need to protect the children from the dangers on the screens of cellphones.

The Cybersecurity Directorate is now authorized across the digital state and the public sector, meaning the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) is no longer the cybersecurity regulator. The BTK has handed over all authority and the National Cyber Incident Response Center (USOM) to the new directorate. In December 2025, the digital state, the operation of the e-government service, artificial intelligence in the public sector and data management were brought under one roof. At the helm of this new structure is a valuable person whom I once worked with in the same venue: Ümit Önal. Önal served as CEO at Türk Telekom for about seven years after his tenure in Turkuvaz Media, before his appointment to his new strategic tenure on Oct. 24, 2025, by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. His remarks at the STRATCOM 2026 summit are a testament to the new doctrinal basis: “Cybersecurity is now a matter of national security.”

Philosophical intelligence

This doctrinal basis is laid out by Köse in his April 2026 report. Köse’s presence is no coincidence. The National Intelligence Academy has positioned itself as the only academic hub generating doctrines in the Turkish intelligence ecosystem. Here is a key sentence from the report: “The biggest risk in the era of artificial intelligence is not merely a lack of access to technology, but weaknesses exhibited in coordination, human resources, and an unevenly distributed decision-making network.”

Köse highlights that the real danger is a lack of coordination, not the failure to have foreign technologies. The common feature of the school shootings in Kahramanmaraş and Şanlıurfa, which had digital traces, was the failure to see the whole picture. Red flags were there, and they were noticed by probably 10 different agencies. Nevertheless, seeing the big picture was impossible. Another statement in the report further delves into the doctrine: “The real necessity is seeing the risks beforehand and taking all institutional measures in a timely manner.”

A philosophical intelligence doctrine makes up the basis of this statement: a superior mindset that can detect the nature and root of the threat and the cultural or philosophical ground that gave rise to that threat.

It is not enough to trace technical tracks of the attack; you should understand what worldview motivated the assailant. You have to see through the meaning to understand the intention, to discover the unseen. This is what Köse tries to explain as philosophical intelligence understanding. It is not sufficient to learn the lessons from the school shootings; you have to know all about it before it happens and prevent it.

Hybrid intelligence

What we face as threats are hybrid in nature, a multilayered type of attack combining digital and physical elements, as well as economic and human nature aspects. Take a phishing attack targeting a research and development center, for instance. It might be a combined attack in the form of a LinkedIn contact, a conference invitation, a subcontractor tender and state intelligence working simultaneously.

A cyber warfare ministry has to establish a three-tier architecture working in synchronization, including tracks provided by human intelligence working in the field, digital patterns captured by signals intelligence and patterns mined from data by open-source intelligence (OSINT). Frankly, the raw data feeds from the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), police intelligence and gendarmerie intelligence would not signal a cohesive risk unless the information is effectively processed, which is the task of the Cybersecurity Directorate. Hybrid intelligence is the ability to see the whole picture moment by moment.

Invisible shield

In the last decade, Türkiye has built a historic arsenal, from Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Kızılelma and Hürjet to Atmaca and Kaan. Yet, the protective shield of this superiority is often underdiscussed. It is counterespionage in cyberspace. A recent case proves this point. Iran’s Shahed-136 drone was rebranded by Russia as Geran-2 and was employed in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These systems shot down in Ukrainian airspace were dismantled by Western intelligence engineers, their software was decrypted, their supply chain was mapped, and all were reverse-engineered. The result was that secrets of Iran’s own weapons were an open book for rival intelligence services, and this information was directly used against Iran and its allies in the recent U.S.-Israel-Iran war.

The doctrinal lesson is clear: A state could see its weapons acting as a boomerang, harming it when it fails to protect itself in cyberspace. Espionage to expose its software architecture, control protocols, GPS routes and supply chains leads to the same outcome as the physical theft of the weapon. A successful electronic infiltration can deliver the secrets of your superiority to your rivals. Accomplishments of the Bayraktar TB2 in Karabakh and Ukraine, and the efficiency of Akıncı in Syria and Libya, rendered Türkiye one of the high-profile targets of technological espionage. Thus, Aselsan, Roketsan, TUSAŞ, Baykar, Havelsan, TUBİTAK Sage, MKE and dozens of subcontractors should operate under the same cyber shield.

This shield goes beyond conventional defense and includes counter-espionage. Rather than focusing on preventing the attack, it concentrates on detecting the assailant, tracking it and setting up a trap to read the opponent’s intentions, and when necessary, infiltrating the electronic systems of the opponent. Türkiye has to achieve this capacity to prevent a repeat of what happened to Iran’s Shahed. The arsenal Türkiye built in the past decade can only be beneficial with the cyber shield it can build within the next decade.

