Politics
Türkiye in focus as Greek Cyprus pushes EU defense clause
A little-used clause buried in the European Union’s treaties has moved to the center of geopolitical debates, as the Greek Cypriot administration pushes to turn a vague commitment into a workable security mechanism, with Türkiye increasingly central to the discussion.
At issue is Article 42.7 of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, a mutual assistance provision often likened to NATO’s Article 5. It obliges member states to aid a country under armed attack “by all the means in their power.” Yet unlike NATO’s collective defense clause, it leaves the nature of that assistance undefined and the process largely in national hands.
For years, the clause has existed more on paper than in practice. It has been invoked only once, by France after the 2015 Paris attacks, and even then, support came in varied, largely bilateral forms rather than through a unified EU response.
That ambiguity is precisely what the Greek Cypriot administration now wants to address.
Speaking after an EU summit in Nicosia in late April, Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Christodoulides said the European Commission would prepare a “blueprint” detailing how the clause should function in the event of an attack. The move reflects growing concern within the bloc that, while the obligation exists, the mechanism to implement it does not.
The immediate trigger appears to be recent regional instability. A drone strike in March near a British military base on the island, during the height of the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran, underscored the island’s exposure. While the base lies on sovereign British territory, the incident sharpened anxieties in the Greek Cypriot administration about spillover risks and the limits of existing security arrangements.
Yet the push also reflects deeper, longer-standing concerns.
The Greek Cypriot administration occupies a distinctive position as one of the few EU member states outside NATO, meaning it cannot rely on the alliance’s Article 5 guarantee. That limitation has long shaped its security outlook, particularly in relation to Türkiye.
The island remains divided between the Greek Cypriot administration and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognized only by Ankara. Türkiye maintains a military presence in the north, which the Greek Cypriot side continues to view as a security concern. Ankara, however, has consistently argued that its forces act as a guarantor of stability and protection for Turkish Cypriots, and not as a threat to the Greek Cypriot side.
This divergence has fed into wider tensions with Greece in the East Mediterranean, where disputes over maritime boundaries, energy exploration and sovereignty claims frequently overlap.
Within this context, Article 42.7 is increasingly seen in the Greek Cypriot administration as a potential framework for collective backing in the event of a crisis. Unlike NATO’s Article 5, which is widely understood to be inapplicable in a dispute involving two alliance members such as Greece and Türkiye, the EU clause could, in theory, be activated in a scenario involving an EU state and a non-member.
That distinction is central to its appeal, particularly in scenarios where tensions involving Türkiye could arise.
Diplomatic discussions in Brussels have increasingly focused on how the clause might operate in practice, including scenarios ranging from hybrid threats to conventional attacks. A series of “tabletop” exercises planned for later this year will simulate such contingencies, testing how EU member states could coordinate a response.
Yet enthusiasm for developing the clause is far from universal.
Many EU countries, particularly those firmly anchored in NATO, are wary of creating parallel structures that could dilute the alliance’s central role. Officials have repeatedly stressed that Article 42.7 is intended to complement, not replace, NATO’s Article 5, which remains the cornerstone of European collective defense.
The distinction is significant. NATO’s clause is backed by integrated command structures and decades of operational planning, whereas the EU provision relies on the political will of individual states. In practice, this means responses under Article 42.7 could vary in speed and scope.
For the Greek Cypriot administration, the initiative reflects both immediate and structural considerations: a response to recent regional shocks, and a longer-term effort to embed clearer security guarantees within EU structures, particularly in relation to Türkiye.
Türkiye, for its part, is likely to view these efforts cautiously. Any move that could broaden the EU’s role in regional security issues touching on Cyprus or the Eastern Mediterranean may be seen in Ankara as an attempt to shift the diplomatic balance.
Turkish officials have consistently rejected characterizations of their presence on the island as a threat, emphasizing instead their role under longstanding arrangements. From that perspective, steps to operationalize Article 42.7 risk reinforcing narratives that frame Türkiye as an external security challenge within the EU context.
Other EU members have their own reservations. Countries such as Hungary and Slovakia have expressed reluctance toward initiatives that could deepen security commitments, while neutral states including Ireland and Austria remain cautious about measures that might blur the line between cooperation and obligation.
The result is a careful balancing act. On one side is the push, led by the Greek Cypriot administration and supported by countries such as France and Greece, to give the EU’s defense clause practical meaning. On the other is a broader effort to ensure that such steps do not undermine NATO or create expectations the EU cannot fulfill.
