Politics
What does NATO membership mean for Türkiye?
Türkiye this year marks the 74th anniversary of its accession to NATO and has the second-largest army in the alliance. It is the only country in NATO’s “southern flank” with a sizable military power and a gateway to the Middle East and wider Asia. Security of the Black Sea also largely depends on Türkiye, especially amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which threatens maritime security.
Founded on April 4, 1949, under the collective self-defense principle set out in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established as a defense alliance against the Soviet threat.
Following the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world order in 1989, NATO launched its Partnership for Peace program with former socialist countries in 1994, with the aim of facilitating their eventual accession to the alliance. In this context, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999, bringing the number of member states to 19.
The fall of the Berlin Wall on Nov. 9, 1989, marked a turning point in NATO’s history and heralded the end of the Cold War.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO established partnerships with its former adversaries as the alliance adapted to the post-Cold War security environment.
NATO later conducted its first major crisis-management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington prompted NATO to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in its history and led the alliance to adopt a broader approach to security.
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty forms the basis of NATO’s collective defense principle, under which an armed attack against one or more allies is considered an attack against all members.
The article states that if such an attack occurs in North America or Europe, each member will assist the attacked ally by taking “such action as it deems necessary,” including the possible use of armed force, in line with the right to individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
NATO subsequently took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
At NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002, the alliance entered its second round of post-Cold War enlargement, holding accession and alliance-related talks with Balkan and Baltic countries.
Greece also withdrew from NATO’s military command structure in 1974 in response to Türkiye’s second Cyprus Peace Operation in August that year, but returned to the structure in 1980.
NATO marked its 77th anniversary on April 4, 2026, celebrating the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1949.
The main aim of the alliance is to maintain the security and sovereignty of member states while developing cooperation among partners.
For Türkiye, the key factor behind accession was the need to balance Soviet pressure, particularly Moscow’s claims over the Turkish straits and eastern provinces. Since joining NATO in 1952, however, Türkiye has emerged as a key member of the alliance due to its support for NATO missions, participation in exercises, steadily growing military capabilities and geopolitical importance.
Türkiye enters alliance
Following World War II, the Soviet Union expanded its influence by establishing communist governments across Eastern Europe, laying the foundations of the Cold War.
NATO emerged as a source of hope for Türkiye under these circumstances. From the alliance’s establishment, the Turkish government showed a strong willingness to join. However, some of NATO’s smaller members, as well as the United States, initially opposed Türkiye’s membership over concerns that it could heighten the Soviet threat.
Yet, Türkiye’s geopolitical importance and the performance of Turkish troops deployed during the Korean War in 1950 demonstrated the potential strategic value of bringing the country into NATO. After two previous applications, in May and September 1950, had been rejected, Türkiye was invited to join NATO alongside Greece on Sept. 21, 1951. The U.S. Senate approved the accession of the two countries on Jan. 29, 1952, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved Türkiye’s accession to NATO on Feb. 18, 1952.
Contributions to deterrence
Türkiye’s contributions extend from the Baltic region to the Black Sea and include NATO missions, operations and exercises, as well as responsibilities in maritime security, crisis management, training and deterrence.
The country currently contributes nearly 3,000 personnel, along with various weapons, vehicles and military platforms, to ongoing NATO missions, operations and initiatives.
Türkiye also hosts critical NATO facilities, including the Allied Land Command, located in the western city of Izmir, and the Rapid Deployable Corps, based in Istanbul.
The capital, Ankara, hosts the Center of Excellence for Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) and the Partnership for Peace Training Center. Istanbul hosts the NATO Maritime Security Center of Excellence (MARSEC COE).
Furthermore, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) this year joined NATO’s Steadfast Dart exercise in Germany from Feb. 12-24, held to improve the operational readiness of the Allied Reaction Force. The army contributed naval, land and air elements, including the Anadolu Task Group, and deployed a joint force of more than 2,000 personnel to Germany.
Starting in 2028, Türkiye will assume leadership of NATO’s Allied Reaction Force (ARF), one of the Alliance’s most critical military capabilities, further strengthening its key role in European security.
With its capabilities in artificial intelligence, cyber defense and space, Türkiye stands out as one of the NATO members adapting most rapidly to the Alliance’s evolving threat landscape.
