A former mayor from Türkiye’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has confessed to the authorities that he paid 1 million euros ($1.17 million) to the party leadership in exchange for being nominated as a candidate in elections, media reports said Monday.

If confirmed, he will be the second CHP mayor to admit charges against him, dealing a blow to the party’s attempt to portray the arrest of Muhittin Böcek and other mayors as politically motivated.

Böcek, who ran the municipality of Antalya in the Turkish Riviera, was arrested last year on charges of corruption and bribery. On Sunday, he decided to collaborate with the authorities under a law providing lenient prison terms.

His son Gökhan Böcek has already invoked the same law and detailed the cash flow from his father to the party headquarters. The father and son duo testified for more than eight hours to prosecutors in Antalya and confirmed the accusations.

Gökhan Böcek testified to prosecutors on May 2 and said he carried 1 million euros in a backpack and delivered it to the CHP headquarters in exchange for approval of his father’s candidacy in the municipal elections.

The former mayor already faces prison terms of up to 44 years in a series of charges, including bribery and money laundering.

Turkish media outlets reported Monday that Gökhan Böcek exposed how CHP chair Özgür Özel instructed party lawmaker Veli Ağbaba to ask for TL 30 million, roughly 900,000 euros at the time, for the nomination of his father in the runup to the 2024 municipal elections. Ağbaba told him to “round it to 1 million euros,” Böcek told prosecutors.

He added that his father told him to “do what’s necessary” to find extra cash. The younger Böcek said he contacted several businesspeople in Antalya, collected the money from them and stored the cash in their family home before delivering it to the party headquarters.

He also confessed that he was welcomed by an unnamed official at the party headquarters. There, he had a phone call with Ağbaba, who instructed him to deliver the cash to the unnamed person. He also claimed that the party later asked for extra cash of up to TL 8 million ahead of the elections.

Last week, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office in Istanbul ordered the seizure of all assets belonging to the former mayor. Along with Böcek, authorities also ordered the seizure of assets belonging to his son and his daughter-in-law. His daughter-in-law, Zuhal Böcek, was detained on April 30 on charges of money laundering.

The charges against the family revolve around bribery, allegedly taken by Böcek and his son, Mustafa Gökhan Böcek, from companies or businesspeople seeking to do business with the city municipality.

The investigation into the alleged wrongdoings of the mayor and his family expanded into a separate case about corruption accusations in Istanbul, where former Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu and dozens of municipal bureaucrats and businesspeople were arrested last year. Böcek and others are accused of accepting TL 195 million ($4.31 million) in bribes for handing out permits for construction and related works to businesspeople. They are also accused of laundering money through jewelry stores and currency exchanges. After Böcek’s arrest, the investigation expanded over the following months through a series of coordinated police operations targeting suspects connected to the municipality, including businesspeople and municipal officials.

Several CHP mayors and municipal bureaucrats have been detained or arrested since late 2024 in far-reaching corruption investigations. Among them was Özkan Yalım, mayor of the western province of Uşak. He was the first mayor to invoke the remorse law for a lenient sentence last week.

Yalım, who was expelled from CHP earlier this month, more than 60 days after his arrest, has admitted to using the municipality’s funds for his private expenses. He also confirmed that his municipality covered the expenses for furnishing a van with luxury features for the use of CHP chair Özel.

He told investigators that the municipality allocated at least 170,000 euros for furnishing the van. He also admitted that he offered free accommodation for CHP lawmakers and other people associated with the party at a hotel he owned in Uşak and hid the accommodation records from the authorities. Like Böcek, he also admitted that he paid cash to the CHP headquarters. Yalım claimed he delivered TL 1.2 million on various dates to CHP, “for use at the CHP conventions.”

Espionage trial

For Imamoğlu, whose trial on corruption charges continued, Monday was the date of the first hearing in an espionage case. Imamoğlu and three defendants in the case face up to 20 years in prison.

The indictment alleges that İmamoğlu, his campaign adviser Necati Özkan, businessman Hüseyin Gün and journalist Merdan Yanardağ ran a criminal network and passed data on Turkish citizens on to foreign intelligence services. Their purpose was to engineer voter behavior before Imamoğlu’s 2019 election campaign, prosecutors say.