For now, the “blueprint” being prepared in Brussels represents an attempt to reconcile those aims, offering reassurance without overextension. Whether that effort succeeds will depend less on legal detail than on political consensus and the willingness of states to act.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Monday that Türkiye has continued pursuing its European Union membership goals despite facing double standards and entrenched prejudice, warning that Europe is at a “crossroads” and needs Türkiye more than Ankara needs the bloc.
Speaking after a Cabinet meeting, Erdoğan criticized the longstanding bias within European institutions, saying Türkiye has struggled to overcome prejudice since the start of its EU accession process.
“Despite the double standards we have been subjected to, we have continued to pursue our membership goals with determination,” he told reporters at a news conference, adding that European actors have repeatedly found reasons to sideline Türkiye and keep it waiting at the door.
Erdoğan said Türkiye has undergone significant transformation over the years, strengthening its economy and democracy, but noted that such progress has not been matched by a shift in Europe’s approach toward Ankara.
“Türkiye has changed and developed, but unfortunately, there has been no change in the attitude of these circles toward our country,” he said.
He added that, unlike other candidate countries, Türkiye has had to contend not only with technical accession criteria but also with what he described as a persistent “mindset problem” in Europe.
The president also criticized what he called “strategic myopia” within many European Union institutions, arguing that such an outlook prevents the bloc from fully recognizing Türkiye’s geopolitical and economic significance.
“Europe is at a crossroads,” Erdoğan said, stressing that the continent stands to benefit more from closer ties with Türkiye than vice versa.
Serdar Kılıç, Türkiye’s special representative for normalization with Armenia, said Tuesday he feels “at home” in the country, pointing to a growing atmosphere of trust as efforts to restore ties move forward.
“I really feel at home here, but my friends also have the same feeling throughout the normalization process,” he said during a panel at Yerevan Dialogue on Tuesday, describing a spirit of “friendship” and “understanding” in ongoing discussions.
Kilic emphasized that the current phase of engagement should not be seen as full normalization.
“We are not normalizing Armenia-Türkiye relations. It’s not a normalization process. It’s a confidence-building process,” he said. “So we are trying to build confidence so that we’ll be able to take over rapid steps that will take us to the full normalization of relations between our two countries.”
He noted that progress made so far might have seemed unlikely in the past.
Kilic also highlighted the importance of broader regional cooperation, particularly in connectivity.
“You cannot isolate the Turkish-Armenian normalization, or confidence-building process, from the overall efforts in the region on connectivity,” he said.
He stressed that this goes beyond transport links: “We shouldn’t only connect or combine connectivity to transport, railroad and so forth. There are more important fields that we have.”
Among these, he pointed to digital infrastructure and aviation. “Internet connections are very important, transportation and air transportation are very important,” he said, adding that agreements have already been signed “with Armenian companies… in order to provide better internet services to the Armenian people.”
He called for regional ownership of peace efforts. “Any idea for enhancing relations, developing relations, and establishing long-term, durable peace and stability in the region… should come from the region, within the region itself,” he said.
Meanwhile, Armenia’s envoy for normalization with Ankara, Ruben Rubinyan, pointed to significant changes in the wider South Caucasus, particularly in relations with Azerbaijan.
“The good news is that we are already seizing the moment,” he said, adding that “there is a state of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, because before last August, there was a state of conflict between these countries.”
Rubinyan highlighted a sustained period without violence along the border. “More than two years have passed already that no single soldier or service person has been killed from either side on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border,” he said. “There has never been such two years.”
He also described recent developments in regional connectivity as “unimaginable.”
“Azerbaijan lifted all restrictions on railroad transit to and from Armenia… trains did not run through Azerbaijan to Armenia for almost three decades,” he said, calling it “a fundamental stone in the wall of peace and interdependence.”
Economic ties are also beginning to emerge. “We have also started direct trade with Azerbaijan,” Rubinyan said, noting that “Armenian businesspeople have already imported… products from Azerbaijan.”
Looking ahead, he also expressed optimism about external support. “I’m absolutely convinced that both European Union and Türkiye have a very positive role to play in the South Caucasus in the coming years or months or weeks or maybe days,” he said.
On Monday, Türkiye and Armenia signed a memorandum of understanding to jointly restore the ancient Ani Bridge, in a move described as a step toward strengthening ties between the two countries.
The agreement was announced following a meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz on the sidelines of the 8th European Political Community Summit in Yerevan, Armenia’s capital.
Türkiye was represented at its highest level since 2008 by Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz, reflecting growing momentum in Türkiye’s normalization process with Armenia.
Relations between the two are seeing one of their most active periods since the 1990s, thanks to the normalization steps taken in recent years.