In this context, Türkiye stands out as one of NATO’s key members strengthening not only its own defense capabilities but also the Alliance’s technological edge through major projects such as the Steel Dome integrated air defense system, the KAAN fighter jet and the Altay main battle tank.
Türkiye allocated 2.33% of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense in 2025, placing it among the NATO members assuming a high level of financial and military responsibility within the Alliance.
Türkiye also remains one of NATO’s key members in counterterrorism, maintaining an active operational role in combating terrorism, one of the threats facing the Alliance.
Significant missions
Since joining NATO, Türkiye has steadily expanded its contributions to the alliance’s missions and operations, including in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Libya and Iraq. Turkish officials say the country has preserved and developed Cold War-era military capabilities while also fighting terrorism and responding to regional instability.
Türkiye supported NATO’s Afghanistan mission between 2002 and 2014 under the International Security Assistance Force and later contributed to the Resolute Support Mission from 2015. Turkish forces also assumed framework nation responsibility for the secure operation of Kabul Hamid Karzai International Airport until NATO’s mission ended in August 2021.
The Turkish military also contributed to the NATO Mission Iraq, launched to help build the capacity of the Iraqi army, from 2018 until a withdrawal process began in March amid worsening security conditions.
Following NATO’s decision to continue the mission with a core staff at the Allied Joint Force Command Naples, Türkiye assigned three personnel to the new structure.
July’s NATO summit
Moreover, Ankara this year, hosted the 36th NATO Heads of State and Government Summit on July 7-8, with leaders issuing a final declaration reaffirming their “unwavering commitment” to Article 5, the alliance’s collective defense clause, and to the transatlantic bond.
The summit brought together leaders of the 32-member alliance as well as key partners to discuss Europe’s defense capacity.
The final declaration of the summit in the end underscored collective defense, procurement agreements and continued support for Ukraine.
Member states had gathered in Ankara to reaffirm their “unwavering commitment” to Article 5, NATO’s collective defense clause, and to the transatlantic bond, it noted.
The declaration said the investments would deliver required capabilities while also strengthening the defense industry and resilience. adding that European allies and Canada increased investment in core defense requirements by more than $139 billion in 2025.
NATO allies further stressed that the support for Ukraine should remain fair, predictable and sustainable over the long term, pledging 70 billion euros ($81.5 billion) in military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine in 2026 and committing to maintain at least the same level of support in 2027.
Moreover, the declaration also emphasized that the Alliance continued to respond and adapt to strategic competition, widespread instability, hybrid threats and recurring crises shaping the broader security environment.
Turkish security forces detained nine suspects linked to the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) as they allegedly attempted to flee the country by boat off the coast of southwestern Türkiye, authorities said Monday.
A total of 12 people, including the nine suspects, two children and the boat’s captain, were intercepted off the Datça district of Muğla province.
The Muğla Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office said the suspects had previously faced proceedings over alleged membership in FETÖ and that their cases were pending appeal. Authorities determined they were preparing to leave Türkiye illegally.
Coast guard teams intercepted the Russian-flagged vessel “Peter Pan” near international waters after receiving information about the group’s location.
Separate legal proceedings were launched against the nine suspects for allegedly attempting to leave the country illegally.
The captain was detained and is being investigated on suspicion of aiding a terrorist group and migrant smuggling. The two children were handed over to relatives.
FETÖ has faced increased scrutiny following the coup attempt that killed 251 people and injured nearly 2,200 others. Tens of thousands of people were detained, arrested or dismissed from public sector jobs following the attempt under a state of emergency.
The terrorist group faces operations almost daily as investigators still try to unravel their massive network of infiltrators everywhere, but an unknown number of FETÖ members, mostly high-ranking figures, fled Türkiye when the coup attempt was thwarted.
Statements by two women to investigators revealed how Muhittin Böcek, former mayor of the southern Turkish province of Antalya for the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), sexually harassed them and used sex in exchange for jobs at the municipality.
Böcek was arrested last year on corruption charges, and investigators have since launched a probe into allegations of sexual harassment by the mayor. Several women have already come forward, shedding light on the allegations. Two more women testified in the case, and their statements, made public on Sunday, show how they were lured to Böcek’s residence with the promise of being hired at the municipality. The unidentified women accused Tuğçe Güney, the director of a municipal youth center who was arrested earlier, of arranging their meetings with Böcek. One of the victims said Güney told her that Böcek would hire her and provide financial assistance to her family if she slept with him.