The National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has documented alleged links between a key suspect in a political espionage investigation and multiple foreign intelligence figures, according to indictment materials seen by prosecutors.

Prosecutors say the operation was carried out by Gün, now described by authorities as operating under the cover of private-sector activity.

According to the Turkish newspaper Sabah, two intelligence reports prepared by MIT were included in the indictment. The reports’ findings were said to match evidence independently obtained by police during the investigation.

According to the first report, Gün maintained ties with Christopher Paul McGrath, a former intelligence official who later moved into the private sector. McGrath previously served in the United Kingdom’s technical intelligence community and later held senior roles in maritime technology and risk intelligence firms, the report said.

MIT assessed that McGrath had served in managerial roles connected to information collection under the direction of Britain’s signals intelligence service, GCHQ.

The report also said McGrath later acted as a consultant for a Switzerland and Türkiye-linked cybersecurity firm beginning in May 2024, but announced his departure shortly after his name appeared in the Turkish investigation.

A second MIT report focused on individuals listed in Gün’s mobile phone contacts, identifying 10 figures described as “critical” and conducting detailed background analysis on each.

According to the report, other individuals listed among Gün’s contacts included Christopher Charles James Sturgess, described as a former senior figure within the United Kingdom’s GCHQ who currently serves as chief technology officer at the London-based firm, Clearwater Dynamics.

The report also cited Martin Howard, who held the post of director for cyberpolicy and international relations at GCHQ between 2011 and 2014 and later served as deputy head of defense intelligence at the U.K.’s Defense Ministry.

Another individual named was David John Charters, identified as a member of Britain’s foreign intelligence service, MI6, and described in Gün’s phone contacts as “a close friend of former MI6 chief Richard Moore.”

Additional names included David Frank Richmond, a former director general for defense and intelligence at the British Foreign Office; Joseph Charles French, who headed defense intelligence at the Defense Ministry from 2000 to 2003; former British special forces commander John Taylor Holmes; Brian Scott, who has worked with U.S.-based intelligence firms Patriot Defense Group and The Ascendancy Group; Fiona Hill, a former analyst at the U.S. National Intelligence Council who served as a deputy assistant to then-President Donald Trump between 2017 and 2019; and David Meidan, a former deputy head responsible for foreign relations and operational cooperation at Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad.

The prosecutor’s office concluded that Gün operated “under the appearance of a businessman” while acting as an intelligence asset, a finding it said was supported by both intelligence and police assessments.

In earlier testimony, Gün told investigators that he owned a company named Piiq and claimed to have partnered with Aaron Barr, whom he described as a former CIA officer.

Remnants of two abutments of a bridge on the border perhaps symbolize best the state of relations between Türkiye and Armenia, or rather, how they could have been after the fall of the Soviet Union. So, it is fitting that the two neighbors decided to turn a new page in their efforts to normalize ties in this very location. Ani Bridge spanning across Arpaçay or as it is known in Armenia, Akhuryan River, will be jointly restored by Türkiye and Armenia under a deal signed by representatives of the two countries last Monday in Yerevan. Experts say that the new steps include profound opportunities for both countries and the region, though they also underline the need for cautious optimism, instead of expecting a swift normalization.

A visit by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz to the Armenian capital to attend the European Political Community summit brought the memorandum of understanding for joint restoration to fruition. Yılmaz, the first high-ranking leader from Türkiye to visit Yerevan since then-President Abdullah Gül in 2008, had kind words for his hosts and, in remarks to journalists after a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, said peace and normalization in the South Caucasus would benefit every country, including Azerbaijan, which advanced its own peace process with Armenia after years of hostilities.

For the better part of the last decade, Türkiye has sought to re-establish ties with countries with which it had sour relations, in line with changing circumstances and as part of its “peace diplomacy.” For instance, it rebuilt ties with Egypt and reached out to Greece after decades of tensions. Now, Armenia may join this growing list of countries with which Türkiye hopes to reconnect for the sake of mutual interests.