The normalization and peace process between Türkiye and Armenia is “extremely valuable” and can serve as an example for other regions, Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz said Monday during a visit to Yerevan.
“Unfortunately, many regions of the world are not in such a situation. There are numerous conflicts and increasingly deepening wars,” Yılmaz told journalists on the sidelines of the 8th European Political Community summit.
The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to jointly restore the ancient Ani Bridge.
The agreement was announced following a meeting between Yılmaz and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on the sidelines of the summit in the Armenian capital.
“Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has made an important contribution to bringing this process to this point,” Yılmaz noted, adding that Pashinyan “has made a major contribution as well, demonstrating courageous leadership by presenting a realistic vision that serves the interests of his people-not just in words, but through concrete actions.”
Türkiye was represented at the highest level since 2008 by the vice president at the summit.
Calling Monday’s meeting in Yerevan “historic,” Yılmaz said: “Both in terms of Türkiye-Armenia relations and Azerbaijan-Armenia relations, the participation and the atmosphere here were highly positive. I hope it brings beneficial outcomes for the shared future, unity of geography, and common destiny of all the nations and states in this region.”
Yılmaz also emphasized Türkiye’s broader diplomatic role, saying: “At the same time, our President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to support normalization and peace with all of Türkiye’s strength and resources, maintaining dialogue with all sides in the region.”
He added that Erdogan’s “diplomacy for peace applies across many areas-not only in this issue, but also conflicts involving Iran, Israel, and the US, Gaza, Africa, Syria, and the Balkans.”
He also said: “Each individual step may not seem sufficient on its own, but over time, these steps accumulate, building trust between countries.”
Yılmaz also pointed to practical developments, including transport and investment links: “Turkish Airlines has resumed flights to Istanbul, and there are plans to increase them. Pegasus had already started earlier. There are also important developments in telecommunications.”
On the wider impact of the Mideast conflict, he said: “We believe that peace serves humanity. A just peace benefits everyone. Wars ultimately bring destruction and create high human costs.”
He added: “As seen in the recent Iran-U.S,-Israel conflict, wars also generate major economic costs.”
On infrastructure, he said: “Regarding the Ani Bridge, technical preparations have already been completed. Our institutions are now on the ground. There are no remaining obstacles, so work is expected to begin very soon.”
According to Yılmaz, “progress is being made day by day in Azerbaijan-Armenia relations, with mutual positive steps being taken,” adding that parallel efforts between Türkiye and Armenia are “creating a new atmosphere in the South Caucasus.”
“This is one of the most strategic regions in the world. It has historically been a transit region. We believe that as peace and normalization are achieved in the South Caucasus, first and foremost, everyone living in this region will benefit. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye-all countries will benefit,” he underlined.
He also linked regional stability to global trade dynamics, noting: “As is well known, there is a war involving Russia, conflicts extending southward, and southern routes are operating at near full capacity. Therefore, the ‘Middle Corridor’ is extremely important, and today everyone recognizes its strategic significance more clearly.”
He concluded by thanking Armenian officials for their warm welcome in Yerevan. “Finally, I would like to say that from the moment we arrived, Armenian authorities showed us great interest and hospitality. I would like to thank all Armenian officials, especially Prime Minister Pashinyan, for their warm welcome and for creating such a positive atmosphere.”
The Board of Cyber Security will hold its first meeting on Tuesday, the Sabah newspaper reported.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is expected to chair the meeting where the country’s road map on cybersecurity will be discussed. Key issues up for discussion will be the protection of critical infrastructure against cyberattacks and the development of human resources for cybersecurity. The board is comprised of the president, vice president, ministers of justice, foreign affairs, interior, national defense, industry and technology, transportation and infrastructure, the secretary-general of the National Security Council, director of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), head of the Presidency of Defense Industries, and head of the Cybersecurity Directorate.
The board meetings will also be open to other ministers and experts, from whom the board seeks input from. The board is also authorized to set up committees and working groups for technical work.
Among its duties are setting policies and strategies for cybersecurity, making decisions for the technological road map of the country, establishing incentives and developing human resources.
The Cybersecurity Directorate was founded in January 2025, shortly before Parliament passed a comprehensive cybersecurity law for better control of cyberspace. The bill included mandates for creating strategies and policies for cybersecurity, as well as the establishment of the Cybersecurity Board.
Perpetrators of cyberattacks, those benefiting from the use of data stolen in cyberattacks, may be punished with prison terms of up to 12 years under the new law. Those publishing, broadcasting and selling data stolen in cyberattacks will face prison terms of up to 15 years. Those failing to report cyberattacks or exploits in their line of work, namely Internet service providers or those offering online services that require storage of personal information, will face fines under the new law.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan held a phone call Monday with Qatar’s prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, to discuss regional developments and ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran, Foreign Ministry sources said.