How the system should work

The shooting in Kahramanmaraş took place at a school, but it actually started somewhere thousands of miles away, in terms of the digital world. Online groups feeding the thoughts of the assailant and other networks involved in other murders have sprouted in the digital world. After the incident, 940 social media accounts were shut down, 1,866 websites were blocked, and 111 Telegram groups were removed. However, the issue was how, by whom and with what authority this network can be monitored. What matters is that this should take place before the attack itself.

First, preventive measures should be at the highest level. Türkiye’s data architecture is scattered across different agencies. Sensing cyber threats against our children is possible with a holistic approach. The Cybersecurity Directorate can use AI and Big Data authorization to detect a culture of violence emerging and growing in closed groups. Preventive measures are not a blackout of screens after an incident; they involve detecting the signals of danger before it happens.

Second, the inspection mechanism should function. A state’s power is measured through its view beyond plain sight. The Cybersecurity Directorate is now tasked with marking the limits against next-generation threats, such as fake voice recordings and videos, holding platforms, gaming groups and social media companies thriving on children accountable.

Third, the authority should have the power to shut down threats. If you cannot inspect a platform, you should shut it down. China’s hard intervention model in the digital space can be considered controversial if you look at it through the lens of democratic tradition. But I think the courage of taking hard, preventive measures cannot be disputed when it comes to the safety of our children. Türkiye should adapt to this model: inspecting whatever we can and shutting down whatever we can’t. Seeking a third option means paying the price.

Another necessity is reducing bandwidth, which is an effective tool, landing somewhere between shutting down and monitoring. Deliberate reduction of traffic to a platform has been an efficient method to bring companies not complying with decisions of content removal to the negotiation table swiftly. Bandwidth reduction should be part of a gradual plan: first, a warning, then fines, then bandwidth reduction, and finally, complete shutdown. I might be judged and deemed too anti-democratic, but I am open to such criticism, as this is a matter of slaughtered, innocent children.

The fifth point for the system to work is setting up “hotlines” between MIT, police intelligence and gendarmerie intelligence. This grouping should be able to see signs of escalating violence. When an extremist network emerges, MIT’s external intelligence should work in synchronization with the Cybersecurity Directorate’s digital tracking system. Amid a threat at a school, police intelligence should be able to be in the field within minutes. When a terror link is detected in a rural area, gendarmerie intelligence should be able to access data immediately.

These links between agencies should also be physical. All three intelligence agencies should have permanent liaison offices within the Cybersecurity Directorate, and they should remain open around the clock to defend the country.

Another essential component of the system is judges and prosecutors alert against threats. The Cybersecurity Directorate’s authority only means something when it is combined with swift legal action and proper legitimacy. The biggest obstacle in emergency intervention in cyberspace is red tape between the agencies. Time consumed by the bureaucracy is time stolen from the life of a child. An independent legal department working around the clock should be established at the Cybersecurity Directorate in the legal framework supported by legal regulations of the Justice Ministry. Cybersecurity prosecutors and judges should work on the same floor, next to each other.

The system should work this way: Critical demands by MIT, police intelligence and gendarmerie intelligence are delivered to cybersecurity prosecutors specialized in the field. The prosecutor immediately handles the request, forms the legal basis and applies to the judge. The judge issues a verdict, and the technical crew working on the same floor applies the verdict within seconds. Then, intelligence staff expands nationwide monitoring.

There is only one way out of the dilemma of “swift but illegal” and “legal but slow,” namely, a swift, legal, democratic and vigilant system. Every minute a judge is absent means inaction of the state, and every moment a judge is present indicates the state’s strategic power. If the assailant is awake all the time, the state should be too.

The digital defense of schools is another matter. The school management systems, e-school infrastructure and counseling service records should be protected under one roof. A counselor’s warning about a child should not be lost in the cracks in the system.

Lastly, artificial intelligence should reach out to the family. The most tangible task of the Public Artificial Intelligence General Directorate will be producing tools for a healthy reading of children’s digital footprints for parents and educators. A change in behavioral patterns or tendency to join closed groups can be relayed to the families as early warning signals.

Time for cyber warfare ministry

Children today live in two worlds, the one with real-world streets, schools and houses, and one with a screen, apps and online groups. The state focused on the first one for decades. The shooting in Kahramanmaraş demonstrated that this second world has been an invisible challenge. The Cybersecurity Directorate is the state’s mark in this second world. We have to ensure genuine cyber protection for the future of Türkiye. We have no time to lose. The architecture to protect this country has been largely built. Now is the time to activate it with vigilant cybersecurity prosecutors and judges in the legal department of the Cybersecurity Directorate, intelligence liaison offices working around the clock, a gradual system of sanctions, a willingness to enforce shutdowns and a bandwidth reduction option.