A bridge beyond restoration

Professor Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş of Ankara University says Yılmaz’s participation in the European Political Community summit is a significant and symbolic development for the normalization process between the two countries. Speaking to Daily Sabah, Bozkuş noted that a new diplomatic process was underway in the aftermath of the 2020 Karabakh war. The said war led to Azerbaijan’s victory against the Armenian occupiers of Karabakh and paved the way for a budding peace between Baku and Yerevan. Türkiye, a close ally of Azerbaijan, runs a parallel process. Over the past six years, Ankara and Yerevan have assigned special representatives to further normalize their relations and have taken steps to establish a lasting diplomatic relationship, reopen land borders and establish transportation and commercial links. Bozkuş highlighted noticeable progress in the process. She pointed out that a recent meeting between Turkish and Armenian delegations on the two countries’ border was followed in days by Yılmaz’s visit, adding that those were important indicators of the sides’ will to keep channels of dialogue open and their commitment to normalization.

“(The deal on Ani Bridge) is not purely a restoration project; it is also a symbolic reflection of years-long problems between Türkiye and Armenia, closed borders and disrupted contact. The bridge is a metaphor of a new concept of relationship, a ‘bridge’ between the past and future, between the memory and normalization,” Bozkuş added.

As a matter of fact, Türkiye was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Armenia within months of its declaration in 1991. In the following years, it sought to help Armenia integrate with the international community. One such step was the invitation of Armenia to the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which was founded in Istanbul in 1992. Yet, one year later, Türkiye started cutting off ties with Armenia and shut down the border when Armenia attacked Azerbaijan.

It took 15 years for the first steps to be taken for normalizing relations. In 2009, they signed protocols to that extent, but the political climate of the time in Armenia stalled the normalization efforts. Another sticking point that prevented restoration of ties has been a different interpretation of a shared history, or rather, the history of Armenians during the Ottoman rule in Anatolia. The infamous 1915 incidents, which are recognized by Armenia as an “Armenian genocide,” have been another obstacle in relations. The former governments of Armenia and the Armenian diaspora in Europe and the United States pushed the “genocide” agenda and its recognition by Türkiye for years before mending ties.

Under Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia has largely changed this rhetoric and introduced the “Real Armenia” doctrine, which touts peace with neighbors. Though not openly declared, this was a step toward abandoning Armenian claims to Karabakh, something also symbolized by a lapel pin worn by Pashinyan that shows Armenia without Karabakh, as was the case in the former maps of the country. Last year, Pashinyan was also quoted by Turkish journalists visiting Yerevan as saying that “genocide recognition” was not a foreign policy priority for them.

Win-win potential

Nigar Göksel, the International Crisis Group’s Türkiye/Cyprus director, says normalization will be a win-win situation for both countries for a wide variety of reasons. She pointed out that especially the opening of the Türkiye-Armenia border would reduce Armenia’s isolation, vulnerability and dependence on Russia. “(It would) strengthen Türkiye’s role and soft power across the Caucasus, and solidify Azerbaijan’s connection to Nakhchivan. It would also create new opportunities in trade, logistics, tourism, energy and digital infrastructure. Provinces in eastern Anatolia are expected to benefit economically, which can also positively spill over into security,” Göksel told Daily Sabah.

The issue of Nakhchivan also figured prominently in Yılmaz’s remarks to the Turkish media in Yerevan. This exclave of Azerbaijan inside landlocked Armenia will be linked to mainland Azerbaijan as part of the Zangezur Corridor, a project that aims to bring economic prosperity to the two countries and Türkiye while strengthening regional trade and transport networks. It is part of the Middle Corridor, a logistics network spanning thousands of kilometers and connecting China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye. Yılmaz noted the strategic importance of the Middle Corridor and how it would present a strong connection between Türkiye and the Caucasus and Turkic states. “This is not only about roads, but it is also about strengthening connectivity in fields ranging from telecommunications and digitalization and energy,” he said. He said making Zangezur functional would lay the groundwork for wider regional cooperation.