She said she had sexual intercourse with Böcek and was given TL 2,000 when she left the house after the incident. The other victim, meanwhile, said she was taken to Böcek’s home twice on the promise of getting a job at the municipality and that Böcek initiated physical contact with her during both meetings, which made her uncomfortable.
According to the first newly surfaced testimony, the incident took place in 2024. The female victim alleged that Tuğçe Güney asked her to meet with Muhittin Böcek “for the purpose of prostitution.” In her testimony, the woman said Güney told her: “He is the mayor. If you sleep with him, he will give you a job at the municipality and provide financial assistance to you and your family.”
The woman said she accepted the offer because she was experiencing financial difficulties and went with Tuğçe Güney to Muhittin Böcek’s home in the Konyaaltı district.
The victim said that when they arrived at the house, Tuğçe Güney stayed in the living room while she went into another room with Muhittin Böcek. However, she said she did not want to have intercourse with Böcek because she felt uncomfortable and left the room.
According to her testimony, as she was preparing to leave the house, Tuğçe Güney stopped her and said: “Use your common sense. Muhittin likes you. Go back to the room.”
The woman said she then returned to the room and had sexual intercourse with Muhittin Böcek.
One of the most striking allegations in the victim’s testimony concerned a payment allegedly made after the meeting. The woman said Böcek gave her TL 2,000 as she was leaving the house.
The victim said she later asked Tuğçe Güney whether she had received any payment herself. She alleged that Güney replied, referring to Muhittin Böcek, “My father already takes care of all my needs. My father supports me.”
The second newly surfaced victim testimony in the case file said the incidents began approximately four years ago. The female victim said she met Tuğçe Güney through a mutual friend and that Güney took her phone number on the day they met and asked her, “Shall I arrange a job for you at the municipality?”
The woman said she was receptive to the offer because she was unemployed at the time. A few days later, she said, Güney called her and told her, “I will take you to the mayor’s house, introduce you to him and get you a job at the municipality.”
According to the victim’s account, Güney later called her and said they would go to Böcek’s house for dinner. The two met in Konyaaltı and took a taxi to Böcek’s home. The woman said that, besides Böcek, a man in his 30s who introduced himself as an assistant was also at the house.
The victim said that during dinner, Muhittin Böcek began touching her legs and that she moved his hand away because she was uncomfortable. In her testimony, she said no discussion took place that day about hiring her at the municipality. After leaving the house, she said she asked Tuğçe Güney why Böcek had touched her and alleged that Güney replied, “He liked you very much; that’s why he touched you. Never mind.”
When she asked what would happen with her being hired by the municipality, the woman said Güney told her, “I’ll take care of it, don’t worry.”
Previously, the testimonies of three victims of a similar nature had been reported by the media in the investigation conducted by the Antalya Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. With the two newly surfaced testimonies, the number of victim testimonies related to the alleged prostitution investigation involving Böcek and his associates that have been reported by the media has risen to five.
The new testimonies are expected to further highlight several aspects of the investigation, particularly whether promises of municipal employment were used to arrange meetings between women and Muhittin Böcek, Tuğçe Güney’s role in the process, and whether other women were similarly directed into such settings using the same method.
The investigation by the Antalya Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office is continuing on multiple fronts.
The opposition Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) held its congress on Sunday amid rumors that it may undergo a significant overhaul. Party sources quoted by the media say the transformation is scheduled for the future, while Sunday’s event in Ankara was merely the fulfillment of a technical requirement for political parties to hold their regular congresses.
The DEM Party follows a left-wing ideology, but its signature issue has been Kurdish rights. Although popular in the southeastern provinces with predominantly Kurdish populations, the DEM Party has narrowed its fight for Kurdish rights to its association with the terrorist group PKK. The party played a key role in the Terror-Free Türkiye initiative launched by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli for the dissolution of the PKK.