The current structure of the directorate, regardless of its comprehensive authority, may not be sufficient against future challenges. In an era where AI has become deeply embedded in military systems, economic infrastructure, collective memory and everyday life, it is necessary to fight across a wide front, from autonomous weapon systems to digital propaganda, from biometric data wars to infiltration operations based on machine learning. The world is rapidly becoming mechanized, and threats are becoming mechanized just as quickly. In such an age, an ordinary directorate is not enough for a nation to protect itself.

If the air force protects the skies, the navy the seas and the land forces the land, then the structure that will protect the cyber domain can only be organized as a ministry, acting as a wartime agency and with the discipline of an army unit. The Cybersecurity Directorate will be the core of a future Cyber Warfare Ministry, like the National Security Agency (NSA) of the U.S., an entity that can see and think of everything on a global scale.

Addressing the parliamentary group meeting of his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Ankara on Wednesday, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said a process for the dissolution of the terrorist group PKK was “in its due course.”

“Those bringing about pessimistic scenarios about the process act upon their own doubts rather than the facts. There is a positive atmosphere right now. There are things to do, and the process is continuing as it is expected to continue,” he underlined.

Media reports recently said that Türkiye stopped work on legal regulations to advance the initiative in the face of the PKK’s slow action for full disarmament. The initiative aims at the full dissolution of the group, which consented to lay down arms last year after its jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan ordered them to do so.

The PKK initially slowed down the disarmament process over developments in Syria, according to a report. The terrorist group’s Syria wing, the YPG, countered advances by the Syrian army earlier this year after a deal with Damascus apparently collapsed. Eventually, the YPG relented, returned to the negotiation table and agreed to integration into the post-Assad Syrian army.

The initial “resistance” by the YPG encouraged dissidents within the terrorist group who opposed dissolution. When the YPG finally agreed to integration, the PKK resumed the disarmament process. Yet, it hit a snag again after the U.S. and Israel launched attacks on Iran. Rumors of the U.S. intention to employ “Kurdish groups” in the region to overthrow the Iranian administration slowed down the process, according to the media reports.

Türkiye was planning to start concrete work this month for legal regulations to facilitate the process. It would be based on a report of recommendations by Parliament’s National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Committee. However, the terrorist group’s reluctance led to a pause in discussions for legal steps.

The pro-PKK Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), which served as a messenger between Öcalan and the PKK and the general public for the initiative, often complains about the pace of the initiative, though they don’t blame the terrorist group. The party’s deputy parliamentary group chair, Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit, said at a news conference earlier this month that they couldn’t accept delays in the implementation of legislation “for various reasons.” Koçyiğit claimed that the government was responsible for the implementation of the initiative.

On the other hand, sources from the ruling AK Party say Türkiye cannot speed up legislative steps at a time of uncertainty, echoing the government’s warning that new laws would not be introduced in the initiative unless the PKK is fully disarmed and the full disarmament verified by Turkish intelligence. Sources said that Türkiye was committed to the introduction of legislative steps only after “confirmation mechanism worked,” referring to intelligence’s monitoring of the disarmament in Iraq, where the bulk of the PKK’s senior cadres hide out.

Erdoğan said on Wednesday that terror-free Türkiye was also a “driver” for economic growth, noting that the terrorism problem cost Türkiye more than $2 trillion.

“Despite all blatant and secret sabotage attempts, the initiative is now past its 18th month, and we have passed many critical thresholds. With the approval of the committee’s reports, we arrived at another turning point in which we have to act sensibly,” he said.

“We hope to go past this turning point without any problems with the support of political parties,” he said.

Erdoğan stressed that they did not heed “empty talk by certain circles about the process.” He reiterated his remarks to journalists on April 23 and underlined that “the atmosphere is positive.”

“Nothing will change in the process as those seeking to prolong the problem had hoped. We set out on this path to remove one of the biggest obstacles before Türkiye. We set out to eliminate sinister plots in the wider region, to remove the dagger stuck on our brotherhood,” he said.

He noted that those posing a challenge to the initiative and those seeking to incite tensions based on the initiative would not be remembered well. Erdoğan urged everyone to act responsibly and avoid rhetoric that would harm the initiative.

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Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization on Wednesday made public a previously classified document from Nov. 11, 1964, detailing the stay of Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the country.

“The Iranian guest has arrived in Türkiye, and it has been decided that he will reside in Bursa. The house where the guest will stay and other arrangements concerning him will be personally handled by the Bursa Yuva Directorate,” the document said.

The file was sent by National Security Service chief Ziya Selışık to the Istanbul Central Office during Khomeini’s stay in Türkiye under MIT surveillance between Nov. 4, 1964, and Oct. 5, 1965.