Bozkuş says Yılmaz’s visit had multiple messages on the regional and global levels as well. “In recent years, the South Caucasus has been a geopolitical field of attraction in international politics, in terms of energy lines, transportation corridors, connectivity projects and competition of major powers. At a time when conflicts on a global scale, energy crises and geopolitical fractures escalate, the South Caucasus’ strategic position has become more apparent. This is clearly observed in competition around transportation and connectivity projects oriented in the region,” she said.

Armenia will hold elections on June 7, a vote Pashinyan branded as a choice “for peace or non-peace” last year as he pushes to achieve the said peace with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

Göksel says that after the elections and in parallel with momentum in Azerbaijan-Armenia normalization, technical and infrastructure preparations for opening the border may accelerate. “While Baku has been expecting Armenia to first remove the reference to its 1991 Declaration of Independence from the Constitution’s preamble, as it includes a claim over Karabakh, we are already seeing de facto openings pick up pace. This is important for giving Armenian society confidence that Pashinyan’s constructive path is delivering results,” she said.

For Türkiye, the restoration of ties is part of wider regional ambitions, that is, increasing the connectivity for peace, as former Ambassador Serdar Kılıç, Türkiye’s special representative for the process, implied during an event in Yerevan earlier this week. Kılıç told the Yerevan Dialogue Forum on May 5 that Türkiye was “building confidence” with Armenia, and this cannot be separated from general initiatives for connectivity in the region. “The connectivity, too, cannot be confined to fields such as transportation. A more comprehensive approach is needed, just as we need a comprehensive approach for ensuring peace and stability in the region,” he said, adding that the ideas to improve relations and maintaining lasting peace and stability should “come from the region itself,” something in line with Türkiye’s advocacy for ‘regional ownership’ in matters regarding the relations in the region instead of relying non-regional actors to resolve the issues.

“In the new era, South Caucasus’ strategic importance is not merely security-oriented. It is also being redefined in the framework of connectivity, sustainable transportation networks, energy security and geoeconomic integration,” Bozkuş said. “In this context, Türkiye’s effort to contribute to the solutions to regional problems, continuing normalization process with Armenia and playing an active role in several transportation and commerce projects, particularly the Middle Corridor, can be counted among elements boosting Türkiye’s clout in the South Caucasus,” she added.

She noted that diplomatic and geoeconomic initiatives were crucial for reinforcing Türkiye’s position as an actor strengthening connectivity between Europe and Asia. “This in turn contributes to Türkiye’s regional influence and makes its strategic importance amid changing global geopolitical balance more visible.”

Likely challenges

This “regional ownership” and bolstering the peace prospects may have its detractors as well, as Göksel points out.

“As with any such change, there will also be actors who lose; those that benefit from the current closed borders might not be able to retain their advantage. From a security perspective, completion of these normalizations, both between Türkiye and Armenia, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, would reduce the scope for external powers to exploit unresolved conflicts for leverage, further lower the risk of renewed war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and enable regional connectivity, contributing to a more predictable order in the South Caucasus. That said, short-term security risks should not be underestimated. Both internal and external actors may attempt to trigger provocations to disrupt the process, so vigilance will need to remain high. Dialogue channels, hotlines and coordination among security officials will undoubtedly need to be tight,” she said.

Bozkuş pointed out that the increasing strategic importance of the South Caucasus in terms of energy security, transportation corridors and connectivity projects made the region one of the most critical geopolitical rivalry areas in international politics. “This might carry some risks and fragility for normalization, but it also means new diplomatic and economic potential,” she added.

“In other words, the South Caucasus’ rising geopolitical importance is something both limiting and encouraging Turkish-Armenian relations,” she noted. That “geopolitical importance” emerged in a thinly veiled pragmatic approach by the U.S. under the Trump administration, which boasts advancing the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. The U.S. apparently aspires to curb the Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Armenia under Pashinyan further distanced itself from Russia, and this was most evident when the Kremlin lashed out at Yerevan for hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the same summit Yılmaz attended.