Negotiations between Iran and the U.S. have been deadlocked since a cease-fire came into effect on April 8, with one round of peace talks to end the more than two-month war having failed in Pakistan.
On Friday, Fidan said Türkiye could consider taking part in multinational demining operations in the Strait of Hormuz after a possible peace agreement between the U.S. and Iran.
Speaking to reporters in London, Fidan said Türkiye “would be open to” participating in a coalition tasked with clearing naval mines in the strait once a deal is reached, describing such work as a “humanitarian” effort. However, Fidan underscored that Ankara would not take part in operations that risk positioning Türkiye as a party to renewed conflict. Ankara would avoid any role implying alignment if conflict resumes, Fidan said.
A court in Ankara will reshape the political career of Özgür Özel. The pharmacist-turned-politician climbed up the career ladder fast in the Turkish main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). On Wednesday, he may lose his seat at the country’s oldest party. Özel and his associates in the CHP face accusations of buying votes from delegates in a November 2023 election in the party that brought Özel to power.
Ahead of the hearing at the Court of Appeals, the CHP announced that it would take “to the field” this week, organizing events in 81 provinces. The announcement is actually a continuation of CHP’s campaign for an early election, but a court verdict may shift the discussion in those “field trips.”
Recently, the court of appeals asked judiciary authorities in Istanbul to send files regarding two corruption cases linked to the party, media reports said. One case involves a businessman accused of bribing CHP-run municipalities to get a share in lucrative tenders. Another case involves Ekrem Imamoğlu, former mayor of Istanbul, who was declared the future presidential candidate of CHP after he was arrested last March on charges of widespread corruption at the municipality. This request may seem routine to an untrained eye, but legal experts say it also means that the appeals court is now at a stage of issuing a final verdict in the vote-buying case.
Barring another delay in the case, the court on Wednesday will issue one of three verdicts: absolute nullification, a request for retrial in the case in a lower court or dismissing the case in its entirety. Absolute nullification means the 2023 election is not valid. This will pave the way for a new election, and until then, a trustee will be appointed to helm the party. This was the case in another trial related to vote-buying in the race for the chairmanship of the party’s Istanbul branch. A retrial will further prolong the process and means the CHP may buy more time ahead of the 2028 elections. If the court dismisses the case, it will cement Özel’s reign in the party, where he held another intraparty election last year to frustrate the ongoing court case and won.
The possibility of a verdict of absolute nullification led to mobilization in the party, with Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş openly calling the administration to “do something” a few weeks ago. Özel, meanwhile, continued his rallies across the country, seeking support for early or by-election, and rallied the CHP supporters around mayors detained or arrested on charges of corruption. The party may continue its rallies in case of absolute nullification, while media reports say Özel and several lawmakers may leave CHP and establish a new party.
As for the possible appointment of a trustee, the name of Özel’s predecessor, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, came up. Kılıçdaroğlu hinted once that he may take the reins in the party again, though the party would be a pale shade of its former self if the new generation of CHP members leave. Özel kept most of the lawmakers and prominent figures who rose in the ranks during Kılıçdaroğlu’s tenure and this may facilitate Kılıçdaroğlu’s task as trustee. A report published by the Sabah newspaper last month says some 100 CHP lawmakers were already ready to support Kılıçdaroğlu if he were to be appointed as a trustee.
Suspects testifying at the last hearing in the vote-buying case last month rejected allegations that they either were paid by the close circle of Özel to vote for him or were scheming to offer gifts and cash to other delegates to sway their opinion of Özel. But witnesses have contradicted this.
Testifying at the hearing, Veysi Uyanık, a delegate at the 2023 congress, said that Imamoğlu met him and other delegates before the congress, seeking their support for Özel. Uyanık said Özel had an election office in Ankara and his supporters were “handing out cash” to delegates. “I asked how much they pay, Özgür Karabat (one of the defendants in the case) told me that they would pay TL 100,000 ($2,250). Karabat’s chauffeur then gave me a ride to my hotel. They pulled a cache of free food coupons from the trunk and gave them to me. I later found out they were worth TL 1.5 million,” he said. Uyanık said he handed TL 20,000 to other delegates staying with him at the hotel after taking TL 100,000 from Karabat.
Mehmet Sevigen, a former lawmaker who testified at the hearing, said he heard reports of vote-buying at the congress and repeatedly warned the CHP administration to respond to the allegations. “But they did not answer,” he told the court.
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