It postponed its congress during the course of the initiative, which led to the implementation of a new law providing for the deferral of sentences for surrendered PKK members. In parallel with the initiative, the DEM Party will likely be transformed as its main argument, “peace” with the PKK, enters a new phase. The PKK’s jailed ringleader, Abdullah Öcalan, in his messages to the public through DEM Party lawmakers, highlighted “democratic struggle” after the PKK’s dissolution, and political pundits say this may lead to a transformation in the party. Some even go further, claiming that Öcalan may become the “honorary” chair of the DEM Party.
The DEM Party held its last congress in 2023, and it was at that congress that the party changed its name from the Green Left Party and elected incumbent co-Chairs Tuncer Bakırhan and Tülay Hatimoğulları. The duo was elected again at Sunday’s congress. Party spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan told BBC Turkish that another congress would be held in the near future, where the party would undergo a substantial change, though she did not hint at what changes the future would bring. She only stated that they were planning to establish a model that would “strengthen the understanding of a democratic republic.”
Addressing the congress on Sunday, Hatimoğulları said it was a “threshold where DEM will review its policies.” She underlined the need for changes in the party’s organization and political language, noting that social expectations and policymaking have changed in recent years.
The party is a continuation of parties like the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which strictly aligned itself with the PKK and advocated for policies the PKK desired, such as greater autonomy for southeastern provinces. Its open support for the terrorist group paved the way for investigations into DEM Party members. The party was quick to boost pro-PKK propaganda after the new law on Terror-Free Türkiye was implemented, angering critics of the initiative by setting up “condolence events” for PKK terrorists who died years ago in counterterrorism operations.
The party has long been ahead of other small opposition parties and, for the opposition, was viewed as a kingmaker when it was called the HDP. In the 2023 elections, the DEM Party’s predecessor supported the main opposition candidate for the presidency. In the 2024 municipal elections, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) sought a less blatant alliance with the DEM Party, and DEM Party voters’ support for CHP candidates in the local elections reportedly led to unprecedented wins for the latter.
Yet, the Terror-Free Türkiye initiative pushed the DEM Party to pursue closer ties with the People’s Alliance of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and MHP. Indeed, it was Bahçeli’s warm handshake with DEM Party lawmakers at the inauguration of the new Parliament session in 2024 that paved the way for the declaration of the Terror-Free Türkiye initiative. The DEM Party still remains a fierce opponent of the alliance, though it is mostly on the same page regarding the Terror-Free Türkiye initiative. The opposition, meanwhile, remains fragmented over the initiative.
Bakırhan said at the congress that the party would remain a “third way” in the current political landscape in Türkiye. He stated that the congress was also the beginning of a new political era they defined as the “democratic republic movement.”
As the main opposition pushes for an early vote, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is still ahead, according to the latest opinion poll by a polling company that gave the closest prediction of the result of the 2023 elections.
The poll by Betimar shows that 35.4% of respondents were willing to vote for the AK Party if an election were held next week. The New Party (YP), which grabbed the main opposition position shortly after its inception, trailed the AK Party at 20.1%.
YP leader Özgür Özel had repeatedly called for rescheduling the 2028 election while he was the chair of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Özel still advocates rescheduling the election and is overconfident, as he recently claimed that the YP would secure 60% of the vote in an early election.
Betimar’s poll also showed a surprise leap for the Good Party (IP), which scored 9.3% in the poll, ahead of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), which usually surpasses it in opinion polls. The CHP, meanwhile, declined to 5.3%, according to the poll, an expected fall given that it lost its main opposition status with the founding of YP by a former CHP lawmaker.
The government, meanwhile, appears intent on holding elections on time. This was underlined by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz. As he announced the medium-term program for the economy on Sunday, Yılmaz noted that the program was prepared on the basis that the elections would be held on time, in the spring or summer of 2028, and that any rescheduling was at the discretion of Parliament. The president also has the authority to call an early election, although President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has so far not openly responded to the opposition’s calls.
Last month, the AK Party marked its 25th anniversary, pledging to provide more services to the country against the backdrop of successive election victories over the past two decades, the longest period the country had been governed without coalition governments since the 1990s.
Sahak Maşalyan, patriarch of the Armenian Orthodox Church in Türkiye, accompanied the Christian congregation to a religious service in the eastern province of Van on Sunday. Maşalyan said that, along with prayers for global peace and brotherhood among people, they had “a special prayer” this year “for the restoration of Türkiye-Armenia ties.”