Speaking about the U.S., Bozkuş highlighted that the Armenian diaspora may impact the normalization process. The United States, along with France, hosts the largest Armenian diaspora in the West. Bozkuş stated that the diaspora was well-organized in the Western countries and maintained a distance from the normalization. Nevertheless, she added that the diaspora was not “homogenous” and highlighted differing political approaches within the diaspora, as well as changes among generations, the impact of regional developments and security concerns of Armenia made more pragmatic and dialogue-focused approaches more visible within the community.

Another major obstacle may be ultranationalist circles in Armenia and the “Karabakh clan,” members of a political tradition who also kept their distance from the process. The said clan refers to powerful political and military figures who came to dominate Armenian politics for years. All are connected to the region, either born there or served there as military or political leaders. Indeed, Pashinyan’s “Velvet Revolution” in 2018 ended this domination, while Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh further eroded the influence of the clan in Armenian politics. Still, they are the most formidable rivals of Pashinyan in the upcoming elections. Bozkuş, however, is optimistic and says the clan’s approach to the matter does not reflect the reality of wider Armenian society. She referred to increasing expectations, especially among younger generations, for the development of economic relations, the opening of borders, the revival of transportation networks and the strengthening of regional integration. “This indicates that public support for normalization increased to an extent,” she said.

Pro-Russian political circles in Armenia are also cautious toward the process, according to Bozkuş. “In this context, the June elections are important not only for domestic politics but as something that will define Armenia’s foreign policy and regional vision. Under Pashinyan, steps taken to improve relations with the West and normalization process with Türkiye and Azerbaijan had a response to an extent among the public. The Pashinyan era has been a time of important opportunities for these processes,” she underlined.

Bozkuş also warned against adopting an overly optimistic approach or hoping for short-term expectations regarding the process. “There are still many sensitive issues that need to be resolved between the two countries, from historical matters to the establishment of diplomatic relations, regional developments and the lack of full mutual trust. So, it will be more realistic to assess the normalization as a multi-dimensional, fragile process that should need more time.”

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) achieved significant gains in the last municipal elections, unprecedented in two decades. However, boiling tensions within the party paved the way for mayors to part ways with the party.

Since the 2024 elections, 14 mayors left the party and joined the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). This number is expected to rise to 15 when Burcu Köksal, the CHP mayor for the western city of Afyonkarahisar, joins the party. Neither Köksal nor the AK Party confirmed the switch, but the CHP administration remains assured that Köksal will leave as she did not return the calls from party officials, nor did she accept requests for a meeting when the rumors broke out. AK Party spokesperson Ömer Çelik, meanwhile, on Saturday, told journalists that they may see “who will join the party at the next parliamentary group meeting.”

The CHP is embattled with corruption trials involving its mayors, as well as infighting over an alleged corrupt 2023 election that brought current Chair Özgür Özel to power. Elsewhere, scandals of extramarital affairs rock the party.

The party attempts to portray the resignations as results of “blackmail” by the government to mayors, though mayors parting ways with the CHP had been adamant critics of the party long before they left. Mayors cite pressure on local administrations by the central administration of the party, lack of interest in their demands from the central administration, intolerance toward criticism, especially on corruption scandals, as well as the purge of dissidents within the party.

A report by the Sabah newspaper says Özel was particularly angered over mayors who met the minister of environment, urban planning and climate change and sought assistance to improve municipal services. The report says Özel’s insulting messages to Mesut Özarslan, the mayor of Ankara’s Keçiören district, who recently resigned from the party, also disturbed other mayors. Mehmet Sevigen, former secretary-general of the CHP, told the Sabah newspaper that the party was “not managed well.”

“They are off the course. The central administration acts on its own without listening to anyone else. They cannot call the people guilty of (corruption) guilty. They are stuck between Ankara and Silivri,” he said, referring to the Istanbul district where former Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu, an influential figure in the CHP and future presidential candidate, is imprisoned.

“They have to weed out the guilty. They cannot call out corruption, however. I expect more resignations unless the party sends out the corrupt ones,” he said.

Mustafa Yavuz, one of the dissidents who was expelled from the party, told Sabah that the incidents in Uşak, Antalya and Bolu left an impact on the public. He was referring to cities whose mayors were detained on corruption charges. During the investigation, media reports revealed secret affairs of Uşak and Antalya mayors.