“The necessary written and verbal instructions have been sent to the Bursa Yuva Directorate. The alias ‘Belli’ will be used in encrypted and other correspondence concerning the guest. Submitted for your information,” the document concluded.

The document is available in the Document section under the Special Collection tab on MIT’s official website.

Khomeini was an Iranian Shiite cleric, political leader and the architect of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah and led to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

He became a prominent opponent of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 1960s, criticizing his Western-backed reforms and calling for an Islamic system of governance based on clerical rule.

Khomeini was forced into exile in 1964 after his outspoken opposition, spending years in Türkiye, Iraq and later France before returning to Iran to lead the revolution.

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Days after she uttered a warning against “Turkish influence” in Europe, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is still the talk of the town in Turkish politics.

Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the government ally Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), criticized von der Leyen on Tuesday during his party’s parliamentary group meeting. “These words are not a blunder. It is a reflection of arrogance and double standards toward Türkiye hidden in this mindset,” Bahçeli said.

In remarks at an event in Germany’s Hamburg, the European Commission president has mentioned her support for EU enlargement and said: “We must succeed in completing the European continent so that it is not influenced by Russia, Türkiye, or China.” She drew criticism from Turkish officials who said the characterization did not reflect the country’s status as a key partner and NATO ally.

Bahçeli noted that critics of von der Leyen in Europe pointed out the error of her remarks by citing that they were “geopolitically incorrect” and “detached from reality.” “Same critics reminded her that Türkiye was a key ally for Europe’s security, a vital line for energy and resources and a crucial partner for migration management and regional balance.”

“This is not a basic polemic. We see that Europe does not have a mental grasp of understanding Türkiye. For years, the European Union has distanced itself from Türkiye in terms of membership. They wagged their fingers at Türkiye under the pretext of teaching it norms and harmony, and as soon as their geopolitical needs emerged, they sought to treat Türkiye as a buffer in terms of an energy corridor, transportation line and security partnership. Yet, while speaking on equality, they reverted to their arrogant ways. This is politically immoral and lacks strategic thinking. This rhetoric will not lead to partnership, sincerity or a climate of trust,” he said.

Bahçeli emphasized that Türkiye stands at the very center of geopolitical knots, as a key point and gateway.

“The issue is not where Türkiye stands, but where the European Union is drifting. The issue is not Ankara’s direction, but Brussels’ hypocritical politics. The issue is not Türkiye’s stance, but the distorted, opportunistic and hypocritical European mindset that seeks to exclude Türkiye when convenient and use it when necessary.”

“We are the Republic of Türkiye, the embodied state of a great civilization whose roots reach deep into Asia, whose branches extend toward the European horizon, and whose shadow falls upon Africa. Those who try to confine us to a narrow space still fail to comprehend that great nations cannot be understood through maps. Türkiye is a friend, but its friendship is not something open to humiliation.

“Our direction has been shaped over centuries within a great historical line that engages with the West, knows the West, confronts it when necessary, and negotiates with it when required. Neither Brussels nor European bureaucracy can tell us where we come from, nor can they define the path Türkiye will follow. The extent, framework and depth of Türkiye’s relations with Russia, China, the Turkic world, the Islamic world, Europe and other global centers cannot be determined by fanaticism. Europe cannot do without Türkiye, neither in security, energy, migration management, transportation, nor in establishing a regional balance, but Türkiye is history, a state, memory, geography, a center, and a reality even without Europe.

“We hope that Europe will confront this ingrained arrogance embedded in its mindset. It should conduct its self-assessment not with slogans, but with reality. It should renew its language toward Türkiye not based on interests, but on rationality,” he said.

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Longtime foes Türkiye and Armenia held another meeting of their joint working group, the Foreign Ministry announced on Tuesday.

The meeting in the eastern Turkish province of Kars was a step toward normalization between the neighbors. The ministry said that the meeting focused on rehabilitation and resumption of the Kars-Gyumri railroad, and sides affirmed that immediate resumption was essential for improving regional transportation connections.

Armenia pursues normalization efforts with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, a process accelerated particularly after Azerbaijan’s victory over Karabakh, a territory occupied by Armenia for years.

Relations began to thaw after the 2020 Karabakh war, with both sides appointing special envoys to pursue normalization talks and negotiating the reopening of their land border. So far, limited agreements have allowed third-country citizens and diplomats to cross, but a full reopening remains elusive.

Renewing relations with Armenia is especially key for Türkiye’s ambitions to serve as part of an economic chain or corridor traversing the region. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized that in remarks last January. He said the Zangezur Corridor played an important part in normalizing the ties. The corridor is a proposed 43-kilometer (27-mile)route through Armenia that will connect Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan. It is viewed as a key link between the three countries for seamless commercial ties.

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