“People living in these lands deserve peace. We ask God for His blessing,” he said after the religious service at the historic Akdamar Church on the eponymous island in Lake Van.
Maşalyan was accompanied by Armenian faithful from across Türkiye, the United States, Europe, Armenia and neighboring Iran. Bishop Mesrob Parsamyan, primate of the Eastern Diocese of the Armenian Church of North America, led the religious service.
Türkiye and Armenia took major steps toward rapprochement this year, especially after a visit to Yerevan by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz and regular meetings between delegations from both sides to normalize relations. The two countries agreed to work on a direct railway route and the restoration of a historic bridge on the border.
Türkiye was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia’s independence within months of its declaration in 1991. Yet, one year later, Türkiye began cutting ties with Armenia and shut down the border when Armenia attacked Azerbaijan.
It took 15 years for the first steps toward normalizing relations to be taken. In 2009, the two countries signed protocols to that end, but the political climate in Armenia at the time stalled the normalization efforts. Under incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia has largely abandoned its anti-Turkish rhetoric and introduced the “Real Armenia” doctrine, which promotes peace with its neighbors.
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who returned to the chairmanship of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) by pledging to eliminate “thieves and bribe-takers through cleansing,” is intent on carrying out a historic transformation of Türkiye’s oldest party. In less than three months, he has reshuffled the party’s top cadres, and more is on the way, especially through changes to the party’s delegate system. Some delegates have acknowledged that they were paid by associates of Kılıçdaroğlu’s rival, Özgür Özel, in a 2023 party election that Kılıçdaroğlu lost.
While party organizations are being completely overhauled, most lawmakers and mayors suspected of corruption have either been referred to disciplinary boards or subsequently forced to resign and join the New Party (YP). The YP was founded by Özel in July, and although it has reduced the CHP’s presence in Parliament, it is tainted by allegations of corruption involving CHP-run municipalities, whose mayors are mostly supportive of the YP.
In the final stage of the purge pledged by Kılıçdaroğlu, attention has now turned to the party’s delegate structure.
In this context, all eyes in the CHP are on Sept. 9, which is also considered the party’s founding anniversary. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is expected to make important statements on the day when various events will be held. It is anticipated that Kılıçdaroğlu himself will announce the long-awaited congress schedule to the public on that date. CHP provincial and district heads will also be in Ankara for the special occasion.
As part of the congress process in the CHP, elections will be held for provincial and district leadership positions, while congress delegates will be determined from scratch. This will, in a sense, eliminate the controversial delegate structure that has caused major problems for the party for the past three years. The CHP’s grand congress is expected to be convened quickly following the Court of Cassation’s ruling on absolute nullity in the case involving vote-buying allegations in the 2023 intra-party election. The aim is to complete the congress processes at the provincial and district levels by the time the Court of Cassation issues its ruling, which will either validate or nullify Kılıçdaroğlu’s reinstatement.
Bribery allegations overshadowed the CHP’s 2023 congress, in which Kılıçdaroğlu unexpectedly lost the chairmanship by a very narrow margin. Rumors that Özel and Imamoğlu had bought the votes of hundreds of delegates in exchange for money were brought before the courts, and the allegations were effectively confirmed by the absolute-nullity ruling issued by the regional appeals court recently. Former Istanbul Mayor Imamoğlu, who was arrested last year on charges of municipal corruption, was a key figure within the CHP. Prior to the intra-party election, he was caught on video at a meeting where he schemed with other party figures to support Özel against Kılıçdaroğlu, who had helped his rise in the party.
Özel’s supporters have accused Kılıçdaroğlu of attempting to undermine the CHP’s prospects of winning the next presidential election under Özel’s leadership, with some of his allies going as far as branding the former chair a “traitor.”
Kılıçdaroğlu, meanwhile, has continued to challenge Özel and his supporters, deepening the political rupture that eventually contributed to the establishment of the YP.
In August, the CHP referred 49 members to disciplinary proceedings over allegations that they worked for another political party while remaining members of the CHP, party spokesperson Müslim Sarı announced. Sarı said the party had previously warned that working for another political party while remaining within the CHP would be considered both unethical and subject to disciplinary rules.
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