“They resisted for two months before expelling Özkan Yalım. People noticed this,” he said, in reference to the mayor of Uşak, who was caught with a mistress when police raided his hotel room to detain him on charges of corruption. Yavuz claimed that thousands of complaints have been filed with the CHP’s public relations office regarding the mayors. He also claimed that three more mayors were seeking to join the AK Party.

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Turkish authorities detained 29 suspects on Friday as part of a corruption investigation targeting a company affiliated with the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IBB), authorities announced.

The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office said the operation focused on Tree and Landscape Inc. (Ağaç ve Peyzaj A.Ş.), a municipal landscaping and green-space company. Investigators allege that suspects set up a “fictional tender system” to manipulate public procurement processes and steer contracts to selected companies.

Detention warrants were issued for 30 suspects, prosecutors said. Police detained 29 of them in simultaneous raids, while one suspect was found to be abroad. Authorities said efforts were continuing to locate the fugitive suspect.

Among those detained were the deputy secretary-general and head of the municipality’s Parks and Gardens Department.

According to the investigation file, suspects allegedly gave certain companies an unfair advantage, coordinated tender procedures and undermined competition in public procurement. Prosecutors also claim the alleged scheme caused public financial losses.

The operation is part of a wider investigation into what prosecutors describe as a criminal organization led by former Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu. Officials say several alleged acts listed in an indictment were connected to Tree and Landscape Inc.

Investigators also allege that suppliers were asked to pay bribes amounting to 10% of contract values and that the money was collected through company executives.

The main opposition CHP is under mounting scrutiny as a wave of corruption, bribery and terrorism-related investigations sweeps across its municipalities.

The most extensive probe targets the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, led by ousted mayor Imamoğlu, over claims of systematic corruption, fictitious tenders and abuse of public resources.

Prosecutors accuse Imamoğlu, identified in the indictment as the leader of a criminal organization, of a wide range of offenses, including forming and leading a criminal group, bribery, money laundering, fraud against public institutions, unlawful collection and dissemination of personal data, destruction of evidence, bid-rigging and abuse of office.

The 3,809-page indictment was completed on Nov. 11, 2025, and seeks prison sentences ranging from 828 years and two months to 2,352 years for Imamoğlu in relation to 142 alleged acts.

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President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Friday received the Vice President of the United Arab Emirates, Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Istanbul amid growing ties between Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates.

According to Turkish sources, the meeting took place at the Dolmabahçe Working Office and was also attended by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.

In a statement shared on his X account following his meeting with President Erdoğan, Sheikh Mansour said the UAE views strengthening partnerships and creating new opportunities for cooperation as a consistent pillar of its relations with countries around the world. He added that the two sides discussed ways to deepen bilateral cooperation and expand it across various sectors in a manner that serves mutual interests and supports development and prosperity for both nations.

Erdoğan’s July 2023 visit to the UAE marked a new milestone in relations as the two countries decided to set up a high-level strategic council, essentially recognizing each other as strategic partners. Since then, commercial relations between the two countries significantly increased. Sheikh Mohammed was a guest of Erdoğan last July, co-chairing the first meeting of the council, after Erdoğan’s last visit to his country in February 2024.

The UAE is Türkiye’s biggest trade partner in the Gulf and bilateral trade volume was about $16 billion in 2024. The two countries aim to increase it to $20 billion in the short term and $40 billion in the medium term.

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Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan held a phone call with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to discuss the latest developments in ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States, diplomatic sources said Friday.

The two top diplomats reviewed the current state of the talks between Tehran and Washington.

Iran said on Friday that it is still reviewing a U.S. proposal aimed at ending the conflict.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told the semi-official Tasnim news agency that Tehran is continuing its assessment of the proposal and will announce its final position once the review process is completed.

The fragile cease-fire between the United States and Iran wobbled again Friday after fresh clashes erupted in the Gulf, with both sides trading accusations of aggression while fears grew that the conflict could spiral back into a wider regional war.

Washington has been awaiting Tehran’s response to a proposed framework aimed at ending the conflict, though major sticking points remain unresolved, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz.

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